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Background and objectives 
 
Understanding the behaviour of private consumption is crucial for the assessment of the 
economic situation in the short and the medium term. As the largest expenditure component 
of GDP, household spending plays a central role in the cyclical fluctuations of activity around 
its long-term growth path. According to consumption theory, households endeavour to smooth 
their spending over the life-cycle, a behaviour which should contribute to dampen the strength 
of cyclical downswings. However, recent developments in private consumption in the euro 
area have been disappointing. Since 2001, growth in private consumption has been 
persistently sluggish and has been much weaker than in some other EU countries or in the 
USA. Furthermore, after years of a declining trend, households have responded to 
deteriorating growth conditions with a rise in their saving rate in 2001-02. Since then their 
saving rate has remained broadly constant.  
 
Against this background the objective of the present study is to analyse the sources of country 
differences in the resilience of private consumption. The study is based on the combination of 
a macroeconomic and microeconomic approach. First, an extensive econometric investigation 
of the macroeconomic determinants of private consumption is carried out for all euro-area 
Member States (excluding Luxembourg), some other EU countries (UK, Sweden and 
Denmark) and the USA ("Part 1: Assessing the factors of resilience of private consumption in 
the euro area – A macroeconomic perspective"). Both country-specific regressions and panel 
regression techniques are applied to macroeconomic data with a view to understand the short-
term and long-term determinants of private consumption. Second, the macroeconomic 
analysis is completed by a microeconomic analysis based on household panel data ("Part 2: 
Determinants of household saving in Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom – A 
microeconomic assessment"). This part of the analysis, which is restricted to three countries 
(Germany, the UK and Spain), aims at taking advantage of microeconomic datasets to shed 
further light on the impact of income uncertainty, demographic changes and, indirectly, 
structural reforms on savings patterns.  
 
 
Macroeconomic analysis  
 
The macroeconomic section of the report undertakes extensive econometric investigation of 
the determinants of consumption in Europe and in the USA using macroeconomic quarterly 
data. We find that it is possible to explain consumption behaviour using traditional 
determinants (disposable income and net financial wealth) and that demographic 
developments and fiscal policy innovations contribute to the explanation. We also find a 
pervasive role for house price developments. These results help us to understand consumption 
developments in the last few years. We analyse the factors that have been behind weak 
consumption in the Euro Area, looking at forecast residuals and the decomposition of 
equations. We argue that changes in real personal disposable income have been the major 
factor behind weak growth in many countries, and that developments in financial and tangible 
(housing) wealth have also had some impact. There has also been residual weakness in 
consumption in Germany and Italy that may depend on recent changes in institutional 
environments such as social security and labour market reforms, although in Italy they are as  
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likely to be associated with weak supply side prospects. Consumption has also been weaker 
than we might anticipate on the basis of its determinants in Sweden, Finland, and Greece.  
 
As a first step, we develop a common basic econometric framework for all countries where 
changes in aggregate consumption are based not only on real net financial wealth and real 
personal disposable income, but also reflect changes in real house prices and real interest rates 
(instrumented appropriately). A consumption function is estimated for each of the 15 
countries considered. The estimated equations are specified as an error correction mechanism 
which captures both short-term and long-term relations between consumption and its 
determinants. We undertake panel data analysis in the same framework, and we report results. 
However, there is evidence from the panel estimation that the diversity of the European 
economies, especially in their dynamic responses, is significant. We would conclude from our 
panel work that assessing the factors causing slow consumption growth in Europe is better 
done using single equations with careful analysis of country-specific problems. 
 
Recognising the diversity and complexity of aggregate consumption patterns across the wide 
range of countries in our sample, we further augment our econometric specification by 
explicitly modelling the effects of demographic changes and government spending. 
Importantly, the analysis of the forecast errors suggests that these two additional determinants 
improves our understanding of consumption behaviour in some countries, while consumer 
spending remains puzzling in others and this suggests scope for further work. This exercise is 
repeated in the panel analysis.  
 
In both the single country studies and the panel estimation we also investigate the role of 
confidence, and find that it is seldom significant. However, where it is significant we find that 
it is Granger caused by wealth, but does not Granger cause wealth; consequently, it is 
redundant in evaluating both forecasts and equations of consumption. We also investigate the 
role of equity market volatility and of equilibrium unemployment as indicators of uncertainty, 
but we find no role for them except for the NAIRU in Spain and the US. In the latter two 
countries a rise in the NAIRU is associated with a rise in the savings ratio. We argue, 
however, that the significance of this term in the Spanish results is more than adequately 
picked up by the structural change dummies that have been included.  
 
Basic model specifications involving only income and wealth effects suggest that 
consumption is largely driven by changes in income in Germany, Austria, Belgium, and 
Portugal, all of which had relatively unliberalised financial systems for much of the sample. 
In these countries the long-run real income effects of over 90% suggest a degree of liquidity 
constrained behaviour as consumers are not able to borrow to smooth their consumption over 
time. By contrast, the long-run income effect in the US, the UK and Sweden is below around 
80%, as these countries have liberalised their financial markets in the late 1980s. They also 
have experienced major asset price fluctuations and/or banking crises, which may have 
prompted consumers to respond more actively to changes in asset values that are reflected in 
financial wealth holdings. The short run dynamics of income and financial wealth 
complement the long run elasticities – countries with strong dynamic income terms, such as 
Germany and Austria, tend to have weaker, if any, dynamic wealth terms. Not surprisingly, 
several Scandinavian countries along with the UK and the USA display the strongest dynamic 
wealth terms in the sample.  
 
The inclusion of real interest rates and house prices tends to improve the general fit of the 
equations suggesting that these variables are important determinants of consumption patterns 
in Europe and the USA. The change in real house prices was found to be statistically 
significant in Germany, the UK, the USA, the Netherlands, Spain, Portugal, and Scandinavian  
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countries. With the notable exception of Germany, all the countries with significant house 
price effects have experienced housing market booms in recent years. In the context of limited 
financial liberalisation and significant evidence of liquidity constrained behaviour, German 
house prices have not followed the upward trajectory seen in many other countries and our 
findings suggest that lacklustre housing market developments may have contributed to weak 
consumption growth in Germany.  
 
Changes in house prices did not have a statistically significant impact on aggregate 
consumption in France, Italy and Ireland – all countries where anecdotal evidence suggests a 
positive impact of rapidly rising house prices on consumption. The explanation of relative 
cycles in housing markets along with relatively recent strides in financial liberalisation may 
explain the statistical and economic insignificance of house prices on consumption in France 
and Italy. An additional possible explanation is that housing wealth effects are better captured 
by housing wealth data than by house price data. The case of Ireland may merit a somewhat 
different explanation: the rapid rise of nominal house prices may be more rooted in the 
impressive GDP and income growth over a sustained period of time. In this context, real 
house prices may be merely adjusting to the growing demand and prevailing income levels. 
 
The inclusion of population composition into the model suggests that demographic changes 
may help explain changes in aggregate consumption patterns in Germany, France, Italy, 
Spain, Sweden and the USA. That we did not find demographic composition to be important 
in more countries in our sample may be due to relatively small aggregate changes in the 
overall population composition in many European countries over the entire sample. Where 
deep and liquid financial markets existed for much of the time covered by our sample, they 
helped to smooth consumption and thus render demographic factors less relevant as explicit 
determinants of changes in consumption. Where the impact of population composition is 
statistically significant, it tends to be of similar economic magnitude. In general, an increase 
in the share of younger age groups tends to lift consumption growth while an increase in the 
share of older age groups tends to reduce it. However, the share of the very young and the 
very old cohorts are both negatively correlated with consumption in Germany, again pointing 
to a limited scale of consumption smoothing in that country. Furthermore, the proportion of 
people over 65 in Germany has been rising somewhat faster in recent years as compared to 
the 1990s and this too may have weakened consumption growth in recent years although this 
effect seems so far to have remained small. 
 
Overall, our findings indicate that fiscal developments have a limited impact on aggregate 
consumption. Changes in fiscal positions were found to be statistically significant in Spain, 
Sweden, Netherlands, Finland, Ireland and Italy and the results conformed to the accepted 
explanation of the Ricardian effects. Interestingly, significant level effects had a negative sign 
in the USA, confirming that US fiscal deficits have boosted consumption growth over the 
sample period. This may point to qualitatively different government spending in Europe as 
compared to the USA, but further analysis is needed to illuminate this point. 
 
 
Microeconomic analysis  
 
The microeconomic section of the report provides an analysis of savings behaviour based on 
household panel data in three countries (Germany, Spain and UK). Panel data were collected 
for the late 1990s and early 2000s (only 1998 and 2003 in the case of Germany). The 
microeconomic section draws on a graphical analysis of savings ratio by age and income 
cohorts as well as on estimated equations of savings behaviour. It aims at complementing the 
macroeconomic analysis which suggests that part of the recent weakness in private  
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consumption cannot be explained by traditional macroeconomic determinants in some 
Member States such as Germany.  
 
First and perhaps most importantly the microeconomic data shed some light on what has been 
happening in Germany, when the aggregate savings ratio rose slightly between 1998 and 
2003. Data by age and income cohort a-priori suggests that saving by households on middle 
and high incomes rose between these two years, with the effect being particularly marked 
among young households on high incomes. This is confirmed by econometric analysis which 
shows that the rise in the overall savings ratio between the two years may be mostly attributed 
to increased saving among households with high incomes. Such households can have a 
disproportionate influence on overall saving. In addition, the impression created from the 
fitted equations is that young people in Germany have a high savings ratio and this is 
probably what lies behind the overall savings ratio which can be described as high relative to 
other countries given that the pension scheme is not funded.  
 
Another aspect of the rise in savings rates in Germany is that savings rates of employed 
households in their thirties have increased between 1998 and 2003. This is unlikely to be a 
consequence of life-cycle saving which tends to take place closer to retirement. However it 
may be precautionary saving associated with a fear of unemployment. It is not possible to 
assess whether that is in fact the case because we cannot observe fears from the available data. 
However further study would make it possible to assess unemployment risk as influenced by 
economic and demographic variables and to establish whether a latent variable describing this 
had any influence on saving behaviour.  
 
An effect which emerges very clearly from the German data- which are of the highest quality 
of the three countries we studied both because the sample sizes are large and because the 
income questions are very methodical- is that an important influence on the pattern of 
aggregate saving by age is the composition of the population. Saving as a function of income 
may not change very much with age, but if people tend to move through income categories 
aggregate saving will be affected.  
 
Less important, but interesting nevertheless is the fact that employed households save more 
than non-employed households even after adjusting for income. This may again indicate 
saving driven by fear of unemployment. 
 
The pattern for Spain and the United Kingdom is less clear. In neither case can we match the 
movements in the micro-data to movements in the macro-economic aggregates. For both 
countries and particularly for Spain, savings patterns are much more volatile than they are for 
Germany. This results from much smaller samples and, in the case of Spain a survey which is 
much more focused on collecting consumption than income data. However the overall 
Spanish data give an impression of high saving by young households but declining with age, 
unlike Germany where it is increasing with age. Estimated regressions, particularly for low 
and middle income households, reinforce this impression and this may be a factor behind 
Spain’s high overall savings rate.  
 
The United Kingdom offers a contrast to this continental picture of high saving by young 
people. The data indicate a savings rate which rises up to the age of thirty at least with further 
rises up to the age of fifty or later. The estimated regressions present this picture rather more 
strongly, with low saving by young people and even those on high incomes. Unless young 
people on high incomes expect further relative increases with the passage of time it is unlikely 
that the low savings rates can be attributed to life-cycle effects; they are more probably an 




We explored the effects of income uncertainty in all three countries using the measures which 
were available. We found a strong positive influence of income uncertainty on saving in the 
United Kingdom. In Germany we did not identify a significant effect. In Spain, where the 
only indicator of income uncertainty was constructed from the ratio of actual to normal 
income, the variable entered the equation with the wrong sign. It is impossible to say whether 
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1 Introduction 
The macroeconomic section of the project report provides a literature survey on aggregate 
consumption and saving, details the construction of a dataset, and provides an extended 
econometric assessment of determinants of aggregate consumption. We seek to cover all euro 
area countries (except Luxembourg), Sweden, Denmark, the UK and the US. Our principal 
analysis of consumption and saving at a macro level is based on recent developments in 
economics and econometrics and builds on work at the National Institute, as detailed in the 
references below. We undertake panel or single-country estimation for error correction 
models of aggregate consumption using quarterly data, with the objective of explaining recent 
behaviour rather than just attempting to test recent theories, although our results also throw 
light on their relevance. Static and dynamic residual analysis casts light on the recent cross-
country patterns of consumption and causes of weak consumption in the Euro Area. We 
present decompositions of the factors affecting consumption derived from our preferred 
equations. These provide a good explanation of behaviour given all the factors that we study 
and hence can be used to explain weak consumption. 
 
In the second section we report on average growth of consumption, personal disposable 
incomes and real financial wealth on average from 1990 to 2001 and then in each subsequent 
year. It is clear from this table that we have some developments to explain in Germany, and to 
a lesser extent in Italy, Finland, and Portugal, Otherwise, the three variables seem to tell a 
coherent story, with low income growth being accompanied by low consumption growth. Our 
empirical work suggests that we can explain much of the weakness in consumption in these 
countries, but not all of it, and that in Germany there are clearly developments that are 
difficult to capture in time series analyses. In general weak consumption is largely explained 
by weak growth in real personal disposable incomes, but other factors are contributing. 
 
It is commonly assumed that aggregate consumption is largely a function of current real 
disposable incomes, and hence weak income growth explains sluggish consumption. Such an 
explanation is indeed consistent with the most basic textbook analysis of consumption based 
on Keynes’ absolute income hypothesis and its popularization by Hicks and Hansen. 
However, recent consumption weakness in Europe may not be fully explained by weak 
income growth. Indeed, other factors appear to have been at work. However, these generally 
make a rather small contribution to our explanation with the exception of house price effects 
in a number of countries, and some of our variables, such as demographic indicators, evolve 
slowly over time and hence cannot be expected to make a contribution to explaining a sharp 
slowdown in consumption. 
 
These additional effects and their link to income can be rationalised in the context of the life 
cycle hypothesis of consumption and saving. This framework forms the baseline for a great 
deal of empirically usable work on consumption, suggesting as it does that consumers 
accumulate assets during working life so as to live on the surplus during retirement (Ando and 
Modigliani 1963). Accordingly, planned consumption is a function of total wealth, based on 
human wealth and non-human wealth. This can be seen in the version of the Life-Cycle 
Hypothesis as derived in Deaton (1992). In this model, planned consumption (
*
t C ) is a 
function of total wealth. Total wealth is the sum of human wealth ( t H ) and non-human 
wealth ( 1 − t W ).  
 




− + = t t t W H m C              (1.1)  
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where m is the Marginal Propensity to Consume (MPC) out of total resources on average 
across the population. Meanwhile, unobservable human wealth can be proxied by some 
function k of current labour income (i.e.  t t kY H = ). The coefficient on human wealth (i.e. 
income) will be boosted when there are liquidity constraints on the availability of credit, since 
it implies that current consumption is closely tied to receipts of current income. Ultimately 
with liquidity constraints and no liquid wealth the equation would reduce to the naïve 
Keynesian equation with income only. More realistically, the ability to consume out of 
wealth, and in particular illiquid wealth, is enhanced when there are no liquidity constraints, 
and such wealth can be used to enhance consumption smoothing over time – either directly 
via decumulation or as security for borrowing. Hence we should expect that the dynamics of 
adjustment and the long run equilibrium in consumption equations will be influenced by the 
existence of liquidity constraints.  
 
An indicator of the incidence of liquidity constraints can be constructed from the relative size 
of both the short and long run coefficients on income and those on financial and non-financial 
wealth terms in the consumption function. When there are no credit constraints, as in a 
liberalised financial system, the impact of current income in the short and long run should be 
lower, since consumers can borrow to cover shortfalls in income. Correspondingly, the short 
and long run impact of wealth will be greater, since it can be either directly decumulated or 
used as collateral for borrowing. On the other hand, we might expect to see a relatively larger 
role for recent changes in income in systems with more liquidity constrained consumers, 
whilst financial and especially non-financial wealth may have more influence when liquidity 
constraints are lower.  
 
In assessing their current and future permanent income, consumers may take into account 
current fiscal policy (as they will anticipate repaying debt in future taxes in a Ricardian 
manner). Expected fiscal changes of governments (e.g. to pay for pension promises) will also 
be relevant, albeit harder to proxy. Uncertainty may be expected to reduce consumption for a 
given configuration of income and wealth, if the consumer accordingly requires a higher level 
of precautionary saving. Confidence indicators or share price volatility might show these 
effects. Demographic effects may also be important if the propensity to consume varies 
consistently in respect of age, as is implicit in the life cycle model. We explore these points in 
further detail below. 
 
Recent studies by Institute staff, detailed in an annex, and our work in this paper use the 
ARDL (autoregressive distributed lag) approach to estimation, with an error correction 
specification, as indeed do recent studies in the US such as Davis and Palumbo (2001) and 
Lettau and Ludvigson (2004). We note that there is an alternative approach to the theory of 
consumption based on the Euler equation, which seeks to aggregate the optimal intertemporal 
consumption decision of a representative consumer characterised by rational expectations 
(Hall 1978). This suggests that consumption should be a random walk with a discount factor 
such as the real interest rate being the only relevant driving variable. The negative discount 
factor proxies the effect on consumption of intertemporal substitution (“the reward from 
saving”).  
 
While there is extensive empirical work with such equations in the US, it has become 
increasingly clear that consumption is in practice forecastable using additional lagged 
variables, notably income changes predicted from lagged information. Furthermore, the Euler 
approach in its pure sense leaves out long run information on the relationship between assets, 
income and consumption – and may suffer worse aggregation problems than “solved out” 
equations incorporating lags (Muellbauer and Lattimore 1995). The theory is also vitiated by  
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its assumption that all consumers are unconstrained in credit markets (Sarantis and Stewart 
2003), and observed behaviour may be the result of some consumers optimising along an 
Euler relationship whilst others adjust consumption in relation to their current income. On the 
other hand, it is possible to nest an Euler specification within an ARDL model by including 
the current real interest rate, as do Barrell and Davis (2004a). The results show decisively that 
consumption is not appropriately modelled as a function of the interest rate alone, given the 
additional significance of differenced and levels terms in consumption itself, income and 
wealth. 
 
The principal quarterly data needed for consumption estimation are aggregate consumption, 
real personal disposable income and net financial wealth (with real wealth derived using the 
consumers’ expenditure deflator). These are drawn from standard sources and are as 
employed in the NiGEM model (Barrell et al 2003) and are discussed in the appendix. The 
data set is approximately complete, but some wealth data for Greece and Ireland have been 
constructed by NIESR as these series are not available from official sources after 1997. In 
addition some wealth data is constructed for the last year of our estimation period. Quarterly 
data on consumption and income for some countries has only been available since the 1990s, 
and although back series have now been constructed, it is clear that in, for instance, Belgium, 
Greece, Ireland and Denmark the data series do not have the same time series properties in the 
1970s as in the 1990s. 
 
In this study we find that it is possible to explain consumption with income and wealth 
effects, but we have to be careful with dynamics, add structural breaks, and utilise other 
variables where appropriate. Our preferred relationships include the growth of house prices in 
all countries except Austria, Italy, France, Belgium, Ireland Portugal and the Netherlands. 
Fiscal effects are present in Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden, Ireland, Italy, Greece and the 
US, mainly as dynamic effects, and population factors help explain consumption in the US, 
France, Sweden and the Netherlands. There are clear unexplained effects in Germany, Italy 
and Sweden in these equations. 
 
2  Background data and previous studies 
Before estimating equations it is worth asking what problems we think we might have to 
explain, and table 1 reports on average income, consumption and real financial wealth growth 
from 1990 to 2001, and compares this average to the developments in the three subsequent 
years. If consumption, income, and wealth are all growing at about the same rate there would 
be little to explain. If consumption is growing relatively more slowly in the recent past, given 
developments in income and wealth, then we might need to look for an explanation.  
 
In France consumption growth has been more robust than we might have anticipated given 
data on income and wealth, whilst in Germany, apart from 2004, very weak income and 
wealth growth could explain weak consumption, but at first glance it does look as if it has 
been additionally weak. Italian consumption looks weak, but so does income growth, and 
there may be unexplained weakness. In Belgium consumption growth has been marginally 
weak, whilst both income and wealth (until 2004) were very weak. In Finland all three 
variables have been strong. Spanish, Greek and Irish consumption looks robust. Although 
Dutch consumption is weak, it also could be explained by income developments, as could 
Austrian weakness. Portuguese consumption looks as if it moves closely with income growth. 
From a simple analysis of the data we would expect to be looking for an explanation of weak 
consumption growth in Germany, much more than in other countries. There may also be a 
need to explain weak consumption growth in Italy, the Netherlands, Austria and perhaps 
Portugal.   
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Table 1:   Growth in key variables  
(Annual percentage change) 
 BGC  BGRPDI  BGRNW    DKC DKRPDI  DKRNW 
Average 1990-2001  2.0 1.9 1.8  1.6  1.5  6.9 
2002  0.3 0.9 -7.8   0.6  1.9  -8.9 
2003  2.2 0.9 -6.1   0.9  1.1  3.3 
2004  2.1 0.8 5.1  4.3  2.9  10.9 
            
 FNC  FNRPDI  FNRNW    FRC FRRPDI  FRRNW 
Average 1990-2001  1.1 1.0 4.8  1.7  2.3  5.4 
2002  1.6 3.0 3.5  2.3  3.2  0.0 
2003  4.4 5.2 2.1  1.6  1.1  4.6 
2004  2.8 5.2  16.7   2.3  1.7  5.8 
            
 GEC  GERPDI  GERNW    GRC GRRPDI  GRRNW 
Average 1990-2001  3.6 3.5 5.0  2.3  1.5  9.7 
2002  -0.5 0.0 6.6   3.3  2.0  -0.5 
2003  0.1 0.6 -2.7   4.5  2.5  1.5 
2004  0.2 0.7  10.6   4.4  6.6  0.9 
            
 IRC  IRRPDI  IRRNW    ITC ITRPDI  ITRNW 
Average 1990-2001  5.0 5.2 6.8  1.7  0.3  4.3 
2002  3.6 3.3  -25.9   0.4  0.6  -8.7 
2003  3.4 0.3 -7.9   1.4  -0.1  3.8 
2004  3.8 3.2  35.2   1.0  1.6  6.0 
            
 NLC  NLRPDI  NLRNW    OEC OERPDI  OERNW 
Average 1990-2001  2.7 2.1 4.1  2.2  1.4  0.5 
2002  0.9 1.6  -14.4   -0.1  0.1  0.7 
2003  -0.7 -0.7 2.6    0.6  1.4  4.4 
2004  0.0 -0.4 3.8   1.5  0.6  4.5 
            
 PTC  PTRPDI  PTRNW    SDC SDRPDI  SDRNW 
Average 1990-2001  2.8 2.9 -2.9   1.3  2.4  2.5 
2002  1.2 0.8 -1.5   1.4  2.2 -13.4 
2003  -0.4 -0.1 -1.6   1.5  1.1  -3.3 
2004  2.5 2.1  37.5   1.8  1.4  14.1 
            
 SPC  SPRPDI  SPRNW    UKC UKRPDI  UKRNW 
Average 1990-2001  2.7 2.7 5.4  2.6  2.8  5.3 
2002  2.9 3.6 -7.5   3.5  1.7 -13.8 
2003  2.6 3.1 1.3  2.6  2.8  -7.2 
2004  4.4 3.2 5.1  3.7  2.1  4.8 
           
 USC  USRPDI  USRNW       
Average 1990-2001  3.3 2.8 4.6      
2002  2.7 3.4 -9.9        
2003  2.9 2.6 0.5       
2004  3.9 3.5 8.6       
 
Key: C real consumption; RPDI real personal disposable income, RNW real personal net financial wealth.  
 
 
The statistical properties of our consumption, income and wealth data are set out in Table 2 
which indicates the data range and reports ADF tests on these data. In general the logs of the  
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data are not stationary, but once first differenced, they are, and hence the series are of order 1. 
It is therefore possible that for each country, consumption, income and wealth represent a 
cointegrating set.  
 
Table 2:   Full data period and ADF tests 
 Data 
sample 
LC LRPDI  LRNW  DLC  DLRDPI  DLRNW 
Belgium  70q2-03q4 -3.4  -2.2  -3.6 -5.7  -8.5  -7.1 
Denmark  71q2-03q4 -2.1  -4.3  -2.0 -7.0  -7.1  -6.8 
Finland  79q2-03q4 -1.6  -2.8  -1.3 -4.3  -5.5  -4.6 
France  70q1-03q4 -2.6  -1.8  -2.9 -5.9  -11.2  -6.5 
Germany  71q1-03q4 -1.4  -1.5  -3.9 -9.0  -8.5  -10.1 
Greece  64q2-03q4 -3.2  -2.8  -2.1 -7.4  -4.1  -7.2 
Ireland  77q2-03q3 -1.0  -1.1  -3.0 -2.5  -5.9  -5.5 
Italy  72q1-03q4 -2.2  -1.4  -0.4 -4.9  -9.8  -7.8 
Netherlands  70q2-03q4 -1.0  -3.13  -3.8 -6.6  -9.5  -8.5 
Austria  70q2-04q1 -4.4  -2.8  -2.5  -11.2  -8.0  -5.8 
Portugal  80q3-02q4 -2.0  -3.0  -2.1 -3.9  -4.6  -5.6 
Sweden  61q2-03q4 -2.6  -2.0  -1.7 -5.4  -6.6  -7.1 
Spain  70q2-03q4 -1.5  -1.5  -2.4 -4.0  -10.0  -5.2 
US  61q2-04q2 -3.1  -3.6  -1.9 -6.5  -8.7  -8.4 
UK  64q2-03q4 -1.5  -2.3  -2.1 -7.8  -9.0  -8.5 
 
Key: LC is the log of real consumption; LRPDI the log of real personal disposable income, LRNW the log of real 
personal net financial wealth, a “D” prefix indicates the difference of the relevant variable. Critical value for a 
unit root at 95% level is -2.9 
 
In order to evaluate the differential evolution of consumption in Europe we need access to 
wider ranges of data. These include estimates of real three month money market interest rates, 
consumer confidence indicators and fiscal balances. House price data is available from the 
BIS or ECB for all euro area countries, and it has been used in Barrell, Davis and Pomerantz 
(2004). Demographic data are drawn from the UN Demographic database (UN Population 
Division 2004). We use monthly share price data from Primark Datastream to derive the 
conditional volatility of equity prices. The indicators of the equilibrium level of 
unemployment that we use were provided by the Commission. The real interest rate, which is 
defined in a forward looking manner as the current short rate less annualised one-quarter 
ahead inflation, is a constructed variable that measures the true indicator with error and hence 
it is instrumented. Data for the tangible (mainly housing) wealth of households has been 
located for a subset of euro area countries, namely Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands 
and Ireland, as well as for the UK and the US. As this data set is incomplete we discuss 
consumption with housing wealth effects in a separate section.  
 
The macroeconomic effects of changes in employment legislation and pensions policies in the 
Euro Area were modelled via addition of dummy variables. These were based on a number of 
sources including the FRDB Social Reforms Database, which is compiled by Fondazione 
Rodolfo Debenedetti. The database includes details of the reforms in the following areas: 
pensions, employment protection and non-employment benefits. Data for all the Euro Area 
countries are included from 1987/1988 to 2001/2002. Since changes to social policies are 
ongoing in most countries, only years with structural reforms were used in the econometric 
estimation. In cases where several marginal reforms together added up to a substantial 
package of changes, this was included in estimation also. The information on when the 
reforms were announced was proxied by the starting quarter for the dummy variable in an 
attempt to model the effects of social reforms as accurately as possible in the context of a  
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macroeconomic model specification. (An Appendix contains a list of country specific reforms 
which were chosen for this exercise.) 
 
In order to formally test the validity of the long run cointegrating relation between 
consumption, income and wealth, we run a series of regressions on the logs of these variables 
and conduct standard ADF tests on the residuals. Table 3 details the results for three 
regressions, where the first has unrestricted coefficients, the second imposes homogeneity 
across income and wealth effects, and the third repeats the first equation with the addition of a 
single step-dummy in the spirit of Perron (1989). Where it is possible, we have used the 
FRDB dataset to identify periods of reform measures to construct Perron-step variables. 
 
Table 3:   Long run cointegrating relations ADF tests 
 BG  DK  FN  FR  GE  GR  IR  IT 
















E  -2.108 -2.405 -3.074 -2.291 -2.536 -4.398 -3.992 -3.433 
E*  -2.109 -2.408 -3.016 -1.520 -2.254 -2.118 -4.062 -3.168 
E**  -2.652 -4.106 -2.994 -2.702 -3.477 -5.485 -3.519 -3.926 
          
 NL  OE  PT  SD  SP  UK  US   













04Q4   
E  -2.103 -2.081 -2.636 -2.807 -4.588 -1.766 -2.798   
E*  -2.496 -1.289 -2.126 -1.882 -4.122 -1.823 -1.805   
E**  -4.151 -1.982 -4.373 -3.105 -4.893 -2.197  --   
a Fourth order ADF test statistics reported 
b Residuals E reported from the following cointegrating regressions where “delta” is a 
step dummy : 
1.  lnC = a + b*lnRPDI + c*lnRNW + E 
2.  lnC = a + b*lnRPDI + (1-b)* lnRNW + E* 
3.  lnC = a + b*lnRPDI + c*lnRNW + delta + E** 
 
Dummys based on the FRDB dataset were included for Belgium, 1997 pensions reform; 
Finland, 1991 employment reform; France, 2000 employment reforms; Italy, 1995 pensions 
reforms; UK, 1996 non employment benefits reforms; and Spain, 1992 for unemployment 
benefit reforms and 1997 pensions reforms. Dummies were also included for the impacts of 
deregulation of the financial market in the UK, with 1989 chosen as the central year, for the 
post 1980 impacts of the Wassenauer agreements in the Netherlands (see Barrell and Genre 
(1999 for details), the deep structural reforms that began in the Swedish welfare state in 1992, 
and for the impacts on French consumption of ERM and Maastricht related policy changes in 
1992. There is also clear evidence of structural break in the data during the re-unification of 
Germany, and this may reflect either a change in behaviour or the differences between West 
and unified Germany. 
 
Overall, the test statistics do not reveal strong cointegrating relations. However, it is 
instructive to note that reform-based step equations (based on E**) find significant 
improvements in the test statistics when there is little difference between the first two 
equations (E and E*). This clearly holds for Denmark, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, and 
Portugal, with positive, but slighter improvements for Belgium, France, Italy, and the UK. 
Indeed, the sample lengths employed are considerable and, as illustrated in the FRDB dataset, 
speckled with various reforms which can give rise to structural shifts. It is well known in the 
literature that such shifts can give rise to a unit root in a series when, in fact, it would 
otherwise be found to be stationary (see Perron (1989)). Therefore, without taking account of 
every potential break in the data, it would be difficult to conclude that these relations fail to  
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cointegrate. In addition, at this stage we have not included any of the other variables, such as 
house prices, that might determine consumption, and hence we cannot yet conclude that no 
cointegration is common. Another measure for assessing a cointegrating relation is advocated 
by Banerjee et al. (1993) which suggests that, in a full error correction model, finding an 
ECM term with a t-statistic greater than 3 (in absolute value) provides strong evidence of a 
cointegrating relation.  
 
Issues raised by the consumption literature. 
Following equation (1.1), if we assume that planned consumption does not always equal 
actual consumption and that human wealth can be proxied by some function k of current 
labour income (i.e.  t t kLY H = ) we can derive the following relationship for actual 
consumption ( t C ) 
 
t t t t bW aLY C ε + + = −1          (2.1) 
 
Our approach is consistent with that of Lettau and Ludwigson (2004), although we use a 
different definition of wealth and income, as there are no housing wealth data available for 
most countries in this study. Hence, we use a different definition of income, as the absence of 
housing wealth suggests we should use an income variable that includes income from 
housing. Lettau and Ludwigson (2004) argue that when wealth changes one must distinguish 
between the signal about longer run prospects one reads from the change and the noise related 
to temporary fluctuations in market values. We denote the structural component of wealth as 
W* and the transitory component as (W-W*). We would expect that the propensity to 
consume out of transitory wealth would be much lower than out of permanent wealth (i.e. 
v1>>v2 below). A rise in equity or bond prices may reflect changes in long term interest rates 
or market perceptions of the future value of the equity stock that do not impact on the income 
flow from the asset, which we would denote r*W*. If wealth is held only for the income flow, 
then it would be wise to use the flow in our relationship, and not wealth. We may write this as  
 










− − − − − − + + + = + = t t t t t t t t t W W v W v W r k kLY m W kLY m C .     (2.2) 
 
If k=k1 then we should use total income instead of labour income in our regressions in order to 
avoid polluting (and perhaps exaggerating) our estimates of the effects of wealth. However, it 
is possible that wealth is held for precautionary reasons, as Carroll (2001) stresses, and not 
only for its income flow or its ability to shift consumption over time. Hence we should 
include both the income flow and the level of wealth, but also distinguish in our analysis 
between transitory and permanent changes in wealth. Hence we use the approximation 
 
t t t t bRNW aRPDI C ε + + = −1          (2.3) 
 
Where RPDI is total real personal disposable income and RNW is real net financial wealth, 
excluding tangible assets. This equation is also appropriate in a forecasting context, as it saves 
splitting income into components. 
 
However, this approximation of consumption behaviour has problems in describing 
consumption, income and wealth relationships, especially in growing economies. As 
suggested by Campbell and Deaton (1989), real income in levels is unlikely to be difference 
stationary. In particular, the first difference of the level of income does not display constant 
variance; earlier increases in the level of income, in any reasonable sample of data, are likely 
to be substantially less than increases later in the sample.  
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This non-constant variance would mean any long-run relationship for consumption would be 
potentially spurious, given that not all of our variables are difference stationary, and a short 
run error correction model (ECM) for consumption would have non-stationary dynamics. 
Campbell and Deaton (1989) argue that most logarithmic specifications fit the data much 
better than estimating the linear relationship, say, between the ratio of consumption to income 
and the ratio of wealth to income. It is clearly also much easier to analyse the dynamics of 
adjustment within a logarithmic model. Consequently we adopt a logarithmic approximation 
for equation (2.3) to ensure that income, in natural logs, is difference stationary and hence that 
our long-run relationship can be non-spurious. The logarithmic approximation is as follows 
 
t t t t RNW RPDI c C ξ β α + + + = −1 0 ln ln ln        (2.4) 
 
In the presence of non-stationary data, we avoid using a static regression approach by utilising 
a dynamic error correction model, as advocated by Banerjee et al. (1993). Consequently, the 
estimated models feature a common error-correction formulation, with the long run, derived 
from (2.5), having terms in consumption, real personal disposable income and real net wealth, 
and short run dynamics and the real interest rate are added.  
 
Our econometric approach hence involves the following consumption specification, with the 
observed real interest rate being instrumented as it is a proxy indicator for the underlying 
expected real interest rate: 
 
1 1
1 2 1 1 1 1 0
* ln * ln *
ln * ln * ln * ln
− − −
− − −
+ + ∆ + ∆ +
+ + + = ∆
t t k t i j t i
t t t t
dRR RR RPDI RNW
RNW RPDI C C
δ δ γ γ
β β α α
     (2.5) 
 
In this context, the presence of variables other than the intercept and the real interest rate 
(RRt) allows us to test for the validity of the Euler equation representation.  
 
Housing wealth and consumption 
Housing wealth can be allowed for in a consumption function in two different ways. We 
mainly follow the strand in the literature on consumption that uses changes in real house 
prices as an indicator of the potential impact of tangible wealth on consumption (see Ludwig 
and Sloek (2002)). Accordingly, we test for the difference of real house prices as a proxy for 
the dynamic impacts of tangible wealth, in addition to the log-difference of real net financial 
wealth. This permits a wide country coverage, since house prices are generally available. 
However, it is not feasible to include house prices in the long run solution, as they are not in 
the same dimension as housing wealth, because they are an index
2. Hence it is not possible to 
calculate a marginal propensity to consume out of housing wealth, and the omission may bias 
results. 
 
What one would ideally need is an estimate of the total stock of wealth in order that one can 
evaluate the relative impact of a one unit of currency change in net financial wealth as 
compared to a unit of non-financial wealth. These data are generally not available for euro 
area countries, and an appendix discusses results for countries where this data is available, 
and also looks at the existing literature, summarised by Catte et al (2004a). This study also 
investigates the role of housing equity withdrawal in consumption functions, and our 
comments on this are also discussed in the annex.  
                                                 
2 Housing wealth is the house price multiplied by the housing stock, or HWt = PHt*HSt. Without the housing 
stock it is impossible to scale the effects of house prices in the regression.  
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Demography  
A corollary of the life cycle hypothesis is that a population which is unevenly distributed 
across age cohorts will have a separate demographic influence on aggregate saving behaviour. 
Omission of demographics (implicitly assuming a “representative-agent” approach is 
accurate) is likely to lead to errors in analysis and forecasting of consumption. Pioneering 
work in this area was by Fair and Dominguez (1991); Attfield and Cannon (2003) apply their 
work to the UK using a vector-error-correction approach. A further key background empirical 
paper is Masson et al (1995) who found the total dependency ratio to have a significant 
negative effect on private saving in a panel of both advanced and developing countries.  
 
Following these studies, we test for demographic effects on consumption over and above the 
standard determinants, using the age cohorts 20-39, 40-64 and 65+ relative to the population. 
We note that most earlier work on demographics and consumption, as well as having fewer 
data points, also featured much more simple approaches to consumption estimation. It is 
important to investigate demographic effects in a fully specified model, as it may be possible 
that some of the impacts of demography on consumption are shared with wealth, which is 
accumulated in part to ensure the consumption smoothing that cohort evolution necessitates, 
only with the inclusion of both will we be able to evaluate correctly the separate effects.  
 
A growing amount of empirical work suggests that personal saving is importantly influenced 
by pension arrangements and pension reform (World Bank (1994), Davis (1995)). In 
principle, funding of pensions could generate increased saving (Kohl and O’Brien (1998)). 
Illiquidity of pension assets may mean that other household wealth may not be reduced one-
to-one when pension assets increase. Interaction between the need for retirement income and 
retirement behaviour may increase saving in a growing economy, as workers increase saving 
to provide for an earlier planned retirement. As unfunded social security is typically seen to 
reduce saving, because it implies an accumulation of implicit claims on future income, a 
switch toward funding of pensions should increase it (Feldstein 1995). There might be 
‘recognition effect’ as people who witness the transition via pension reform from PAYG to 
funded systems realise the importance of saving for retirement. Tax incentives that raise the 
rate of return on saving via life insurance or pension funds may encourage higher aggregate 
saving. (McCarthy and Neuberger 2004).For recent empirical analyses of the positive effect 
on saving from funding of pensions, see Bosworth and Burtless (2004), while on the implicit 
wealth accumulation in pay-as-you-go systems reducing saving see Rossi and Visco (1995) 
and Feldstein (1995). However, these important issues are impossible to address in a macro-
economic context except through the use of policy related dummy variables as in the 
discussion of the FRDB database. 
 
Ricardian effects and consumption 
Ricardian effects are tested by inclusion of appropriate variables reflecting government 
expenditures, deficits and/or debt ratios in the basic consumption specification. We note that 
in the empirical literature there have been a number of studies looking at fiscal effects on 
consumption, most of which have rejected Ricardian equivalence. For example Masson et al 
(1995) find a Ricardian offset from fiscal expansion raising household income of around 50% 
in 21 advanced countries, while Giavazzi et al (2000) reject Ricardian equivalence for a panel 
of 18 OECD countries. However, both OECD (2004) and Pomerantz and Weale (2005) find 
impacts of government surpluses on the savings rate using panel data analysis across a range 
of countries. Their results suggest that a one per cent of GDP increase in the government 
surplus would reduce private sector saving by around 2/3rds of that amount, leaving national 
saving increased. However, these studies use reduced form explanations and do not look 
directly at the determinants of consumption, and part of the result could come, for instance, 
through the impact of government borrowing on real interest rates.  
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As noted in Hemming et al (2002), there are a number of difficulties to be faced in estimating 
Ricardian equivalence in consumption, notably there is a need to include government 
spending which affects permanent income even in a Ricardian world, as otherwise there may 
be overestimation of other government variables. Also there is a signalling effect of debt 
financed tax cuts on future spending and taxation, which may vary between countries and 
over time. In this context it will be relevant to consider future impacts of fiscal policy in the 
context of the ageing of the population and the costs of pension systems, as illustrated in Dang 
et al (2001), Casey et al (2003) and Bogaert and Cotis (2001). Our own approach is simply to 
add the difference and lagged level of the fiscal position to the standard consumption 
function. The difference is instrumented given possible simultaneity with consumption. These 
coefficients give a preliminary indication of the degree of Ricardian behaviour in the 
European economies, and it is significant, albeit noticeably smaller than the reduced form 
estimates would suggest. 
 
Consumer confidence, uncertainty and structural reforms 
Both ongoing structural reforms and rising concerns related to the implications of aging could 
impact on consumption through their effects on the confidence consumers have in their 
income prospects. We attempt to incorporate the standard consumer confidence indicators in 
the consumption function, while noting that these may largely reflect short term issues such as 
the risk of unemployment. We also include indicators of the volatility of wealth, and of the 
equilibrium level of unemployment. We include these as they may both increase the need for 
precautionary saving. More volatile wealth may raise saving as may the risk of 
unemployment. An increase in equilibrium unemployment for given level of expected 
incomes will increase the expected volatility of incomes as the chances that individuals pass 
through spells of unemployment are increased.  
 
The role of consumer confidence indicators is very similar to that of financial wealth, as this 
will reflect forward looking information contained in the equity markets. US evidence from 
Ludvigson (2004) shows that in that country, confidence does contain forward looking 
information but much of that information can be provided by other popular economic and 
financial indicators, and independent information provided is limited. There is thought to be a 
partial link to future income growth and non-stock-market wealth, although there remains a 
residual not accounted for by these variables. Although we can justify a separate role for 
confidence indicators, we would expect that we would find them significant but unimportant 
in a wider panel than the countries in Pain and Weale (2001).  
 
As an alternative to direct confidence indicators, we use a conditional volatility indicator for 
the factors affecting consumer confidence, namely the conditional volatility of share prices 
derived from a GARCH model. Byrne and Davis (2004) undertook extensive research on the 
impact of such uncertainty indicators in respect of fixed investment, and found exchange rate 
volatility had a significant negative impact on investment. Rather less has been done on 
consumption, which is paradoxical given the focus of the “Consumption CAPM” asset pricing 
model on the links from equity markets to consumption. Nevertheless, we note that some 
relevant work using GARCH has been undertaken in Japan, where Oyama and Yoshida 
(1999) found an impact of uncertainty on consumption in Japan – but not in Germany or the 
US - including the error on a first order GARCH model in income in the aggregate 
consumption function. An alternative proxy suggested by Maravall and Planas (1999) is the 
standard error of a one period ahead forecast error from a univariate time series model for 
personal income. We can also compare the inclusion of confidence/uncertainty indicators to 
the work we have undertaken on the micro data sets that takes account of the uncertainty of 




Annex:   NIESR work on consumption  
Barrell, Byrne and Dury (2003) found evidence of an effect of net financial wealth as well as 
income on consumption in the European economies, and tested in a panel context for 
differences between European countries. They found that it is possible to show that France, 
Germany, the Netherlands and Austria have similar consumption behaviour with significant 
financial wealth effects, but with some difference in the dynamics of adjustment. Byrne and 
Davis (2003) analysed the impact of disaggregated financial wealth on consumption for G-7 
countries, and found that, contrary to earlier empirical work, illiquid financial wealth, 
(equities, bonds, life insurance and pension assets less mortgage debt) scaled by personal 
disposable income (PDI), tends to be a more significant long-run determinant of consumption 
than liquid financial wealth (deposits and money market instruments less other debt) across 
the G-7. They suggested that this pattern reflects a shift from liquidity constrained to life 
cycle behaviour following financial liberalisation, and also a more disaggregated pattern of 
wealth holding. Results were robust in SUR analysis, tested in a nested manner, using varying 
definitions of liquid assets and using non-property income instead of personal disposable 
income. 
 
Barrell and Choy (2003) and Barrell and Davis (2004a) estimated consumption functions for 
the UK and the G-5 respectively, in the latter on a country-by-country and on a SUR panel 
basis (including pooled mean group estimation), which encapsulate roles for both financial 
and tangible wealth, where the latter is closely linked to the value of the stock of privately 
owned housing. Results suggest that housing-related tangible wealth plays a distinctive role in 
the determination of consumption in the short- and long-run. They also detected a marked 
negative effect of real interest rates. 
 
An alternative to use of tangible wealth is non-financial asset prices. Analysts suggest that 
these have played a role in the evolution of consumption in many countries. Using GLS panel 
estimation for 19 countries, Barrell, Davis and Pomerantz (2004) found such a role for house 
prices in consumption, where the short run effect of a given rise in house prices on 
consumption far exceeded that of net financial wealth. Their estimates were used to analyse 
the effect of a banking or currency crisis on consumption, and the work showed that 
consumption plays an important role in the macroeconomic adjustment following a financial 
crisis. Furthermore, the effect of a crisis is aggravated by high leverage, notably as shown by 
the effect of a high debt-income ratio, despite the benefits of financial liberalisation in easing 
liquidity constraints. It is also greater in a small open economy than in the G-7. Meanwhile, 
falling house prices were shown to be part of the transmission process of financial instability, 
and high nominal interest rates are an indicator of sharp declines in consumption. 
 
Barrell and Davis (2004b) sought to assess directly the impact of financial liberalisation on 
consumption. Their prior view is that the removal of liquidity constraints during liberalisation 
may reduce the response of consumption to short run changes in real personal disposable 
income, and may boost wealth effects correspondingly. They accordingly reported estimates 
of the significance of leveraged dummies for financial liberalisation within consumption 
functions featuring both tangible and financial wealth for the G-5 and two smaller OECD 
countries for which data are available, namely Canada and Sweden. The results are consistent 
with marked shifts in consumer behaviour over the five years following liberalisation, with a 
greater degree of consumption smoothing. They also find that wealth effects become more 
relevant and convergence to the desired consumption path is more rapid after liberalisation.  
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Al Eyd, Barrell and Holland (2005) investigate the role of wealth effects and find that 
financial market openness is clearly a factor behind the propagation of shocks in the world 
economy. They argue that it would be wrong to conclude that financial market openness has 
been a major factor behind coordinated movements in output. There is evidence that equity 
prices affect consumption in most economies, but the evidence to support a direct effect on 
investment is weak, at least outside the US and the UK. Work on the determinants of 
consumption suggests that the impact of changes in wealth on consumption in the Euro Area 
is, as least in the short term, small, although it builds up over time.  
 
Al Eyd et al (2005) undertake two sets of experiments, and show that the pattern of fiscal 
multipliers is dominated by openness to trade, but that openness to foreign financial markets, 
as measured by Gross assets to GDP, reduces the scale of the multiplier, as do overall 
holdings of wealth. Some crowding out does come from domestic holdings of equities. They 
also undertake equity price shocks that are temporary, and in general when they shock Euro 
Area equity markets, the effects are small. It is clear that equity price shocks that originate in 
the US have significantly greater impacts than those that originate in Europe. Spillovers from 
global equity price shocks account for 80 to 90 per cent of the impacts of a global shock in the 
Euro Area, with most of the spillover coming from the US. This reflects the fact that the US 
response to a change in wealth is higher than in the Euro Area, in part because equity wealth 
to income is 2.5 times higher, and also because there are stronger impact effects of wealth. 
This in turn is driven by the significantly higher level of direct equity wealth ownership in the 
US, where over half of households own equities directly, whilst in Europe most equities in 





3  Single Country Estimation  
 
3.1.  The workhorse model 
The examination of the determinants of aggregate consumption begins with a detailed 
analysis of single country models of consumption based on our “workhorse” error-correction 
model (ECM) given by (3.1). By sequentially modifying the dynamic terms in (3.1), we are 
able to examine several alternative representations for each country. This systematic approach 
permits us to identify the contributions of specific variables and can also be seen as indirectly 
testing for the validity of the standard Euler equation representation.   
 
t t t k t i j t i
t t t t
RPH dRR RR RPDI RNW
RNW RPDI C C
ln * ln * ln *
ln * ln * ln * ln
2 1 1
1 2 1 1 1 1 0
∆ + + + ∆ + ∆ +
+ + + = ∆
− − −
− − −
δ δ δ γ γ
β β α α
   (3.1) 
 
where RPDI is real personal disposable income, RNW is real financial wealth, RR is the level 
of the real interest rate, RPH is the real price of housing, and static homogeneity is imposed 
on the long run income and wealth terms. As discussed above, a log approximation is 
employed to ensure that the errors are stationary and that the estimation is efficient. In 
addition, the sample period is 1974-2004, which covers a long period of time but avoids the 
potentially differing behaviour in the pre Bretton Woods era.  
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Setting 0 2 1 = = = δ δ δ , we begin with a “basic” equation which only contains dynamic terms 
in income and wealth. This basic equation sets a common specification across countries where 
we endeavour to find significant roles for these dynamic terms. We then proceed by adding 
real interest rates in an effort to detect intertemporal substitution effects. Finally, we 
incorporate real house price effects to arrive at an equation which is in line with the recent 
literature discussed above. This new workhorse model serves to facilitate the examination of 
further dynamic terms of interest to this study.  
 
Initial Basic Equations 
We begin by looking at the “basic” equation results in Table 4 where it can be seen that the 
specification given by (2.5) was found to be estimable for all countries, except Spain where 
the significance level of the ECM indicates a failure to cointegrate. The ECM values (or speed 
of adjustment) vary substantially from a very slow speed of adjustment found in Sweden, 
0.025 (per cent per quarter), to a relatively rapid adjustment of 0.29, found in Germany. 
Significance levels for the ECM terms in Denmark, Sweden and Belgium are low and suggest 
that, as with Spain, the equations may be mis-specified. We would expect the speed of 
adjustment to increase in both size and significance with the addition of relevant relations in 
the cointegrating vector.  In general, the ECM terms across our sample of countries suggest a 
moderate convergence to the long run equilibrium where, for the remaining countries, the 
speed of adjustment is below 0.1, with the additional exceptions of Finland, Portugal and the 
Netherlands, all yielding just over 0.1.   
 
Examining the long run elasticities, we can see long run real income effects of over 90% in 
Germany, Belgium, Denmark, Portugal, and Austria which, with the exception of Denmark, 
all had relatively unliberalised financial systems for much of the sample (see Boone et al. 
(2001)). As a result, the corresponding long run wealth effects in these countries are below 
0.1 (given that long run homogeneity is imposed). Elsewhere, the long run income effect is 
somewhat lower, at 0.8-0.9 in Greece, France, Finland, the Netherlands and Ireland, while it is 
below 0.8 in Sweden, Italy, the UK, and the US.
3 The latter result is not surprising since all of 
these countries have liberalised financial markets and have experienced major asset price 
booms and/or banking crises over the sample, which might induce consumers to respond more 
to asset values. Stronger long run wealth effects (and, hence, weaker long run income effects) 
suggest a positive degree of consumption smoothing, while stronger long run income effects 
suggest a degree of liquidity constrained behaviour. In Italy, however, there is a large long run 
wealth effect; although, this can be attributed to the large amount of government debt held by 
the personal sector.  
 
We note that using similar panel and single equation estimation techniques, Al-Eyd and 
Barrell (2005) find evidence of liquidity constrained behaviour in France and Germany, while 
finding less of this behaviour in the UK. The authors suggested that liquidity constrained 
behaviour, whether driven by financial market developments and/or other structural factors 
may be more binding in the former set of countries. Indeed, taken in terms of the life 
cycle/permanent income approach to consumption, a priori, in a financially liberalised 
country one might expect to find small or insignificant elasticities on short term income in 
addition to significant elasticities on short run wealth, including the real price of housing (see 
below). Conversely, significant income elasticities accompanied by insignificant wealth 
elasticities suggests that consumption is being driven by current income rather than overall 
wealth.  The data do not tell us if these findings are driven by choice or necessity; however, 
this type of ad hoc interpretation is “industry standard” insofar as exercises of this nature are 
                                                 
3 Given the failure to find a cointegrating relation in Spain over this sample period, these Basic results are 
inconclusive.   
 15
concerned (see for example Al-Eyd and Barrell (2005), Blundell-Wignall et al (1995), 
Campbell and Mankiw (1991), and Barrell and Davis (2004b)).   
 
The short run dynamics support our priors regarding liquidity constrained consumers. In 
particular, we find that countries with strong dynamic income terms tend to have weaker, if 
any, dynamic wealth terms. This is because the strong presence of the former indicates 
significant liquidity constrained behaviour and thus little or no ability for agents to finance 
current consumption out of wealth. This holds clearly for Germany, Greece, Austria, and 
Portugal which, as mentioned above, are countries that were slow to liberalise their financial 
markets. We also fail to find significant wealth terms for the Netherlands and Belgium, 
although the income effect is rather weak in these countries. Other countries with smaller or 
less significant dynamic income terms tend to have the strongest dynamic wealth terms of the 
sample. This includes countries such as Sweden, Denmark, the UK and the US, all of which 
are financially liberalised. Some exceptions, however, are France, Finland and Ireland where 
these countries have substantial dynamic effects from both income and wealth terms. This is 
likely to be a result of the sample period where a strengthening of financial market reforms in 
the latter part of the sample coupled with a strong early income effect have combined to yield 
this outcome. A shallow, but persistent short run income effect in the US and the UK 
(evidenced by current and first-lagged significance of RPDI) complements a solid wealth 
effect. 
 
The overall results from these Basic equations find that the speeds of adjustment are 
moderate, and in some cases are of borderline significance. Moreover, the presence of strong 
wealth and income effects (or a mixture of the two) is consistent with particular structural 
factors, including the stage of financial sector development and indicators of liquidity 
constrained behaviour. These Basic equations are of interest to this study because they are the 
“normal” way of modelling consumption (e.g. Muellbauer and Lattimore (1995)) and their 
weaknesses suggest that we would find systematic forecast failure using them. As a result, 
additional variables may prove to be relevant indicators of consumption and should be 
explored for their significance and additional forecasting power.  
 
Real Interest Rates 
The results from the basic equations are in line with our priors in respect of the degree and 
nature of financial market reform and reflect the data sample over which they were estimated.  
In general, we find that strong and significant terms in differences and levels of income and 
wealth lend support to an empirical representation for consumption that is more complex than 
suggested by the standard Euler equation approach. With the aim of finding intertemporal 
substitution effects, we now introduce the real interest rate into the analysis (where these 
series are derived from an instrumental variables procedure using lagged values of nominal 
interest rates and inflation).  
 
Looking at Table 5, there is a significant (and negatively signed) lagged level term for the real 
interest rate in Italy, with borderline significance in the US, Germany, Ireland, Belgium, 
Sweden and the Netherlands. In addition, all of these countries except Germany have 
significant (or borderline significant) current difference terms for the real interest rate. The 
remaining countries – Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Portugal, Spain and the 
UK – fail to find significant, or correctly signed, real interest rate effects at either the level or 
current difference terms. As with the basic equation analysis, all else equal, one might expect 
to find significant real interest rate effects in countries with more developed financial markets 
and fewer liquidity constrained agents where the availability of loans makes current income 
less of a constraint on consumption. The results in Table 5, however, do not align as clearly 
with our priors as in the basic equations.  
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A notable feature of this set of estimations is that, in many countries, the ECM term gains 
both in size and in terms of significance with the addition of the real interest rate. This lends 
some empirical support to an intertemporal substitution effect and is in line with theoretical 
approach of the Euler equation approach. However, it is clear from the significance of other 
variables that the macro data do not lend much support to the presumption that consumers are 
forward looking with constant risk aversion, employ time wise separable utility functions that 
are essentially quadratic (so that we can use certainty equivalence), and who maximise over a 
long time horizon.  
 
Real House Prices  
Anecdotal evidence suggests that high and rapidly rising house prices help to support 
consumption growth. Most countries in the sample have experienced significant housing 
market booms over the past decade. Where a house price boom has ended, as in the 
Netherlands, consumption growth became sluggish or even negative (Debelle 2004). As 
shown in Table 6, with the inclusion of house prices into the basic model, the size and 
significance of the speed of adjustment coefficient is an improvement over the two previous 
models for France, Italy, the UK, the US, Spain, Germany, Portugal and Denmark. And, in all 
countries, except Belgium, the t-statistic of this ECM term has increased to 2.0 or above.  
 
The magnitude of the effect of real house prices on changes in consumption over the entire 
sample period is most pronounced in Portugal, closely followed by those in Finland, Germany 
and the US and the UK. Perhaps, this is somewhat surprising, given the relatively depressed 
level of house price stability in Germany over the past decade. German house prices have not 
followed the upward trajectory seen in many European countries and in North America and 
have actually declined slightly since the late 1990s. Given the econometric results presented 
here, this might suggest that house prices have been a negative driver of German consumption 
growth over the past decade.  
 
Significant house price effects are also found in Denmark, Sweden and Spain. Interestingly, 
the Spanish equation shows a marked improvement over the previous model estimates with 
the ECM term nearly doubling in size and becoming statistically significant.  This suggests 
that the long run relations are now cointegrating and this is supported by significant long run 
income and wealth effects which are more in line with the other countries.  
 
Despite the fact that Ireland has experienced a long period of rapidly rising nominal house 
prices there is no significant evidence of its contribution to consumption growth. Indeed, the 
rise in Ireland’s house prices may be rooted in the impressive GDP and income growth that it 
has experienced over a sustained period of time, rather than in a housing boom that gives rise 
to strong wealth effects in consumption. Taken in this context, house prices may not be 
viewed as rising too rapidly, but merely adjusting to the growing demand and prevailing 




The econometric results in Table 6 support the notion that consumption behaviour tends to be 
most similar in the UK and the US.  Examining the long run elasticities, income and financial 
wealth effects in the UK and the US are similar to each other in magnitude, while the short-
run dynamic adjustment in (lagged) income and financial wealth terms are nearly identical. 
Although the short-run income effect is somewhat larger in the UK as compared to that in the 
US, the dynamic adjustment process in both countries is rather similar. At the same time, 
interest rates seem to have a bigger impact on consumption in the US, as compared to the UK.  
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Including house prices reverses the sign on the interest rate coefficient in the UK, while it 
remains negative in the US; however, this term still remains insignificant in both country 
models.   
 
Perhaps not surprisingly, Germany and Austria also exhibit a level of similarity in patterns of 
consumption behaviour. The long run income and wealth elasticities are similar in the Basic 
estimates and they grow closer with the addition of real interest rates and house prices. The 
dynamic adjustment process is also similar in both countries. Although the size of the income 
effect is larger in Germany as compared to Austria, net financial wealth does not play a role in 
the way either country’s private consumption adjusts. Again, this remains the case with the 
addition of real interest rates and house prices.  
 
Observations on Single Equation Estimates 
Our analysis so far has revealed several important points about the determinants of aggregate 
consumption. In general, the speed of adjustment terms in the model specification tend to 
improve in both size and statistical significance with the addition of real interest rates and real 
house prices. The general fit and diagnostics of the equations also show some improvement 
with the addition of these two extra variables. If forecasts were to be constructed and 
evaluated using only the basic equation, then they would be missing information available in 
relationships that involve real interest rates and house prices. These observations lend some 
empirical support to the rejection of the standard Euler equation representation, at least over 
this sample period. The empirical findings presented here are in line with anecdotal evidence, 
prior estimates and other studies relating to the degree of financial market liberalisation, and 
liquidity constrained behaviour.   
 
In our full model, real interest rates are significant in levels only in Italy, and perhaps also in 
the Netherlands, Ireland and the US.  House price effects are more pervasive and they are 
insignificant only in Belgium, Ireland, Austria, France and Italy. In short, our analysis 
suggests that real interest rates and especially house prices appear to contribute toward a fuller 
understanding of the determinants of aggregate consumption patterns in the US and in some 
countries in Europe beyond that which can be explained through changes in income and 
financial wealth alone. Clearly, specification problems remain as serial correlation tests often 
fail, and we turn to these issues next.  
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Table 4:   Single Equation Consumption Estimates Using Non-linear Least Squares 
(Basic equations)*  
 

























































ln RNW(-1)  0.016 0.101 0.115 0.219 0.359 0.220 0.653 























D ln RNW(-1)     0.029 
(2.4) 
    
Intercept 
dummy 
   92Q1  80Q1 
 











































2 adjusted  0.52 0.53 0.34 0.49 0.70 0.51 0.41 
SE  0.012  0.0072 0.0056 0.0048 0.0059 0.0045 0.0055 
LM(4)  14.87 25.75  10.2  12.7  2.28  11.51  3.75 
Key: C stands for real consumption; RPDI for real personal disposable income, RNW for real personal net 




Table 4 (cont.):   Single Equation Estimates using Nonlinear Least Squares  
(Basic Equations)*  
 

































































ln RNW(-1)  0.06  0.213 0.115 0.075 0.034 0.178  0.08  0.112 
D ln RPDI  0.774 
(13.8) 










D ln RPDI(-1)        -0.306 
(3.7) 
  
D ln RNW   0.027 
(5.9) 
    0.027 
(2.4) 
  0.0396 
(2.5) 




D ln C(-1)   0.418 
(5.9) 






































2 adjusted  0.62 0.53 0.22 0.28 0.27 0.65 0.43 0.57 
SE  0.006 0.004 0.008 0.005 0.008 0.006  0.01  0.007 
LM(4)  6.1 14.3 5.6  7.6  4.8 13.1 2.0  5.1 
Key: C stands for real consumption; RPDI for real personal disposable income, RNW for real personal net 
financial wealth, ECM for the error correction terms. A “D” prefix indicates the difference of the relevant 
variable.   
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Table 5:   Single Equation Consumption Estimates Using Non-linear Least Squares 
(including real interest rates)* 
 































































ln RNW(-1)  0.019 0.106 0.104 0.215 0.362 0.221 0.541 















D ln RPDI(-1) 
 





D ln RNW 
 







D ln RNW(-1) 
 
   0.026 
(2.15) 






























2 adjusted  0.52 0.52 0.34 0.55 0.70 0.55 0.41 
SE  0.012  0.0073 0.0056 0.0045 0.0060 0.0044 0.0055 
LM(4)  12.61 27.91  9.8  7.8  2.28  14.09  3.13 
* Dummy variables same as those in Basic equations (Table 3.1) unless reported differently here. 
Key: C stands for real consumption; RPDI for real personal disposable income, RNW for real personal net 
financial wealth, ECM for the error correction terms, RR for the real interest rate. A “D” prefix indicates the 















Table 5 (cont.):   Single Equation Estimates using Nonlinear Least Squares 
(Including Real Interest Rates)*  
 

































































ln RNW(-1)  0.058 0.183 0.077 0.038 0.033 0.177 0.082 0.114 












D ln RPDI(-1)        -0.304 
(3.4) 
  
D ln RNW   0.028 
(4.4) 
    0.027 
(2.4) 
  0.021 
(1.9) 
D ln RNW(-1)          0.043 
(4.5) 
 
D ln C(-1)   0.418 
(5.9) 
     0.308 
(3.6) 
  
























    -0.001 
(2.8) 
R
2 adjusted  0.63 0.54 0.25 0.29 0.26 0.65 0.42 0.59 
SE  0.007 0.004 0.008 0.005 0.008 0.006  0.01  0.007 
LM(4)  6.4 17.9 6.9  6.7  4.8 13.0 3.7  5.6 
* Dummy variables same as those in Basic equations (Table 3.1) unless reported differently here. 
Key: C stands for real consumption; RPDI for real personal disposable income, RNW for real personal net 
financial wealth, ECM for the error correction terms, RR for the real interest rate. A “D” prefix indicates the 
difference of the relevant variable.  
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Table 6:   Single Equation Consumption Estimates Using Non-linear Least Squares 
(including real interest rates and house prices data)*  
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ln RNW(-1)  0.034 0.123 0.095 0.216 0.127 0.188 0.231 















D ln RPDI(-1) 
 





D ln RNW 
 







D ln RNW(-1) 
 
   0.027 
(2.18) 



































D ln RPH(-1)     0.021 
(0.43) 
    
R
2 adjusted  0.55 0.55 0.34 0.55 0.73 0.51 0.46 
SE  0.012  0.0069 0.0057 0.0045 0.0056 0.0042 0.0053 
LM(4)  18.42 21.13  9.7  9.2  4.02  12.95  3.42 
a Greek house price data are not available prior to 1990Q1. 
* Dummy variables same as those in Basic equations (Table 3.1) unless reported differently here. 
Key: C stands for real consumption; RPDI for real personal disposable income, RNW for real personal net 
financial wealth, ECM for the error correction terms, RR for the real interest rate, RPH for real house prices. A 












Table 6 (cont.):   Single Equation Estimates using Nonlinear Least Squares 
(Including Real Interest Rates and Real House Prices)*  
 

































































ln RNW(-1)  0.052 0.092 0.053 0.019 0.091 0.094 0.011 0.116 












D ln RPDI(-1)        -0.207 
(2.8) 
  
D ln RNW   0.024 
(3.8) 
    0.017 
(1.7) 
  




D ln C(-1)   0.359 
(5.1) 
        






















   -0.001 
(2.8) 










   -0.008 
(0.3) 







         Time;**    
R
2 adjusted  0.64 0.56 0.27 0.29 0.33 0.71 0.44 0.59 
SE  0.007 0.004 0.008 0.005 0.008 0.005  0.01  0.007 
LM(4)  6.7 12.5 9.5  6.1  1.1  7.3  4.9  5.9 
* Dummy variables same as those in Basic equations (Table 3.1) unless reported differently here. 
** Single point dummy variable dropped from those reported in Basic equations  (Table 3.1) 
Key: C stands for real consumption; RPDI for real personal disposable income, RNW for real personal net 
financial wealth, ECM for the error correction terms, RR for the real interest rate, RPH for real house prices. A 





3.2.  Expanding the determinants of consumption 
 
The single equation analysis above suggests that basic models of consumption, based on 
income and wealth alone, may not be adequate predictors of the patterns in aggregate 
consumption experienced in the countries across our sample. In particular, we found that 
strong wealth effects in some countries warrant the inclusion of real house prices and real 
interest rates in the model specification; while in other countries strong indications of liquidity 
constrained behaviour discouraged the inclusion of these variables. In general, however, we 
find that many of the cointegrating relations improve in both size and significance with the 
workhorse model suggesting that this specification should form the basis of further analysis.    
 
Building on this “workhorse” specification, we seek to improve the fit of this model by 
examining the significance of several alternative factors in the determination of aggregate 
consumption. These factors include demographic changes, fiscal effects, consumer 
confidence, equity market volatility, and a Commission Services estimate of equilibrium 
unemployment (the NAIRU). The factors are added to our workhorse model one at a time in 
an attempt to isolate their respective contributions and in order to preserve the limited degrees 
of freedom in the time domain. (All data sources are detailed in the Appendix.) 
 
To model the impact of demographic changes on aggregate patterns of consumption, 
population estimates obtained from the United Nations are divided into age cohorts for each 
country – representing ages 20-39, 40-64, and 65 and over. The proportion of the total 
population (logged) in each age bracket provides the variable used in estimation. NIESR 
estimates of the government balance (at both the lagged level and current difference) are used 
to proxy for the fiscal effects on consumption where strong Ricardian behaviour is evidenced 
by an improvement (deterioration) in the fiscal position and concurrently stronger (weaker) 
consumption. Measures of consumer confidence are also incorporated at the lagged level and 
first difference where, ceteris paribus, we might expect to find a positive correlation between 
these measures and consumption. Equity price volatility is proxied with the lagged conditional 
variance from a GARCH (1,1) estimation using the logged difference of monthly share prices. 
Finally, the estimate of the NAIRU has been provided by the European Commission and 
enters the model at the lagged level, where we would expect to find a negative relation with 
consumption since, ceteris paribus, a rise in this term increases the individuals perception of 
risk and so should reduce consumption.   
 
Demographic effects  
Table 7 details the impact of adding demographic variables to the workhorse model. The 
analysis finds that population composition by age group has a statistically significant impact 
on aggregate consumption in France, the US, Spain, Germany and Sweden; although only 
France and Sweden show significant effects across all age cohorts. With the notable exception 
of Germany, younger age groups tend to contribute positively to consumption growth while 
older age groups tend to contribute negatively to consumption growth.  The German results 
suggest that both the very young and the very old are negative contributors to consumption 
(the middle cohort is not significant); however, this result must be measured against the large 
dynamic income effect in Germany that suggests a significant degree of liquidity constrained 
behaviour. The young have smaller incomes and may be unable to borrow to smooth their 
consumption over time as compared to their counterparts in other countries with a greater 
degree of financial market development. Although there is no dynamic income effect in 
Spain, we find a similarly negative contribution from the younger age cohort, albeit at a 
borderline level of significance. These results are consistent with the findings of our micro 
analysis for these two countries. The micro analysis does not suggest a similar pattern for the  
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UK.  We would suggest that Germany and Spain both have liquidity constraints, particularly 
in the young adult age bracket.  
 
The largest demographic effect is found in Sweden where the young and middle aged cohorts 
boost consumption growth by 0.5 and 0.3 per cent (per quarter), respectively, while those in 
the 65 plus age cohort also boost consumption but only by about 0.05 per cent. The strong 
contribution from the youngest cohort reflects strong population growth in this age bracket 
over our sample as well as a robust dynamic wealth effect that is complemented by a high 
degree of financial sector development. In France, the young and middle aged cohorts share 
the same positive (significant) sign as those in Sweden, but the magnitude of their impact is 
about ½ the size of those in Sweden; while the 65 plus age cohort has a coefficient of just 
over 0.05 of one per cent, but is a negative contributor to consumption. Unlike in Sweden, 
France does have a strong dynamic income term, but it has only a moderate and borderline 
significant dynamic wealth effect.   
 
The older population cohort was found to have a negative impact on consumption in seven 
countries in our sample, but only in Germany is this impact statistically significant. The 
negative contribution to consumption of the 65 plus age group is not strictly in line with the 
life cycle hypothesis which suggests that consumption, as a proportion of income, increases 
later in life as savings decrease. This counter theoretical effect in Germany may help explain 
some of the weakness in the pattern of consumption in this country, especially given the 
estimated magnitude of the effect in our equation.  Since the late 1990s, the proportion of 
people over 65 in Germany has been rising somewhat faster as compared to the preceding 
decade, while the cohort of 20-39 year olds has been declining over the same time period.  
 
Ricardian effects 
Table 8 details the role of each country’s respective fiscal position on consumption. In line 
with theoretical explanations of the impact of government spending on private consumption, 
we find some significant Ricardian effects at both the lagged level and first difference of this 
variable; although, the effects are most pronounced when fiscal effects are specified in first 
differences. In particular, we find statistically significant fiscal effects in Greece, Italy, Spain, 
Sweden, the Netherlands, Finland and Ireland; and borderline significant effects in Belgium. 
Interestingly, in the US, there is a negative and significantly signed effect, suggesting that US 
fiscal deficits exhibit a Keynesian multiplier effect and have boosted consumption growth 
over the sample period. This latter finding is also evident in France, albeit at borderline 
significance. In terms of economic importance, our results indicate that a significant 
improvement (deterioration) in the fiscal position is necessary in order to have a discernable 
impact on private consumption.  
 
Confidence effects 
Table 9 details the role of confidence indicators on consumption, where the sample period has 
been shortened and begins in 1985Q1, unless otherwise noted in the table. Confidence 
indicators in levels were found to be statistically significant in Austria, the US, and Spain with 
borderline significance in the UK, France and Portugal. In line with our priors, these 
contributions are positively correlated with consumption; however, the magnitude of these 
effects is rather small with the largest level effect in Austria having a coefficient of 0.7E-3. 
Confidence indicators where also found to be significant in first differences in the US and 
Sweden; although the Swedish sample is considerably shorter than the other countries leading 
us to question the validity of this result. The impact of the difference term in the US is 
approximately half the size of that found in levels for Sweden.  
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The results presented here are in line with our findings for the panel estimation (presented 
below) and build upon results presented elsewhere, as discussed in the literature review 
above. The addition of consumer confidence indicators, however, impacts differently on the 
estimated equations across countries. For example, in Austria and Spain it decreases the speed 
of adjustment and reduces the effects from house prices, as compared against the workhorse 
model estimates. In the US, there too is a considerable deterioration in the house price effect, 
although it is instructive to note that data for this country is based on a different source as 
compared to that for the Euro Area countries.  
 
In general the confidence indicators appear to impact on the change in real financial wealth, 
and make it less significant. This suggest we check whether confidence Granger causes 
wealth or wealth Granger causes confidence. We undertake this analysis below, and we find 
that confidence only Granger causes wealth in countries where is not significant, and where it 
is significant it is Granger caused by wealth. Hence we would conclude that we have no 
significant role for confidence in estimating equations, but that it may be useful in a 
forecasting context to help us set residual judgements when wealth data is not available. 
 
Equity price volatility 
Table 10 details the impact of equity market conditional volatility (or uncertainty) on 
consumption. As indicated by the weak results in the panel estimation below, it is difficult to 
find a statistically significant link between equity volatility and consumption. Indeed, France 
is the only country where we find significant results and interestingly where the finding is a 
positive contribution. Taken in conjunction with a failure to find decisive contributions in any 
of the other countries, the results here suggest a very weak “traditional” wealth effect – i.e. a 
wealth effect associated only with equity prices. This is not that surprising given the strong 
income effects detailed in the above tables and once the degree and depth of financial market 
liberalisation in Europe is considered. We note that volatility has been high in Germany, but 
we can find no role for it in our equations.  
 
Estimates of NAIRU 
Table 11  details the impacts arising from the addition of estimates of equilibrium 
unemployment, or the NAIRU. Significant NAIRU effects are only found in Spain and with 
borderline significance in the UK and the US. We have not used this variable further in the 
case of the US and the UK as both have relatively stable unemployment, and changes in this 
slowly trending variable are unlikely to help us explain recent developments, and it is not 
clear that it is needed in either equation. We might anticipate that uncertainty arising from 
structural changes in the economy may also be reflected in the impact of the NAIRU, and it 
may also genuinely reflect increased uncertainty about income prospects, as we argue above. 
The strong significance of the Spanish result, especially as compared against the robust 
insignificance of the NAIRU in other European countries, prompts us to examine this finding 
closer.  
 
Figure 1 plots the annual change of the Spanish NAIRU along with the two intercept dummy 
variables used in our equations, as indicated by the boxes along this series.  It appears that the 
breaks in the NAIRU are matched almost identically with the intercept dummy variables, 
which may be giving rise to the robust significance of this term in the Spanish equation. The 
occurrence of the shift dummy variables and the breaks in the NAIRU are, of course, naturally 
linked through the structural changes in the Spanish economy during those periods.  These 
include the joining of the European Union in 1986 and the ERM crisis in 1992-93, during 





























































































































































Annual estimation of selected countries 
The quarterly nature of the data used in this study implies the possible existence of residual 
seasonality effects, which could potentially give rise to biased parameter estimates.   
Therefore, it is instructive to test for the possibility of these effects by estimating some of our 
basic models in terms of annual data to see if we arrive at similarly oriented results, as 
compared against our quarterly estimates.  We do this for a select set of countries where, for 
example, certain coefficient estimates might seem to be counter to our priors regarding their 
magnitude and significance.  In particular, we consider countries which have large dynamic 
income terms and, hence, the implication of a significant degree of liquidity constrained 
behaviour. These are Germany, Austria, Italy, France and Ireland. 
 
Table 12 details the annual findings for each country under two model variants, the basic 
equation (with dynamic income and wealth terms, where significant), and the basic equation 
with the addition of real house prices. Dynamic income terms are significant in all countries 
and across all variants. Moreover, these terms are of a comparable magnitude to those 
reported in (Table 4). Cumulative income effects are clearly illustrated with the German basic 
equation that delivers a much stronger income effect than in the quarterly results above. The 
same is seen in the Irish basic equation where both the income and wealth effects are nearly 
double in magnitude in this annual regression as compared to the quarterly estimates. The 
French equation shows an almost identical dynamic income effect to its quarterly counterpart, 
while the Italian equation has more than triple the effect. None of these results change 
significantly when the real price of housing is added.  As such, it is clear from these annual 
results that there are no idiosyncratic seasonal effects in our quarterly analysis. We can 
therefore remain confident of the presence of liquidity constrained behaviour in these 
economies during the sample period covered in this study.   
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Table 7:  Addition of Demographic Data to Single Equation Consumption Estimates 
Using Non-linear Least Squares  
(Including real interest rates and house prices data)* 
 





























































LRNW(-1)  0.002 0.142 0.035 0.377 0.105 0.104 0.169 















D ln RPDI(-1) 
 





D ln RNW 
 







D ln RNW(-1) 
 
   0.016 
(1.36) 



































D ln RPH(-1)     0.08 
(1.57) 
















































2 adjusted  0.55 0.57 0.42 0.56 0.73 0.55 0.47 
SE  0.012  0.0068 0.0053 0.0045 0.0056 0.0040 0.0053 
LM(4)  17.87 22.72  8.9  6.9  4.04  10.33  3.88 
* Dummy variables same as those in Basic equations (Table 3.1) unless reported differently here. 
Key: C stands for real consumption; RPDI for real personal disposable income, RNW for real personal net 
financial wealth, ECM for the error correction terms, RR for the real interest rate, RPH for real house prices. A 





Table 7 (cont.):  Addition of Demographic Data to Single Equation Consumption 
Estimates Using Non-linear Least Squares  
(Including real interest rates and house prices data)*  
 

































































ln RNW(-1)  0.074 0.097  0.03  0.818 0.051 0.167 0.139 0.066 












D ln RPDI(-1)        -0.279 
(3.3) 
  
D ln RNW   0.023 
(3.8) 
    0.021 
(2.1) 
  




D ln C(-1)   0.295 
(4.1) 
        






















   -0.001 
(2.9) 










   0.001 
(0.3) 



























































         Time;**    
R
2 adjusted  0.66 0.60 0.26 0.31 0.31 0.71 0.44 0.58 
SE  0.006 0.004 0.008 0.005 0.008 0.005  0.01  0.007 
LM(4)  6.6 14.2  11.1 4.8  1.3  5.8  6.8  8.6 
* Dummy variables same as those in Basic equations (Table 3.1) unless reported differently here. 
** Single point dummy variable dropped from those reported in Basic equations (Table 3.1). 
Key: C stands for real consumption; RPDI for real personal disposable income, RNW for real personal net 
financial wealth, ECM for the error correction terms, RR for the real interest rate, RPH for real house prices. A 





Table 8:    Addition of Fiscal Policies to Single Equation Consumption Estimates 
Using Non-linear Least Squares  
(Including real interest rates and house prices data)* 
 





























































LRNW(-1)  0.029 0.085 0.103 0.184 0.012 0.258 0.164 















D ln RPDI(-1) 
 





D ln RNW 
 







D ln RNW(-1) 
 
   0.023 
(1.8) 


































































2 adjusted  0.55 0.59 0.35 0.57 0.73 0.61 0.53 
SE  0.012  0.0066 0.0056 0.0044 0.0057 0.0038 0.0049 
LM(4)  19.94  11.52  10.4  9.3  3.27 5.92 5.07 
* Dummy variables same as those in Basic equations (Table 3.1) unless reported differently here. 
Key: C stands for real consumption; RPDI for real personal disposable income, RNW for real personal net 
financial wealth, ECM for the error correction terms, RR for the real interest rate, RPH for real house prices, 






Table 8 (cont.):  Addition of Fiscal Policies to Single Equation Consumption 
Estimates Using Non-linear Least Squares  
(Including real interest rates and house prices data)* 
 

































































ln RNW(-1)  0.046 0.024 0.005 -0.02 0.096 0.072 0.086 0.014 












D ln RPDI(-1)        -0.184 
(2.5) 
  
D ln RNW   0.017 
(2.7) 
    0.009 
(0.9) 
  




D ln C(-1)   0.286 
(3.9) 
        






















   -0.001 
(2.62) 










   -0.018 
(0.6) 







































         Time**    
R
2 adjusted  0.64 0.59 0.40 0.30 0.32 0.71 0.44 0.61 
SE  0.007 0.004 0.008 0.005 0.008 0.005  0.01  0.007 
LM(4)  6.5 10.6 8.8  5.4  1.1 11.3 8.1  6.7 
* Dummy variables same as those in Basic equations (Table 3.1) unless reported differently here. 
** Single point dummy variable dropped from those reported in Basic equations  (Table 3.1). 
Key: C stands for real consumption; RPDI for real personal disposable income, RNW for real personal net 
financial wealth, ECM for the error correction terms, RR for the real interest rate, RPH for real house prices, 
GBR for the government budget ratio (as a share of GDP). A “D” prefix indicates the difference of the relevant 
variable.   
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Table 9:  Addition of Confidence Indicators to Single Equation Consumption 
Estimates Using Non-linear Least Squares  
(Including real interest rates and house prices data)* 
 





























































LRNW(-1)  0.225  0.226  0.005 1.84 0.114 0.13 0.047 















D ln RPDI(-1) 
 





D ln RNW 
 







D ln RNW(-1) 
 
   0.036 
(2.7) 







































   





























2 adjusted  0.45 0.51 0.36 0.55 0.50 0.55 0.46 
SE  0.007  0.0075 0.0047 0.0041 0.0051 0.0041 0.0053 
LM(4)  5.41 6.71 12.9  3.0  3.23 11.73  6.24 
* Dummy variables same as those in Basic equations (Table 3.1) unless reported differently here. 
Key: C stands for real consumption; RPDI for real personal disposable income, RNW for real personal net 
financial wealth, ECM for the error correction terms, RR for the real interest rate, RPH for real house prices, 




Table 9 (cont.):    Addition of Confidence Indicators to Single Equation Consumption 
Estimates Using Non-linear Least Squares  
(including real interest rates and house prices data)*  
 

































































ln RNW(-1)  0.064 0.104 0.005 -0.65 0.059 0.003 -0.001 0.042 












D ln RPDI(-1)        -0.227 
(1.4) 
  
D ln RNW   0.006 
(0.4) 
    -0.3E-3 
(0.03) 
  




D ln C(-1)   -0.151 
(0.9) 
        






















   -0.001 
(2.1) 










   -0.036 
(0.9) 







































         Time;**    
R
2 adjusted  0.66 0.45 0.32 0.08 0.27 0.31 0.43 0.56 
SE  0.006 0.004 0.007 0.005 0.008 0.004  0.01  0.006 
LM(4)  10.0 13.2 16.3  1.8  3.9  3.5  5.1  1.4 
* Dummy variables same as those in Basic equations (Table 3.1) unless reported differently here. 
** Single point dummy variable dropped from those reported in Basic equations  (Table 3.1). 
Key: C stands for real consumption; RPDI for real personal disposable income, RNW for real personal net 
financial wealth, ECM for the error correction terms, RR for the real interest rate, RPH for real house prices, 




Table 10:  Addition of Equity Price Volatility to Single Equation Consumption 
Estimates Using Non-linear Least Squares  
(Including real interest rates and house prices data)*  
 





























































LRNW(-1)    0.248 0.095 0.219 0.127 0.187 0.235 















D ln RPDI(-1) 
 





D ln RNW 
 







D ln RNW(-1) 
 
   0.032 
(2.6) 
















































2 adjusted  0.73 0.50 0.36 0.55 0.73 0.53 0.46 
SE  0.0057 0.0076 0.0056 0.0045 0.0057 0.0041 0.0053 
LM(4)  5.26  6.62  11.3  8.1  4.25 10.52 3.79 
* Dummy variables same as those in Basic equations (Table 3.1) unless reported differently here. 
Key: C stands for real consumption; RPDI for real personal disposable income, RNW for real personal net 
financial wealth, ECM for the error correction terms, RR for the real interest rate, RPH for real house prices, 















Table 10 (cont.):  Addition of Equity Price Volatility to Single Equation 
Consumption Estimates Using Non-linear Least Squares  
(Including real interest rates and house prices data)*   
 

































































ln RNW(-1)  0.059 0.103 0.053 0.016 0.116 0.122  0.0175  0.007 












D ln RPDI(-1)        -0.276 
(3.2) 
  
D ln RNW   0.023 
(3.7) 
    0.019 
(1.8) 
  




D ln C(-1)   0.357 
(5.0) 
        






















   -0.7E-3 
(1.1) 










   -0.066 
(1.6) 























     86Q1**
* 
Time**    
R
2 adjusted  0.64 0.56 0.26 0.28 0.34 0.72 0.44 0.58 
SE  0.006 0.004 0.008 0.005 0.008 0.005  0.01  0.007 
LM(4)  6.7 12.4 9.2  5.8  6.0  9.5  4.5  1.4 
* Dummy variables same as those in Basic equations (Table 3.1) unless reported differently here. 
** Single point dummy variable dropped from those reported in Basic equations (Table 3.1) 
Key: C stands for real consumption; RPDI for real personal disposable income, RNW for real personal net 
financial wealth, ECM for the error correction terms, RR for the real interest rate, RPH for real house prices, 





 Table 11:  Addition of NAIRU estimates to Single Equation Consumption Estimates 
Using Non-linear Least Squares  
(Including real interest rates and house prices data)*  
 





























































LRNW(-1)  0.014 0.184 0.029 0.147 0.119 0.083 0.174 











D ln RPDI(-1) 
 







D ln RNW 
 





D ln RNW(-1) 
 
   0.023 
(1.9) 
















   -0.7E-3 
(1.6) 
   -0.9E-3 
(3.2) 
 





























2 adjusted  0.55 0.52 0.33 0.37 0.74 0.54 0.51 
SE  0.011 0.007 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.004 0.005 
LM(4)  18.3  24.4 9.2 11.1 3.6  8.7  6.6 
* Dummy variables same as those in Basic equations (Table 3.1) unless reported differently here. 
Key: C stands for real consumption; RPDI for real personal disposable income, RNW for real personal net 
financial wealth, ECM for the error correction terms, RR for the real interest rate, RPH for real house prices. A 















Table 11 (cont.):  Addition of NAIRU estimates to Single Equation Consumption 
Estimates Using Non-linear Least Squares  
(Including real interest rates and house prices data)*   
 

































































ln RNW(-1)  0.073 0.635 0.049 0.084 0.093 0.082 0.002 0.116 

















D ln RNW   0.023 
(3.9) 
    0.021 
(1.9) 
  








    






















   -0.001 
(3.2) 










   0.002 
(0.05) 























         Time**    
R
2 adjusted  0.64 0.63 0.26 0.19 0.33 0.67 0.42 0.60 
SE  0.007 0.004 0.009 0.005 0.008 0.006  0.01  0.007 
LM(4)  6.4 13.0 9.7  0.9  1.1  5.7  6.4  6.4 
* Dummy variables same as those in Basic equations (Table 3.1) unless reported differently here 
** Single point dummy variable dropped from those reported in Basic equations (Table 3.1) 
Key: C stands for real consumption; RPDI for real personal disposable income, RNW for real personal net 
financial wealth, ECM for the error correction terms, RR for the real interest rate, RPH for real house prices. A 




Table 12:    Annual estimates of selected countries 























































































ln RNW(-1)  0.026 0.024 0.118 0.019 0.119 0.074 0.036 0.033 



































     1992  1992    
R
2 adjusted  0.95 0.56 0.76 0.75 0.59 0.60 0.49  0.547 
SE  0.007 0.004 0.015 0.016 0.008 0.008 0.012 0.013 
LM(4)  0.9 12.4  0.02  0.03 1.6  2.0  3.9  4.8 
Key: C stands for real consumption; RPDI for real personal disposable income, RNW for real personal net 
financial wealth, ECM for the error correction terms, RPH for real house prices. A “D” prefix indicates the 






3.3. Preferred  equations 
In this study, we have endeavoured to provide a systematic examination of the main factors of 
aggregate consumption which is not only grounded in basic economic theory, but which also 
offers scope for modern interpretation on these seminal themes.  The analysis presented above 
indicates that the patterns of aggregate consumption across Europe, the Euro Area and the US 
are not easily identified through a common model specification. Indeed, varying structural 
and institutional factors across these countries imply that saving and spending decisions are 
diverse and should be expected to respond differently to alternative economic indicators.   
Consequently, we have found that certain drivers of consumption are significant in some 
countries while they are insignificant in others.  
 
The systematic nature of this study, therefore, runs the risk of obscuring the key determinants 
of aggregate consumption since the inclusion of irrelevant variables will not only distort the 
residuals, but will also restrict the forecasting performance of any model specification.  To 
address these concerns, we build upon the above analysis to arrive at a set of preferred 
equations which include only the relevant variables from across all of the single country 
specifications above.  Of course, the grouping of all relevant variables in the same 
specification may indeed render some previously significant variables obsolete, so the final 
specifications presented below contain only those which are relevant in this inclusive 
specification.  
 
Table 13  lists the preferred equations. In all but a few cases, the ECM term is large in 
magnitude and highly significant, with a t-statistic greater than 3.0 (absolute) implying the 
presence of a strong cointegrating relation.  However, in the remaining cases, the significance 
of the ECM term remains comfortably above 2.0. The long run income effect is stronger in 
those countries which, as discussed above, might be associated with less liberalised financial 
systems (such as Germany and Austria); while the (implied) long run wealth effect is 
strongest in countries with a greater degree of financial sector development (such as the UK 
and the US). The dynamic terms, however, vary substantially across countries and yield 
interesting results. For example, German consumption is best explained by income and the 
real price of housing, while French consumption is best explained by income and 
demographic factors. These findings have significant macroeconomic implications for 
policies aimed at both financial markets and government finances in these countries. 
Although, in some countries, such as Austria and Belgium, a very simple model determined 
by income alone is sufficient to determine aggregate consumption.   
 
The findings presented here reflect a marked improvement over the model variants reported in 
the tables above. Not only do these results provide for a richer set of dynamic drivers of 
consumption they also help to highlight the implications for changes in macroeconomic 
policies.  Finally, the insignificance of the real interest, and indeed the inclusion of these 
many other determining factors, supports the view of a more complex model of consumption 
than offered by the traditional Euler equation approach.  
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Table 13:    Preferred equations*   
 





























































LRNW(-1)  0.016 0.101 0.049 0.211 0.134 0.135 0.126 















D ln RPDI(-1)       0.190 
(5.1) 
  
D ln RNW 
 









   -0.5E-3 
(3.3) 
  -0.4E-3 
(2.4) 
 
D ln RPH       0.106 
(3.8) 
  0.071 
(2.4) 





   0.192 
(4.2) 
    
Log (40-
64/pop) 
   0.160 
(3.3) 
   0.043 
(3.4) 
 
Log (65+/pop)     -0.054 
(2.2) 
    
CONF(-1)        0.8E-4 
(1.8) 
 
GBR(-1)        -0.001 
(4.9) 
 
DGBR    0.002 
(2.0) 
  0.002 
(2.5) 
   
R
2 adjusted  0.52 0.54 0.41 0.56 0.73 0.62 0.52 
SE  0.012 0.007 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.005 
LM(4)  14.87  23.7  9.7 8.6 4.2 5.3 3.8 
* Dummy variables same as those in Basic equations (Table 3.1) unless reported differently here. 
Key: C stands for real consumption; RPDI for real personal disposable income, RNW for real personal net 
financial wealth, ECM for the error correction terms, RR for the real interest rate, RPH for real house prices, 
CONF for consumer confidence, GBR for the government budget ratio (as a share of GDP). A “D” prefix 





Table 13 (cont.):  Preferred equations* 
 

































































ln RNW(-1)  0.053 0.103 0.023 0.075 0.033 0.069 0.043 0.098 












D ln RPDI(-1)        -0.147 
(2.2) 
  
D ln RNW   0.018 
(2.9) 
       
D ln RNW(-1)         0.042 
(5.0) 
 
D ln C(-1)   0.253 
(3.6) 
        
D RR             -0.6E-3 
(2.7) 




      -0.018 
(0.6) 


















      
Log (65+/pop)   0.038 
(2.4) 
        
DGBR    0.001 
(2.4) 
    0.003 
(3.4) 
  0.004 
(2.5) 
R
2 adjusted  0.64 0.62 0.38 0.28 0.26 0.72 0.45 0.60 
SE  0.006 0.004 0.008 0.005 0.008 0.005  0.01  0.007 
LM(4)  6.8 13.6 5.0  7.6  4.5  9.8  2.0  5.3 
* Dummy variables same as those in Basic equations  (Table 3.1) unless reported differently here 
Key: C stands for real consumption; RPDI for real personal disposable income, RNW for real personal net 
financial wealth, ECM for the error correction terms, RR for the real interest rate, RPH for real house prices, 
CONF for consumer confidence, GBR for the government budget ratio (as a share of GDP). A “D” prefix 




3.4.  Consumer Confidence and Consumption 
Recently there has been a growing interest in examining the link between confidence 
indicators and real economic activity (see Ludvigson (2004), for example).  Confidence 
indicators are based on surveys conducted across both businesses and households and are 
designed to gather information on expectations of current and future economic conditions.  In 
the context of the present report, we should ask if household confidence measures hold 
meaningful economic information on consumer expenditure beyond that contained in other 
observable economic and financial indicators, such as real net wealth and real house prices.  If 
they do, then we should be able to improve our consumption model with the addition of 
consumer confidence measures.    
 
In order to help us establish the desirability of using a measure of consumer confidence, we 
need to determine the causal relationship between this and the other variables of interest, 
namely real net wealth and real house prices. If we find that confidence Granger causes either 
real net wealth or real house prices, then it would be considered to have meaningful 
implications for real economic activity. However, if the reverse holds – i.e. that real net 
wealth Granger causes confidence and that real house prices Granger cause confidence – then 
any useful information we might obtain from the confidence measure is already contained in 
these observable variables.  In this case, we would not expect to find confidence as a 
significant driver of aggregate consumption.  
 
Here we conduct standard statistical tests to determine the Granger causality between real net 
wealth and confidence as well as between real house prices and confidence. We begin by 
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i t i t conf RNW conf ν θ φ α ,     (3.3) 
 
where real net wealth (RNW) is specified in first differences to ensure stationarity and the 
measure of consumer confidence (conf) is stationary in levels.
4  We then proceed by running 
each regression and testing the joint significance of the exogenous variables by conducting a 
variable deletion test.  In the case of equation (3.2), we test the joint significance of the j γ , 
whereas in equation (3.3) we test the joint significance of the i φ .  Determining the Granger 
causality between real house prices and confidence involves a similar set of equations as (3.2) 
and (3.3), except that real house prices (RPH) are substituted in place of real net wealth.  The 
resultant F-tests on the unrestricted and restricted regressions are reported for each country in 
Tables 14-17 below.  
 
The results presented in Tables 14 and 15 suggest that real financial wealth may Granger 
cause consumer confidence in Germany, Sweden and Finland, and possibly also in Greece 
and Spain. However, consumer confidence does not appear to Granger cause real net financial 
wealth in any of the above mentioned countries. Instead, consumer confidence may Granger 
cause real net financial wealth in the Netherlands, Belgium and Portugal. Given that our 
single country equations do not find a statistically significant role of consumer confidence in 
                                                 
4 We substitute the first difference of real house prices (RPH) for RNW to examine the Granger causality 
between RPH and conf.    
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either the Netherlands, Belgium or Portugal, we conclude that it does not help to explain 
changes in consumption growth vis-à-vis its impact on real net financial wealth in any of the 
Euro Area countries.  
 
As suggested in the above discussion, consumer confidence may also impact consumption 
through real house prices. Therefore, we examine Granger causality between confidence 
indicators and real house prices in our sample. The results of our analysis are summarised in 
Tables 16 and 17. These suggest that real house prices Granger cause consumer confidence in 
Ireland and Portugal, whilst confidence Granger causes real house prices in Austria, Germany, 
Spain and Ireland. These findings suggest that consumer confidence may help explain 
changes in consumption which are not captured by the evolution of real house prices. Since 
we find confidence indicators to be statistically significant determinants of changes in 
consumption in Austria and Spain, there appears to be a role for modelling confidence as a 
separate determinant of consumption in these countries.  
 
Table 14:   Granger Causality Tests in Single Equation Estimation: does confidence 
Granger cause real net financial wealth? 
















F-Statistic  0.65 1.01 0.98 0.71 0.04 1.03 0.42   
           

















F-Statistic  1.36 1.09 2.06 2.96 2.24 0.62 1.63 1.18 
Note: Red indicates countries where lagged confidence term was found to be a statistically significant determinant of 
consumption at the 95% level and italicized black were significant at the 90% level 
 
Table 15:   Granger Causality Tests in Single Equation Estimation: does real net 
wealth Granger cause confidence? 
















F-Statistic  0.22 1.88 0.73 0.44 0.56 3.87 1.76   
           

















F-Statistic  2.76 4.47  0.6  0.69 1.13 4.86 1.86 1.52 
Note: Red indicates countries where lagged confidence term was found to be a statistically significant determinant of 
consumption at the 95% level and italicized black were significant at the 90% level 
 
Table 16:   Granger Causality Tests in Single Equation Estimation: does confidence 
Granger cause real house prices? 
















F-Statistic  2.39 0.36 0.26 0.53 1.81 1.35 2.31   
           

















F-Statistic  3.4  2.62 1.11 0.88 0.30 0.64 1.22 2.61 
Note: Red indicates countries where lagged confidence term was found to be a statistically significant determinant of 
consumption at the 95% level and italicized black were significant at the 90% level 
  
 44
Table 17:   Granger Causality Tests in Single Equation Estimation: do real house 
prices Granger cause confidence? 
















F-Statistic  1.43 0.81 1.23 0.04 0.80 0.44 0.76   
           

















F-Statistic  1.13 2.49 0.92 0.56 4.55 1.61 1.56 4.22 
Note: Red indicates countries where lagged confidence term was found to be a statistically significant determinant of 




3.5. Forecast  Errors   
 
Short term forecasts and decomposition of determinants of consumption 
Given our new set of preferred equations, it is instructive to assess their forecasting 
performance and to decompose the contributions of each component to consumption in this 
final specification of some of the major economies. Here, we provide forecasts over recent 
history of the preferred equations and the initial basic equations (containing income and 
wealth dynamics). Both models are estimated up to 1999Q4 and then used to forecast the 
remainder of the sample to 2004Q4. In addition, the preferred equations are forecast over a 
shorter horizon covering the period 2001Q1 to 2004Q4 to highlight the period when most 
countries in our sample began to experience a marked deterioration in consumption. This is 
followed by the decomposition of consumption for the selected preferred equations. The 
Annex to this section contains the forecast errors relating to the workhorse model (interest 
rates plus house prices) and additions to this model, including demographics, fiscal effects, 
and confidence indicators.  
 
Forecast errors 
Tables 18 and 19 below detail the forecast errors for the basic and preferred equations, 
respectively, as measured against the actual data; and Table 20 details the shortened forecast 
horizon for the preferred equations.  
 
 
Table 18:   Single Equation Forecast Errors – Basic Equations   
(Annual average) 
  OE GR FR  IT UK US  SP   
2000  0.0043 -0.0022 0.0008 0.0025 -0.0076 -0.0035 -0.0029   
2001  0.0005 -0.0016 0.0008 -0.0042 -0.0006 0.0015 -0.0043   
2002  0.0004 -0.0015 -0.0001 0.0008 0.0035 0.0047 -0.0033   
2003  0.0014 0.0036 0.0000 -0.0006 0.0027 0.0096 -0.0038   
2004  0.0025 -0.0055 0.0010 -0.0007 0.0067 0.0082 0.0006   
Average 
2000-04  0.0018 -0.0004 0.0003 -0.0004 0.0009 0.0041 -0.0027   
Average 
2002-04  0.0014 -0.0011 0.0003 -0.0002 0.0043 0.0075 -0.0022   
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 GE  SD  NL  BG  PT  FN  DK  IR 
2000  0.0026 -0.0046 0.0114 0.0028 -0.0008 -0.0101 -0.0115 0.0031 
2001  0.0024 -0.0077 0.0044 -0.0080 -0.0048 -0.0038 -0.0030 -0.0002 
2002  -0.0019 -0.0003 0.0058 -0.0011 -0.0044 -0.0051 -0.0005 -0.0015 
2003  -0.0013 -0.0048 -0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0028 -0.0007 -0.0012 0.0016 
2004  -0.0053 -0.0037 0.0027 0.0011 -0.0007 -0.0092 0.0079 0.0004 
Average 
2000-04  0.0005 -0.0043 0.0053 -0.0016 -0.0027 -0.0058 -0.0040 0.0007 
Average 
2002-04  -0.0028 -0.0029 0.0027 -0.0001 -0.0026 -0.0050 0.0021 0.0002 
 
 
The results for the basic equations tend to show systematic errors where long runs of positive 
and negative residuals imply that the equations either under or over predict consumption. 
Amongst the Euro Area countries, eight display negative residuals in the last two years, 
suggesting some weakness of consumption. They are particularly large in Germany, Finland 
and Greece. Systematic prediction failure is common among all countries except for 
Germany, Italy, the UK and Ireland where there appears to be a marked break in the 
behaviour of the residual suggesting a change in at least one of the key drivers of 
consumption. In general, however, the residuals from the basic equations imply that important 
determinants of private consumption growth are still missing in some of the country models. 
Thus, while not necessarily yielding significant contributions on their own, the alternative 
drivers of consumption reflected in the preferred equations could help to refine our 
understanding of private consumption and improve the forecast performance of the model. 
 
 
Table 19:   Preferred Equation Forecast Errors (2000-2004) 
(Annual average) 
  OE GR
  FR IT UK US SP   
2000  0.0042 0.0002 0.0109 -0.0010 0.0026 0.0061 0.0014   
2001  0.0068 -0.0004 0.0061 0.0015 -0.0057 -0.0023 -0.0008   
2002  0.0035 -0.0012 0.0071 -0.0032 0.0018 0.0047 -0.0003   
2003  0.0033 -0.0002 0.0072 0.0000 0.0003 0.0046 0.0002   
2004  0.0042 0.0050 0.0110 -0.0010 0.0020 0.0094 -0.0004   
Average 
2000-04  0.0050 -0.0044 0.0144 -0.0020 0.0055 0.0043 0.0045   
Average 
2002-04  0.0045 0.0008 0.0079 -0.0006 -0.0004 0.0041 -0.0003   
          
 GE  SD  NL  BG  PT  FN  DK  IR 
2000  -0.0020 -0.0082 0.0054 -0.0001 -0.0039 0.0002 0.0019 -0.0001 
2001  0.0031 -0.0043 0.0073 0.0028 -0.0012 -0.0008 -0.0110 0.0024 
2002  0.0030 -0.0124 0.0048 -0.0080 -0.0066 0.0049 -0.0030 0.0025 
2003  -0.0013 -0.0072 0.0071 -0.0011 -0.0057 0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0037 
2004  -0.0003 -0.0101 0.0035 -0.0002 -0.0048 0.0030 -0.0011 0.0017 
Average 
2000-04  -0.0046 -0.0072 0.0057 0.0011 -0.0014 -0.0024 0.0069 0.0018 
Average 
2002-04  0.0011 -0.0085 0.0057 -0.0016 -0.0046 0.0018 -0.0038 0.0007 
 
 
The preferred equations in Table 19 show some improvement in the forecast performance for 
most countries and there are fewer negative errors in the last two years of the sample. 
Amongst the Euro Area countries, however, Belgium Portugal and Germany do show 
negative errors in both of these years, but the forecast performance is clearly better in  
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Germany; although we appear to have a stronger explanation of the behaviour of consumption 
in most countries with these preferred equations. Hence, it is useful to turn to these 
determinants of aggregate consumption in order to gain an understanding of recent 
weaknesses in consumption growth 
 
It is, of course, difficult to forecast so far out of sample, even though the equations were 
selected over the entire data period and particularly given that the driving variables are not 
forecast. Table 20 is even slightly better since this covers the shortened period and thus 
excludes any noise from the longer forecast horizon. However, there appears to be continued 
problems of over prediction with these shorter forecasts for Germany and Italy, while France 
shows continuous under prediction. In addition, Finland, Greece and Sweden appear to have 
weak consumption during this period. Given these persistent effects, we now examine 





Table 20:   Preferred Equation Forecast Errors (2001-2004) 
(Annual average) 
  OE GR FR  IT UK US  SP   
2002  0.0015 -0.0010 0.0018 0.0003 0.0011 -0.0003 0.0006   
2003  0.0026 0.0042 0.0041 -0.0007 0.0025 0.0024 0.0000   
2004  0.0031 -0.0050 0.0066 -0.0018 0.0061 -0.0022 0.0049   
Average 0.0018 -0.0004 0.0031 -0.0006 0.0024 0.0000 0.0014   
          
 GE  SD  NL  BG  PT  FN  DK  IR 
2002  -0.0022 -0.0003 0.0051 -0.0005 -0.0046 -0.0012 0.0002 -0.0038 
2003  -0.0011 -0.0061 0.0020 0.0003 -0.0036 0.0017 -0.0005 0.0017 
2004  -0.0055 -0.0038 0.0041 0.0018 -0.0005 -0.0036 0.0076 0.0018 
Average -0.0022 -0.0025 0.0028 0.0004 -0.0022 -0.0008 0.0018 -0.0001 
 
 
Decomposing Changes in Consumption 
We utilise the dynamic structure of our equations in order to find the cumulated effects of the 
driving variables on consumption. The contributions depend not only on current events, but 
also on the impact of previous events on current consumption mediated through the lagged 
dependent variables. Hence, the residuals in our charts are ‘dynamic’ as they cumulate the 
effects of past omitted variables and other factors on the growth of current consumption. They 
are not, therefore, directly comparable to the ‘static’ residuals that we present in the tables 
above. We choose to present evaluations for the three largest Euro Area countries, the UK and 

























































































































































































































































The German equation moves from a position of substantial under prediction to an almost 
equal and opposite over prediction in 2002 where it continues to grow (negatively) over the 
rest of the sample. This behaviour is also reflected in both of the preferred equation residual 
tables and suggests that at least one key driver of consumption has eroded during this period. 
As we can see from the decomposition chart, the dynamic residual is negative in 2002 and 
again, albeit it to a lesser extent, in 2004. This indicates that there have been factors reducing 
consumption in addition to those that we have been investigating. These may reflect the 
impact of worries about structural reforms to the labour market and social security, both of 
which may lead individuals to (correctly) perceive that they need to raise their level of 
savings. Weak housing markets in Germany have been marginally reducing consumption in 
that country, but this has been partly offset by the impact of stronger growth in real wealth. 
However, it is clear from the chart that the major factor holding back consumption growth in 
Germany has been the weak growth of real personal disposable income since the beginning of 
2002. 
 
The decomposition for the UK shows that the contribution of income growth slowed in 2002, 
but only marginally. Although strong growth in real house prices has added significantly to 
the strength of consumption boosting it by more than 1 per cent in 2003 and 2004. Weak 
financial asset prices and growing debts have meant that real financial wealth has held back 
consumption marginally in the UK. The dynamic residual is generally small, but appears 
positive in 2004. However, data revisions after our data set was cast have removed this under 
prediction and this is discussed in the National Institute Review for October 2005. 
 
The decomposition for France shows that the contribution of real disposable income to the 
growth of consumption also slowed in 2002, albeit by a small amount. The French preferred  
 48
equation contains demographic factors and these build slowly over time and hence they add 
little to our understanding of recent patterns in French consumption. Growth in real financial 
wealth has added to consumption growth in 2004, but only marginally and overall it is clear 
that consumption was under predicted in 2004 evidenced by a positive contribution from the 
dynamic residual. This is consistent with the results in our forecast error tables.  
 
There are large unexplained factors in the determination of Italian consumption, and this is 
reflected by the need for a number of one-off dummies in our regression equation. The 
decomposition for Italy shows that the cumulate effects of the equation residual have been 
regularly negative in the last 5 years. The Italian equation has a significant role for the real 
interest rate and as this has been low in recent years it has been supporting consumption, as 
has the direct effect of continual attempts to tighten fiscal policy. Real financial wealth effects 
have been strong, in part because the Italian wealth stock is biased toward bonds and their 
prices have been rising in a period of falling long term rates.  
 
The Italian decomposition is repeated in the subsequent chart without the residual for clarity 
of exposition. It is clear from this chart that weak real personal income growth held back 
consumption from 2001 to the beginning of 2004, but since then it has been boosting 
consumption growth modestly. There has, however, been unexplained weakness in 
consumption growth in Italy in 2004 and 2005, possibly reflecting worries about future 
income prospects following-on from a very weak supply side performance over the last few 
years 
Figure 3 
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The decomposition for Sweden displays a similar pattern to that of Germany with a sharp 
slowdown in the impact of real personal income growth in 2002, which leads to a slowdown  
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in consumption growth. However, from the end of 2003, a strengthening of the impact of 
income growth, along with a positive impact of increases in real financial wealth, have helped 
to support consumption. The residual weakness we observe in static residuals above is 
washed-out in the dynamic residuals suggesting that consumption growth is explainable. Once 
again, demographic factors have no great impact on short term developments, as we would 
expect. 
 
Our decomposition of growth for Finland shows that the residual weakness of consumption 
we have seen has come about despite a strengthening in the impact of personal income growth 
and positive contributions from house price growth and real financial wealth. Only fiscal 
policy has had a direct negative impact on consumption and in 2004 the impact of personal 
income growth declined slightly. Developments in 2005 will have to be captured by dummies 
to cover the impact of the strike in the paper and pulp industries. 
 
The decomposition for Greece shows that consumption growth has been strong and has been 
supported by contributions from real personal income and from real financial wealth. In 2004, 
the impacts of personal income growth increased markedly as a result on the Olympics, but 
consumption growth did not respond, as we can see from the dynamic residual. This probably 
reflects a rational response to transitory developments. 
 
 
Annex:   residuals  
 
Table 21:   Single Equation Forecast Errors – New Basic Equations   
(With real interest rates and house prices) (Annual average) 
 
  OE GR FR  IT UK US  SP   
2000  0.0044 -0.0007 0.0019 0.0003 -0.0054 -0.0039 -0.0026   
2001  0.0023 0.0012 0.0011 -0.0050 0.0020 0.0013 -0.0041   
2002  0.0030 0.0018 -0.0003 -0.0011 0.0003 0.0039 -0.0035   
2003  0.0015 0.0066 0.0001 -0.0021 0.0020 0.0088 -0.0046   
2004  0.0022  --  0.0018 -0.0035 0.0054 0.0060 0.0003   
Average 
2000-04  0.0027 0.0023 0.0007 -0.0020 0.0009 0.0032 -0.0029   
Average 
2002-04  0.0022 0.0042 0.0006 -0.0022 0.0026 0.0062 -0.0026   
          
 GE  SD  NL  BG  PT  FN  DK  IR 
2000  0.0021 -0.0028 0.0100 0.0025 -0.0020 0.0007 -0.0112 0.0022 
2001  0.0026 -0.0065 0.0044 -0.0084 -0.0060 0.0023 -0.0031 0.0002 
2002  -0.0021 0.0000  0.0035 -0.0018 -0.0055 -0.0010 -0.0005 -0.0044 
2003  -0.0018 -0.0052 -0.0017 -0.0016 -0.0051 0.0000 -0.0014 -0.0009 
2004  -0.0065 -0.0042 0.0025 -0.0003 -0.0019 -0.0049 0.0063 -0.0021 
Average 
2000-04  0.0002 -0.0036 0.0041 -0.0023 -0.0041 -0.0006 -0.0041 -0.0010 
Average 
2002-04  -0.0035 -0.0031 0.0015 -0.0012 -0.0042 -0.0020 0.0015 -0.0025 




Table 22:   Single equation forecast errors – New Basic Equations plus Demographic 
Data (Annual Average) 
 
  OE GR FR  IT UK US  SP   
2000  -0.0091 -0.0001 0.0062 -0.0067 -0.0060 -0.0035 -0.0037   
2001  -0.0159 0.0033 0.0073 -0.0142 0.0032 0.0028 -0.0074   
2002  -0.0226 0.0043 0.0065 -0.0132 -0.0006 0.0044 -0.0104   
2003  -0.0336 0.0089 0.0099 -0.0177 0.0040 0.0096 -0.0153   
2004  -0.0395 0.0006 0.0129 -0.0239 0.0072 0.0057 -0.0132   
Average 
2000-04  -0.0241 0.0034 0.0075 -0.0129 0.0015 0.0038 -0.0100   
Average 
2002-04  -0.0319 0.0046 0.0098 -0.0183 0.0035 0.0066 -0.0130   
          
 GE  SD  NL  BG  PT  FN  DK  IR 
2000  -0.0048 -0.0045 0.0093  0.0000 -0.0096 -0.0032 -0.0049 -0.0113 
2001  -0.0025 -0.0143 0.0025 -0.0118 -0.0132 0.0011 -0.0130 -0.0030 
2002  -0.0093 -0.0086 -0.0007 -0.0053 0.0000 -0.0016 -0.0162 -0.0005 
2003  -0.0083 -0.0102 -0.0063 -0.0049 0.0000  0.0007 -0.0203 -0.0014 
2004  -0.0158 -0.0070 -0.0014 -0.0041 0.0000 -0.0047 -0.0234 0.0064 
Average 
2000-04  -0.0062 -0.0094 0.0012 -0.0055 0.0000 -0.0008 -0.0136 -0.0041 
Average 





Table 23:   Single equation forecast errors – New Basic Equations plus Confidence 
Indicators (Annual Average) 
 
  OE
*  GR FR  IT UK US SP   
2000  --  -0.0027 0.0003 0.0021 -0.0059 -0.0034 -0.0014   
2001  --  0.0010 0.0020 -0.0053 0.0008 0.0042 0.0006   
2002  --  0.0021 -0.0010 -0.0002 0.0013 0.0052 0.0034   
2003  --  0.0088 0.0008 -0.0047 0.0011 0.0111 0.0031   
2004  --  -0.0035 0.0001 -0.0035 0.0047 0.0072 0.0071   
Average 
2000-04  --  0.0011 0.0005 -0.0020 0.0004 0.0049 0.0026   
Average 
2002-04  --  0.0025 -0.0001 -0.0028 0.0024 0.0078 0.0045   
          
 GE  SD  NL  BG  PT  FN  DK  IR 
2000  0.0010 -0.0111 0.0080 0.0003 -0.0019 0.0000 -0.0116 0.0022 
2001  0.0022 -0.0346 0.0025 -0.0089 -0.0058 0.0076 -0.0036 -0.0009 
2002  -0.0037 -0.0258 0.0022 -0.0021 -0.0048 0.0051 -0.0007 -0.0144 
2003  -0.0032 -0.0211 -0.0021 -0.0015 -0.0047 0.0101 -0.0006 -0.0094 
2004  -0.0087 -0.0228 0.0033 -0.0014 -0.0015 -0.0018 0.0070 -0.0069 
Average  -0.0009 -0.0232 0.0027 -0.0030 -0.0043 0.0057 -0.0041 -0.0056 
Average 
2002-04  -0.0052 -0.0232 0.0012 -0.0016 -0.0037 0.0045 0.0019 -0.0102 




Table 24:   Single equation forecast errors – New Basic Equations plus Fiscal Balance 
(Annual Average) 
 
  OE GR FR  IT UK US  SP   
2000  0.0019 -0.0005 0.0035 -0.0002 -0.0071 -0.0024 -0.0004   
2001  -0.0013 0.0013 0.0032 -0.0046 -0.0002 0.0035 -0.0016   
2002  0.0026  0.0028 -0.0009 -0.0012 -0.0003 0.0031 -0.0006   
2003  0.0005 0.0072 -0.0025 -0.0020 0.0020 0.0074 -0.0010   
2004  0.0013 -0.0030 -0.0014 -0.0031 0.0059  0.0037  0.0041   
Average 
2000-04  0.0010 0.0016 0.0008 -0.0020 0.0001 0.0030 0.0001   
Average 
2002-04  0.0015 0.0024 -0.0016 -0.0021 0.0026 0.0047 0.0008   
          
 GE  SD  NL  BG  PT  FN  DK  IR 
2000  0.0028 -0.0034 0.0070 0.0023 -0.0016 0.0007 -0.0093 -0.0006 
2001  0.0053 -0.0060 0.0048 -0.0082 -0.0059 0.0023 -0.0023 0.0025 
2002  -0.0013 0.0012 0.0058 -0.0010 -0.0045 -0.0010 0.0013 -0.0078 
2003  -0.0012 -0.0056 0.0025 -0.0012 -0.0047 0.0000 -0.0005 -0.0075 
2004  -0.0057 -0.0044 0.0045 -0.0002 -0.0015 -0.0049 0.0079 -0.0079 
Average 
2000-04  0.0014 -0.0035 0.0050 -0.0020 -0.0041 0.0005 -0.0027 -0.0034 
Average 







4  Panel estimation  
It is possible to investigate consumption behaviour in the Euro Area, the EU and the US using 
panel data analysis. This involves imposing restrictions on parameters across countries that 
may not be strictly valid, and we test for this in various ways. We first estimate a basic model 
of all countries and for the EMU members, we then add progressively the real interest rate and 
the change in real house prices. This gives us a basis from which we can evaluate the roles of 
consumer confidence, government deficits, demography, equity price volatility and 
equilibrium unemployment indicators to see if these in turn have had an impact on 
consumption. We report the residuals on the three basic equations and those where the 
additional variables are significant in order to aid the evaluation of the reasons for weak 
consumption in Europe. In an annex we also use the panel analysis to test for various 
specification changes, such as the inclusion of gross wealth and gross liabilities and changing 
the time domain. 
 
 
4.1  Basic Results for a fixed effects panel 
We chose for the base case the sample period 1974-2004, which covers a long period of time 
but avoids the potentially differing behaviour in the pre Bretton Woods period. As in the 
single equation evaluation, we start with a basic model including levels and dynamics in real 
personal disposable income (RPDI) and real financial wealth (RNW), and we then add the 
lagged level of real interest rates (RR) as well as the current change, as well as the rate of  
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change in the real house (RPH) to this model. We use the same log approximation to ensure 
that errors are stationary and estimation is efficient. Our workhorse model discussed above is  
 
t t t k t i j t i
t t t t
RPH dRR RR RPDI RNW
RNW RPDI C C
ln * ln * ln *
ln * ln * ln * ln
2 1 1
1 2 1 1 1 1 0
∆ + + + ∆ + ∆ +
+ + + = ∆
− − −
− − −
δ δ δ γ γ
β β α α




The results of GLS fixed effects unbalanced panel estimation using the simplest possible 
specification are shown in Table 25, column 1 and all the variables are significant at 95%. 
The short run effect of a 1% increase in income is a rise in consumption of 0.14%, while the 
effect of a 1% rise in real net financial wealth effect in the short run is smaller at 0.01%. In 
the long run the income effect is 0.67% (the ratio of the income term to the error correction 
coefficient) while the corresponding wealth effect is 0.15%. Given our time domain contains 
almost 120 elements, even with an error correction coefficient of 0.02 (0.1 approximately if it 
were annual data) we do not expect the time series bias on the lagged dependent variable (see 
Nickel (1981) and Judson and Owen (1999)) to be significant. 
 
The parameter results are in line with existing estimates (such as those of Barrell and Davis 
(2004a)). According to the F tests, the equality of slope coefficients as well as the fixed 
effects are accepted relative to Leamer’s (1978) diffuse prior. This is an F test with critical 
values which become larger as the number of observations grows, an alternative to the 
conventional testing procedure, which is certain to reject all point null hypotheses when 
sample sizes become large. The diagnostics imply no heteroskedasticity or autocorrelation. 
The second column shows the corresponding result for the Euro Area. The results are very 
similar, although we note that the short run wealth effect smaller. Also, the coefficient on the 
change in net financial wealth is not significant for the EMU countries as a whole. 
Diagnostics are again satisfactory.  
 
There are additional questions we can address. The third and fourth columns show extended 
equations to allow for an effect of real interest rates. This is a generated regressor, and hence 
it is measured with error, and it is therefore instrumented by past interest inflation and rates. It 
is clear that in both the full sample and the euro area, real interest rates had a significant long 
run effect on consumption on average, but the short run effect of a change in real interest rates 
is insignificant and possibly of the wrong sign. Other variables remain significant, and 
dynamic terms in real income and to a lesser extent real wealth are larger in size than in the 
equations without real rates, suggesting that some specification error has been removed. Note 
that this result does imply that an Euler approach would not be appropriate, given the 
significance of the short and long run income and wealth variables, as well as lagged 
consumption. The Euler approach would imply that significance should only attach to the 




Table 25:   Panel consumption functions for 1974-2003 
  Basic  +Real interest rate  +House prices 
  All EMU  All EMU  Full  sample  EMU 
















































































F (pooling)  4.8 (8.3)  6.4 (7.8)  3.5 (8.6)  4.2 (8.1)  3.1(8.8)  3.3 (8.3) 
F (fixed effects)  5.0 (7.6)  4.9 (7.3)  4.7 (7.6)  4.9 (7.2)  6.5 (7.6)  8.0 (7.2) 
R-bar sq  0.10 0.11 0.13 0.17 0.19  0.22 
LM het  .09 (0.77)  1.26 (0.26)  0.20 (0.66)  3.97 (0.05)  0.35(0.55)  0.63 (0.43) 








2.2 (1.00,1.00)  2.2 (0.99,1.00) 
Implicit long 
run:-  
income effect    0.67 0.60 0.63 0.58  0.77  0.75 
wealth effect  0.15 0.19 0.20  0.203  0.11  0.12 
Key: C stands for real consumption; RPDI for real personal disposable income, RNW for real personal net 
financial wealth, ECM for the error correction terms, RR for the real interest rate, RPH for real house prices. A 
“D” prefix indicates the difference of the relevant variable.  
 
Finally in Table 25 we show the impact of adding real house prices as well as real interest 
rates to the basic equation to address the potential impact of tangible wealth on consumption. 
This is restricted to the short run and does not allow for accumulation as well as price 
increases, given lack of tangible wealth data for the full set of countries. It can be seen that the 
difference in the log of house prices is highly significant both for the total dataset and for the 
euro area countries, albeit much smaller when the UK, US, Denmark and Sweden are 
excluded – countries which are financially liberalised and where house prices have been 
buoyant in recent years. The effect is also considerably larger than that of the change in real 
financial wealth, which nevertheless remains significant. The rest of the parameters are 
significant, with the exception of the change term in real financial wealth in EMU. The error 
correction term doubles in size as compared to the previous specification, and becomes more 
significant, suggesting we have a much better specified model. The long run impact of income 
rises markedly in this relationship, suggesting that the simpler relationships without house 
prices suffered from omitted variable biases. 
 
4.2  Robustness checks on data period and gross wealth  
Robustness checks on the estimates in Table 25 were conducted, and are reported in Annex 
Tables 37, 38 and 39. We first split the net financial wealth term into assets and liabilities and 
tested to see whether these two variables had differential impacts, and we concluded that they 
did not. We then successively lengthened and then reduced the data period. Using the long run 
effects of income and wealth as a diagnostic, it can be seen that there are few dramatic 
changes to the estimates. Including the period before 1974 reduces the income effect for all 
countries in the basic and real interest rates equations but the results with real house prices  
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included are virtually identical. The more recent estimates beginning in 1980 generally show 
higher long run income effects – implausibly so for the simpler equations for the EMU 
countries, while the long run wealth effect is comparable.  
 
4.3  Expanding the determinants of consumption 
Table 26 shows three variants on the basic equation that we found were potentially 
significant, whilst table 27 includes two that did not add to our explanation. All of these 
experiments are intended to capture some of the potential factors underlying weak 
consumption in Europe. These are, first, low consumer confidence, second poor fiscal 
performance, third, demographic ageing, fourth, the changing pattern of equilibrium 
unemployment and fifth, equity market volatility. In estimating equations allowing for 
consumer confidence, we incorporated the first difference and the lagged level of the 
confidence indicator derived by the Eurostat for each country. We similarly in assessing fiscal 
effects on consumption include the difference and level of the fiscal deficit. We instrumented 
the current difference given possible simultaneity with the difference of consumption. Third, 
we added demographic data in terms of the lagged log of the share in total population of the 
three age groups 20-39, 40-64 and 65+. We then added a Commission Services estimate of 
equilibrium unemployment (the NAIRU) for each country. Finally, we included the lagged 
conditional variance derived from country-by-country GARCH (1,1) estimation of equity 




The first two columns of Table 26 show that the level of confidence is highly significant, 
whilst difference effects only matter if we include the non-EMU countries. Note that the 
estimates using confidence indicators only utilise them from 1985, and in some countries in 
1995, due to short period over which confidence series are available, and hence cannot be 
directly compared with other results. Confidence is more significant in the all countries 
regression than in the EMU regression, suggesting it may be more significant in the US and 
the UK than in the Euro Area. It is notable that inclusion of confidence leads to insignificance 
of a number of variables, including short run wealth effects in both regressions as well as 
changes in interest rates in our basic regression for All countries and house prices in the EMU 
regression. We do find a significant role for the lagged level of confidence in both the whole 
sample and in the EMU regression, but current dated effects may be absent in the Euro Area. 
Our results are consistent with the work of Pain and Weale (2001) as well as with the more 
negative results we find in our single equation study. Ludvigson (2004) which shows that 
confidence does contain forward looking information but much of that information can be 
provided by other popular economic and financial indicators, and independent information 
provided is limited. 
 
                                                 
5 Details of the volatility regression estimates is available on request.  
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Table 26:   Additions to basic equations for 1974-2004 
  Confidence (1985 on)  Govt deficit  Demographics 
  All EMU  All  EMU  All  EMU 




































































































      




      




























F (pooling)  2.8 (9.6)  2.6 (8.9)  2.7 (9.3)  2.8 (8.7)  3.2 (9.5)  3.2 (8.9) 
F (fixed 
effects) 
7.3 (7.1)  8.1 (6.7)  6.2 (7.5)  7.3 (7.2)  5.8 (7.5)  7.8 (7.2) 
R-bar sq  0.22 0.24  0.20  0.19  0.19  0.22 
LM het  0.59 (0.44)  4.4 (0.035)  .30 (.59)  1.0 (0.3)  0.69 (0.41)  1.3 (0.25) 













income   
0.70 0.8  0.79  0.81  0.76  0.67 
Long run 
wealth  
0.091 0.02  0.10  0.08  0.11  0.12 
Key: C stands for real consumption; RPDI for real personal disposable income, RNW for real personal net 
financial wealth, ECM for the error correction terms, RR for the real interest rate, RPH for real house prices, 
CONF for consumer confidence, GBR for the government budget ratio (as a share of GDP). A “D” prefix 
indicates the difference of the relevant variable.  
Note: Brackets after F tests show critical value for Leamer diffuse priors, brackets after LM heteroskedasticity 
test and DW show P-values. 
 
As the introduction of confidence measures removes the change in real financial wealth from 
the equations we investigated the relationship between wealth and confidence by checking 
whether confidence Granger causes net financial wealth. We started by running a regression 
of the change in the log of wealth on the two lags of itself and two lags in the change in 
confidence, and then repeated the exercise with confidence as the dependent variable. We 
found no significant role for confidence in the wealth regression, but we did find a significant 
role for wealth in the confidence regression. Hence changes in wealth Granger cause changes 
in confidence, and not the other way around. This suggests it would not be appropriate to  
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include confidence in an econometric equation, but it could be helpful in forecasting, as full 
sets of data on wealth are only available with a lag. The evolution of confidence could be used 
to help make judgements about the setting of future residuals in forecasts for consumption 
using equations that did not include confidence factors. In addition, we can forecast wealth 
using equity prices and other easily available indicators such as personal sector liabilities and 
holdings of monetary assets. We should note that in both experiments the confidence 
regression fails the fixed effects test. 
 
Ricardian effects 
The second set of results shows that the fiscal positions (columns 3 and 4) also have an impact 
on consumption. They are consistent with a Ricardian explanation whereby an improvement 
(deterioration) of the fiscal position leads to stronger (weaker) consumption. The change in 
the fiscal position is instrumented by lags of itself to allow for the possible simultaneity with 
changes in consumption, and it is significant in both regressions. The change in deficits is 
significant in both regressions, but the level of the deficit is not significant in the regression 
for all countries, and is only marginally significant in the EMU regression. We calculate that 
in the long run a one per cent increase in the government surplus in the Euro Area might 




The demographic results differ a little between the full sample and the EMU countries, with 
more significant results for the latter. The only age related variable which is significant is the 
proportion in the 20-39 age groups, the size of which boosts consumption, ceteris paribus. 
This is plausible as this is the age group that has to spend a large proportion of its income on 
accumulating consumer goods, not least owing to mortgage borrowing which counts as 
negative saving. The middle group have a positive but insignificant effect on consumption. 
The 65+ age group meanwhile reduces consumption, but the effect is not significant. Note 
that this is not strictly in line with the life cycle hypothesis since it would imply high saving 
by 40-64s and negative saving by the elderly as they decumulate assets. As was the case for 
fiscal effects, the standard variables tend to be significant in this case, although the long run 
income effect is low in the Euro Area. We should note that the demographic effects cause the 
EMU regression to fail the fixed effects test.  
 
Estimates of the NAIRU 
We added a series representing equilibrium unemployment to the regression on the 
assumption that increases in the NAIRU increase individuals specific perceptions of risk, and 
hence should reduce consumption. In particular a higher NAIRU with a given level of income 
should raise the risk of spells of unemployment. This should raise the need for precautionary 
saving, and hence reduce consumption for each level of income. In both the full sample in the 
EMU countries we found no significant role for the NAIRU, although its effect was of the 
correct sign. We should note that the NAIRU variable cause the EMU regression to fail the 
fixed effects test,  
 
Equity price volatility 
The fourth set of results is for conditional volatility of equity prices. An increase in the 
volatility of wealth would perhaps raise the need for precautionary saving, as assets would be 
harder to collateralise in such an environment. We find in each case that equity price volatility 
is not significant. Asset price volatility may be to a large extent unobserved as market based 
assets are often held by life assurance companies and pensions funds, and consumers may  
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have little understanding of the impact of equity price volatility on their wealth
6. Changes in 
financial wealth may therefore contain few signals for consumers, and we would expect that 
changes in real net financial wealth would not be significant. The short run impacts of 
financial wealth that we observe are small but they are marginally increased by the inclusion 
of equity market volatility, and they become significant in our Euro Area regressions. It is 
possible that equity market volatility helps us understand consumption behaviour, but the 
evidence in support of this proposition is not strong. 
 
Table 27:    Additions to basic equations for 1974-2004 
  Equilibrium Unemployment  Equity market  volatility 
  All EMU  All  EMU 









































































F (pooling)  2.9 (9.1)  3.0 (8.5)  3.0 (8.9)  4.3 (8.3) 
F (fixed effects)  6.2 (7.5)  7.3 (7.2)  6.0 (7.4)  7.2 (7.0) 
R-bar sq  0.19 0.22 0.16  0.20 
LM het  .42 (0.52)  062 (0.43)  0.4(0.51)  2.1 (0.15) 
DW  2.2 (1.0,1.0)  2.2 (0.99,1.0)  2.2 (1.0,1.0)  2.3 (1.0,1.0) 
Long run: income effect    0.76 0.73  0.76  0.72 
Wealth effect  0.12 0.13  0.14  0.12 
Key: C stands for real consumption; RPDI for real personal disposable income, RNW for real personal net 
financial wealth, ECM for the error correction terms, RR for the real interest rate, RPH for real house prices, 
GVAR for a measure of equity price volatility. A “D” prefix indicates the difference of the relevant variable.  
Note: Brackets after F tests show critical value for Leamer diffuse priors, brackets after LM heteroskedasticity 
test and DW show P-values. 
 
 
4.4  Pooled mean group estimation 
As we know from the individual country studies above there are good reasons to presume that 
we should not assume common dynamics across our group of countries, and it is also not clear 
that this group of countries share a common long run. Although the regressions reported 
above include test for general poolability which are weakly passed, there are a number of 
more specific hypotheses we can test. We can undertake a series of regressions where we 
relax in turn the restrictions on the dynamics around the error correction term, the speed of 
error correction and ultimately the long run structure of common coefficients. This sequence 
                                                 
6 Note that we also tested for a separate effect of the log pension assets/GDP ratio and its first difference. These 
are derived from annual data from the OECD and national sources. In fact, there is no significant effect either at 
the short or the long run. Hence results are not reported here.  
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of test has been advocated by Pesaran and Smith (1995), and they not only help us avoid 
biases in the parameters of the panel, but also allow us to investigate interesting differences 
between countries.  
 
Table 28 shows the basic Pesaran style pooled mean group (PMG) estimates where we allow 
for a common long run and a common error correction by idiosyncratic dynamic terms. The 
coefficients on the long run are not markedly changed compared to the GLS panel shown in 
Table 25. Long run income effects take up more than 90 per cent of the explanation of the 
long run, and static homogeneity essentially holds in the data, and is not imposed. 
Nevertheless, the dynamic terms do suggest significant differences in the dynamics of 
consumption across countries. Net wealth differences are significant only in Finland, Ireland, 
Sweden and the UK, countries that have experienced asset price booms and/or banking crises 
over the estimation period. As regards the income growth term, it is not significant in Sweden 
and Spain and is only significant at 90% in Belgium, France and the Netherlands. Similar 
patterns are reproduced for the euro area. The size of the dynamic income term in particular 
varies markedly, much in line with the results in Barrell and Davis (2004a), from 0.1 in the 
Netherlands to 0.76 in Germany in both estimates, suggesting pooling is not fully appropriate 
for the difference terms. 
 
Table 28:   Pooled mean group estimates (basic equation) for 1974-2003 
ALL EMU 
LC1  -0.03064 -5.4  LC1  -0.02767 -4.3 
LRPDI1  0.026584 4.3  LRPDI1  0.024016 3.3 
LRNW1  3.82E-03 6.0  LRNW1  3.36E-03 4.8 
BGDLRNW 2.69E-04  0.0  BGDLRNW  -3.40E-04  0.0 
DKDLRNW 0.012231  1.5  FNDLRNW  0.050326 3.1 
FNDLRNW  0.050339 3.0  FRDLRNW 0.014812  0.8 
FRDLRNW 0.015093  0.8  GEDLRNW  -2.19E-03  -0.1 
GEDLRNW -1.69E-03  -0.1  GRDLRNW  -7.79E-04  -0.1 
GRDLRNW -4.19E-04  -0.1  IRDLRNW 0.035781 2.7 
IRDLRNW  0.035405 2.6  ITDLRNW 0.023492  1.1 
ITDLRNW 0.0235  1.0  NLDLRNW  9.61E-03 1.0 
NLDLRNW 9.57E-03  1.0  OEDLRNW  -6.39E-03  -0.6 
OEDLRNW -6.00E-03  -0.5  PTDLRNW 3.64E-03  0.2 
PTDLRNW 3.84E-03  0.2  SPDLRNW  6.24E-03  0.8 
SDDLRNW  0.035186 2.9  BGDLRPDI  0.216662 1.8 
SPDLRNW 7.06E-03  0.9  FNDLRPDI  0.397863 4.4 
UKDLRNW  0.089261 3.4  FRDLRPDI 0.275503  1.7 
USDLRNW 0.015343  0.6  GEDLRPDI  0.755716 9.8 
BGDLRPDI  0.215564 1.7  GRDLRPDI  0.380354 5.0 
DKDLRPDI  0.129441 1.9  IRDLRPDI  0.456334 5.8 
FNDLRPDI  0.398454 4.3  ITDLRPDI  0.257751 2.2 
FRDLRPDI  0.270938 1.6  NLDLRPDI 0.081707  1.6 
GEDLRPDI  0.756563 9.6  OEDLRPDI  0.720613 5.9 
GRDLRPDI  0.38094 4.9  PTDLRPDI  0.352983 4.2 
IRDLRPDI  0.454713 5.7  SPDLRPDI 0.043396  0.7 
ITDLRPDI  0.256864 2.1 
NLDLRPDI  0.084206 1.6 
OEDLRPDI  0.714433 5.7 
PTDLRPDI  0.355909 4.1 
SDDLRPDI 0.068673  0.9 
SPDLRPDI 0.03955  0.6 
UKDLRPDI  0.170627 3.1 
USDLRPDI  0.246701 2.8 




Table 29    Pooled mean group estimates (extended equation – levels terms)  1974-
2003 
ALL EMU 
LC1  -0.04078 -5.9  LC1  -0.03533 -4.4 
LRPDI1  0.03537 5.0  LRPDI1  0.028745 3.3 
LRNW1  3.47E-03 3.2  LRNW1  4.09E-03 3.0 




We also ran a PMG equation including real interest rates and real house prices.. Interest rate 
effects are more significant in the Euro Area than in the whole sample, once we allow for 
heterogeneity in the dynamics. Concerning difference terms (Table 30), only Ireland, Sweden 
and the UK feature significant financial wealth terms; for RPDI there are significant 
differences in Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Austria, the UK and the US. Germany and 
Austria (OE) display the largest short term income effects (over 0.7) in the sample, whilst for 
most countries it lies around 0.3. When we consider short term effects for real rates it is 
Germany, Austria and the US that are sensitive, although in the former case this may reflect 
the change in the level of real interest rates around 1990 that was associated with the 
structural changes that came with unification. For house prices, the estimate of the impact of 
changes on consumption highlights Denmark, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden, 
Spain, the UK and the US. Similar results obtain for the EMU sample. Note that it is implies 
that for some countries, only the long run and error correction terms determine consumption 
growth. This result may reflect the rather restricted dynamic specification in the panel, as our 
single country studies about suggest that for some countries, such as France, a lag in the 
change in RPDI is need in the equation. Of course the validity of the dynamics that come 
from the PMG depend in turn on the validity of the PMG assumptions that the error correction 
and the long run coefficients are equal. 
 
 
Table 30:   Pooled mean group estimates (extended equation – difference terms) 
ALL EMU 
BGDLRNW 3.90E-03  0.2  BGDLRNW  5.07E-03  0.3 
DKDLRNW -3.35E-03  -0.4       
FNDLRNW 0.019162  1.0  FNDLRNW  0.019727  1.1 
FRDLRNW 0.019443  1.1  FRDLRNW  0.020093  1.1 
GEDLRNW -7.87E-03  -0.3  GEDLRNW  -7.63E-03  -0.3 
IRDLRNW  0.028776 2.0  IRDLRNW  0.032747 2.3 
ITDLRNW 0.029772  1.2  ITDLRNW  0.033121  1.4 
NLDLRNW 8.43E-03  0.9  NLDLRNW  9.83E-03  1.0 
OEDLRNW -7.83E-03  -0.7  OEDLRNW  -7.29E-03  -0.7 
SDDLRNW  0.027993 2.3      
SPDLRNW -3.78E-03  -0.4  SPDLRNW  -2.92E-03  -0.3 
UKDLRNW  0.046722 1.7      
USDLRNW 8.26E-03  0.3      
BGDLRPDI 0.193545  1.4  BGDLRPDI  0.19195  1.4 
DKDLRPDI 0.0481  0.6      
FNDLRPDI  0.290118 2.9  FNDLRPDI  0.277976 2.8 
FRDLRPDI 0.206316  1.2  FRDLRPDI  0.198797  1.2 
GEDLRPDI  0.712478 8.7  GEDLRPDI  0.711517 8.6 
IRDLRPDI  0.259067 2.6  IRDLRPDI  0.254722 2.6 
ITDLRPDI  0.222674 1.9  ITDLRPDI  0.229721 1.9  
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NLDLRPDI 0.054176  0.8  NLDLRPDI  0.049181  0.8 
OEDLRPDI  0.749811 5.9  OEDLRPDI  0.739645 5.8 
SDDLRPDI -0.04236  -0.5       
SPDLRPDI -0.09449  -1.2  SPDLRPDI  -0.09687  -1.3 
UKDLRPDI  0.135004 2.5      
USDLRPDI  0.170173 1.9      
BGDRR 4.45E-04  0.6  BGDRR  3.88E-04  0.5 
DKDRR 7.99E-06  0.0      
FNDRR -5.63E-04  -0.8  FNDRR  -6.2E-04  -0.8 
FRDRR 1.29E-03  1.4  FRDRR  1.24E-03  1.3 
GEDRR  -1.29E-03 -1.7  GEDRR -1.36E-03  -1.8 
IRDRR -3.47E-05  -0.1  IRDRR  -9.05E-05  -0.2 
ITDRR -7.66E-04  -0.9  ITDRR  -8.10E-04  -1.0 
NLDRR 2.05E-04  0.8  NLDRR  1.12E-04  0.4 
OEDRR  -2.88E-03 -3.2  OEDRR  -2.95E-03 -3.3 
SDDRR 2.66E-04  0.8       
SPDRR -1.66E-04  -0.8  SPDRR  -2.38E-04  -1.1 
UKDRR 4.20E-04  0.8  BGDLRPH  0.011935  0.2 
USDRR  -2.09E-03 -1.8  FNDLRPH  0.160752 4.5 
BGDLRPH 0.020851  0.4  FRDLRPH  0.028491  0.5 
DKDLRPH  0.174038 4.5  GEDLRPH 0.069286  0.9 
FNDLRPH  0.16899 4.7  IRDLRPH  0.197463 3.2 
FRDLRPH 0.03972  0.6  ITDLRPH  -0.01238  -0.7 
GEDLRPH 0.075721  1.0  NLDLRPH  0.11106 3.4 
IRDLRPH  0.216592 3.5  IRDLRPH  0.197463 3.2 
ITDLRPH -9.93E-03  -0.5  ITDLRPH  -0.01238  -0.7 
NLDLRPH  0.120747 3.7  NLDLRPH  0.11106 3.4 
OEDLRPH 0.042288  0.8  OEDLRPH  0.041902  0.8 
SDDLRPH  0.159987 3.5      
SPDLRPH  0.118563 3.0  SPDLRPH  0.110955 2.8 
UKDLRPH  0.150336 4.3      
USDLRPH  0.143285 1.6      
 
 
Table 31 assesses whether it would be justified pool these models. There are number of test 
available for poolability, with the most restrictive being the classical F test and the least being 
Leamer’s dispersed prior. The first set of results test for the equality of long run coefficients 
given that dynamics differ whilst the second block of results test for the equality of the 
dynamic coefficients given the equality of the long run coefficients. Although our preferred 
general models for all countries and for EMU countries with house prices and interest rates 
have an F test of only 2 or 2.2 respectively on the equality of the long run coefficients across 
equations, this is above the Classical statistical test for parameters with T*N degrees of 
freedom and 56 restrictions. Only the test for a common error correction term amongst EMU 
countries, but no common long run coefficients, is passed at the classical level of significance. 
However, the classical test is probably too restrictive, as the relevant number of degrees of 
freedom for this test could be as low as T which equals 120, which is the size of the time 
domain, and it is unlikely to be as high as T*N, where N is the number of cross section 
elements. The observed F is well below the level of the widely used Leamer’s dispersed prior, 
and this suggests that we could perhaps accept that poolability in these cases. 
 
Given the acceptance of pooled long runs, we can test to see if we can pool the dynamic terms 
in the equations. The relevant F statistics range from 3.7 to 9.1, all of them well above the 
Classical level, and most below the Leamer dispersed prior. Indeed the only one that falls 
outside the dispersed prior is the basic EMU model, whilst the extended EMU model with 
house prices and interest rates falls well inside. There is a case to be made on Classical  
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grounds for there being no poolability, whilst we could also argue that all coefficients in the 
extended model are poolable if we are more flexible. The error correction terms are 
potentially poolable in the all country case, and probably so in the Euro Area, However, in 
this case both dynamics and long run effects would still differ between countries. The PMG 
results above reflect the noticeable diversity amongst the dynamics of adjustment terms, and 
pooling these terms would lead to poor forecasting equations for each of the Euro Area 
countries. Hence we would argue that the panel results and their residuals should be seen as 
indicative, and that the evaluation of the weakness of consumption in the Euro Area is best 
undertaken with our individual equations in the previous section. However, maintaining 
poolablity of the long run structure whilst allowing differences in the dynamics may also be of 
interest, and it is perhaps defendable  
 
Table 31:   F tests on equality of coefficients in PMG for 1974-2003 
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Notes: (1) PMG is compared with a totally unrestricted equation, (2) PMG is compared with totally restricted 
equations (3) Test for equality of ECMs in PMG equation. 
 
 
4.5  Looking at the pattern of residuals 
Following these sets of results, we may undertake a measurement of residuals country by 
country in order to find whether consumption has been weak in recent years relative to cross-
country average determinants. In addition we should look for residuals that have been 
becoming increasingly negative, as these will have been contributing to slow growth in 
domestic demand. We look at static and dynamic residuals, at averages across years for all 
countries, utilising only those equations where additional significant variable were added. 
Hence no results are reported for equity price volatility or for NAIRU effects.  
 
We first look at the pattern of residuals on equations that include income and wealth, as these 
are the industry standard. If these do not suggest that there is an unexplained weakness in 
consumption then we can conclude that weak growth in consumption, if it has been observed,  
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is due to weak income or wealth growth. In our panel estimates we have two contenders for 
the basic model, one with common parameters and the PMG model where dynamics are 
allowed to differ across countries. If either of these is not predicting well we can look for 




A notable feature shown in Table 32 is sizeable negative residuals for Germany, and to a 
lesser extent in France, in 2002-4, which is the period of principal interest. This implies over 
prediction by the equations (weak consumption). In Germany the residual is larger than in 
France, though both are larger in 2003 than 2004. Virtually all other countries, including Italy 
and the UK, have some alternation in residuals, the exceptions on the negative side being the 
Netherlands for most specifications, and on positive side the US. These results would suggest 
that there are missing explanatory factors in our specification. There are similar results for the 
equations for the EMU countries alone (Table 33).  
 
Dynamic residuals 
Tables 34 and 35 show the corresponding dynamic residuals, cumulating errors through the 
lagged dependent variable for the 12 quarters up to the current observation. The cumulative 
negative error is again sizeable for Germany and to a lesser extent France, as well as 
Denmark, Austria and (in 2003-4) the Netherlands. The US and Ireland have sizeable, albeit 
declining, positive dynamic residuals. The German dynamic residuals are far higher in the 
simple fixed effects panel than in the PMG results, and as we add real interest rates and house 
prices the dynamic residual in Germany falls to just over 2 per cent in 2004, compared with 5 
per cent in the basic panel. However, this remains one of the largest discrepancies on the 
table, and it increases more than any other residual.  
 
Looking at these residuals in terms of a progression through the models helps us to draw some 
conclusions on the main areas where consumption is unexplainably weak. Focusing on Table 
34, in the basic fixed effects panel, the EMU countries where there us a large dynamic 
residual in 2004 is France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Austria. In our preferred 
PMG specification, with real interest rates and house prices, we get a consistent result only for 
France, Germany and the Netherlands. Looking then at the variants, we see that in all cases 
the large dynamic residual recurs for France and Germany. However, in the Netherlands the 
demographics reduce the residual considerably. In the EMU regression residuals in Table 35 
the results are broadly consistent but dynamic residuals are rather lower for France in the 
basic case and here Germany is most prominent.  
 
Annual average residuals 
Looking at the data year by year in Table 36 there tend on average to be negative residuals for 
most of the specifications in 2002-3 but positive in 2004, suggesting that the specifications do 
not capture all aspects of the recession. We take an unweighted average for these results, and 
hence Denmark and Ireland, for instance, where behaviour appears not to be captured by our 
model as well as in other countries, carry the same weight as France and Germany, which 
represent more than half of the Euro Area sample in value terms. Given this constraint, we 
can compare the average dynamic residual on our fixed effects EMU panel with the same for 
the PMG model. The average residual falls from -0.87 to -0.27, suggesting that allowing for 
some heterogeneity allows us to explain more of the behaviour of consumption. This 
conclusion also leads us to look at individual country regressions.  
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Conclusions and Further Work 
In general we can claim that adding real interest rate effects and including a role for house 
prices improves our ability to understand consumption behaviour, and to explain weak 
consumption in the Euro Area in the last few years. It is clearly wrong to use a common 
equation with common dynamics for all these countries, and the PMG is our preferred 
explanation of developments. This allows short run dynamics to vary but has a common long 
run explanation. There is some evidence that the direct inclusion of government borrowing 
and indicators of the age structure help us explain consumption behaviour, but they add little 
that is substantive in terms of the recent residuals. Confidence measures help us forecast 
consumption, but as they are caused by wealth, they are not directly useful. However, even 
after the inclusion of all relevant factors, we may conclude that consumption has displayed 
unexplained weakness in a number of European countries, especially in Germany.   
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Table 32:   Static residuals (percent, quarterly averages) – all countries 
 
    BG DK FN FR GE GR IR  IT  NL OE PT  SD  SP  UK US 
Basic  2002  0.01  0.06 -0.07 -0.12 -0.48 -0.10 -0.31  0.02 -0.08 -0.31 -0.08  0.18  0.16  0.21  0.02 
fixed  effects  2003  0.05  0.10  0.28 -0.23 -0.55  0.36 -0.03 -0.21 -0.67 -0.13  0.05 -0.14  0.02  0.01  0.28 
panel  2004  0.15  0.88 -0.19 -0.05 -0.32 -0.29  0.03 -0.18 -0.28 -0.19  0.29  0.04  0.52  0.41  0.26 
Real  rates  2002  0.00 -0.01 -0.20 -0.16 -0.48 -0.17 -0.31  0.03 -0.09 -0.29 -0.05  0.11  0.06  0.23 -0.03 
fixed  effects  2003  0.04 -0.03  0.11 -0.25 -0.52  0.26 -0.14 -0.23 -0.63 -0.15  0.01 -0.18 -0.15  0.00  0.20 
panel  2004  0.12  0.73 -0.28 -0.13 -0.39 -0.50  0.29 -0.28 -0.29 -0.21  0.23 -0.07  0.36  0.41  0.14 
Real  house  prices 2002 -0.03 -0.04 -0.22 -0.31 -0.45 -0.09 -0.34  0.19 -0.01 -0.33 -0.23 -0.08 -0.05 -0.05  0.05 
fixed  effects  2003 0.06  -0.10 0.12  -0.45  -0.46 0.52  -0.14  -0.06  -0.52 0.01  -0.21  -0.34  -0.29 0.03 0.30 
panel  2004  0.26  0.61 -0.28 -0.35 -0.36 -0.22  0.49 -0.10 -0.21  0.00  0.03 -0.29  0.26  0.39  0.22 
PMG  2002 -0.03  0.07  0.00 -0.14 -0.35 -0.20 -0.27  0.05 -0.12 -0.23 -0.08  0.37  0.17  0.23  0.02 
basic  2003 0.05 0.08 0.00  -0.20  -0.20 0.32 0.03  -0.19  -0.74  -0.10 0.05  -0.20 0.04 0.00 0.23 
  2004  0.17  0.84 -0.36 -0.05 -0.32 -0.48  0.11 -0.22 -0.32 -0.13  0.36  0.03  0.52  0.42  0.20 
PMG  2002 -0.02 -0.02 -0.11 -0.12 -0.37 -0.24 -0.20  0.00 -0.14 -0.19 -0.10  0.31  0.04  0.20 -0.04 
Real  rates  2003  0.03  0.01 -0.07 -0.22 -0.24  0.24 -0.09 -0.28 -0.76 -0.10 -0.01 -0.26 -0.11 -0.02  0.12 
  2004  0.10  0.83 -0.40 -0.12 -0.35 -0.56  0.31 -0.30 -0.36 -0.11  0.33 -0.06  0.37  0.36  0.13 
PMG    2002  0.02 -0.01 -0.27 -0.13 -0.32  0.00 -0.26  0.23 -0.04 -0.08 -0.09  0.06 -0.09 -0.44 -0.04 
Real  house  prices 2003  0.10 -0.05 -0.01 -0.25 -0.16  0.46 -0.05 -0.01 -0.63  0.05 -0.15 -0.43 -0.23 -0.07  0.15 
  2004  0.24  0.69 -0.30 -0.13 -0.28 -0.17  0.57  0.00 -0.28  0.06  0.14 -0.33  0.28  0.18  0.11 
Demographics  2002  0.05 -0.02 -0.09 -0.22 -0.38 -0.12 -0.48  0.22  0.07 -0.33 -0.24 -0.04 -0.11 -0.02  0.15 
  2003 0.15  -0.07 0.28  -0.35  -0.36 0.49  -0.32  -0.01  -0.42 0.03  -0.22  -0.30  -0.36 0.07 0.40 
  2004  0.37  0.67 -0.10 -0.25 -0.23 -0.25  0.31 -0.03 -0.09  0.04  0.04 -0.25  0.19  0.43  0.32 
Uncertainty  2002 -0.01 -0.03 -0.06 -0.28 -0.41  na  -0.47  0.18  0.03 -0.34 -0.25 -0.02 -0.02 -0.05  0.09 
  2003  0.10 -0.09  0.21 -0.43 -0.36  na  -0.30 -0.07 -0.49  0.01 -0.22 -0.30 -0.25  0.05  0.33 
  2004  0.25  0.62 -0.24 -0.35 -0.33  na  0.29 -0.12 -0.23  0.00  0.00 -0.31  0.27  0.38  0.23 
Confidence  2002 -0.09 -0.16 -0.19 -0.20 -0.36 -0.05 -0.49  0.05  0.13 -0.42 -0.03 -0.07  0.06 -0.16  0.14 
  2003 0.17  -0.06 0.27  -0.17  -0.26 0.77  -0.06  -0.10  -0.17 0.04 0.11  -0.15  -0.07  -0.02 0.48 
  2004  0.24  0.60 -0.15 -0.23 -0.15 -0.06  0.38 -0.03  0.12 -0.01  0.35 -0.09  0.41  0.30  0.29 
Fiscal  effects  2002 -0.07 -0.03 -0.23 -0.25 -0.44 -0.05 -0.36  0.16  0.00 -0.29 -0.31 -0.04 -0.05  0.01  0.12 
  2003 -0.01 -0.11  0.19 -0.40 -0.43  0.56 -0.17 -0.05 -0.50  0.03 -0.21 -0.38 -0.30  0.07  0.36 
  2004  0.22  0.56 -0.26 -0.32 -0.33 -0.19  0.43 -0.08 -0.23  0.00  0.00 -0.33  0.29  0.40  0.25  
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Table 33:   Static residuals (percent, quarterly averages) – EMU 
 
    BG FN FR GE GR IR  IT  NL OE PT SP 
Basic  2002  0.03 -0.05 -0.08 -0.45 -0.08 -0.28  0.04 -0.06 -0.28 -0.07  0.20 
  2003 0.08 0.32  -0.18  -0.50 0.40 0.03  -0.20  -0.64  -0.09 0.07 0.08 
  2004  0.19 -0.14 -0.01 -0.28 -0.19  0.13 -0.16 -0.21 -0.16  0.34  0.58 
RR  2002 -0.01 -0.24 -0.14 -0.46 -0.17 -0.29  0.03 -0.08 -0.26 -0.03  0.04 
  2003  0.05  0.08 -0.21 -0.48  0.26 -0.12 -0.23 -0.59 -0.13 -0.01 -0.16 
  2004  0.13 -0.28 -0.12 -0.38 -0.50  0.34 -0.30 -0.24 -0.19  0.24  0.35 
RHP  2002 -0.01 -0.28 -0.31 -0.44 -0.09 -0.25  0.25  0.01 -0.22 -0.19 -0.05 
  2003  0.10  0.05 -0.39 -0.44  0.47 -0.05  0.01 -0.47  0.02 -0.21 -0.28 
  2004  0.27 -0.32 -0.32 -0.40 -0.34  0.54 -0.08 -0.17  0.00  0.02  0.26 
PMG  2002  0.00  0.03 -0.10 -0.31 -0.16 -0.20  0.07 -0.08 -0.21 -0.06  0.22 
basic  2003 0.08 0.03  -0.15  -0.16 0.36 0.10  -0.18  -0.71  -0.07 0.06 0.09 
  2004  0.20 -0.31  0.00 -0.28 -0.43  0.18 -0.20 -0.28 -0.10  0.38  0.58 
PMG  2002  0.00 -0.11 -0.08 -0.35 -0.21 -0.16 -0.01 -0.13 -0.17 -0.11  0.06 
RR  2003  0.04 -0.05 -0.19 -0.22  0.25 -0.07 -0.31 -0.74 -0.09 -0.03 -0.10 
  2004  0.10 -0.37 -0.09 -0.33 -0.54  0.35 -0.31 -0.34 -0.11  0.33  0.39 
PMG    2002  0.03 -0.31 -0.14 -0.32 -0.02 -0.21  0.22 -0.01 -0.08 -0.08 -0.10 
RHP  2003  0.11 -0.03 -0.27 -0.16  0.45 -0.01 -0.02 -0.60  0.06 -0.15 -0.24 
  2004 0.25  -0.33  -0.14  -0.29  -0.20 0.62 0.00  -0.27 0.07 0.13 0.27 
Demographics 2002  0.11 -0.10 -0.16 -0.32 -0.09 -0.39  0.28  0.11 -0.23 -0.19 -0.11 
  2003  0.24  0.26 -0.24 -0.28  0.47 -0.25  0.06 -0.34  0.02 -0.21 -0.36 
  2004 0.42  -0.07  -0.16  -0.21  -0.33 0.33 0.00  -0.02 0.02 0.04 0.19 
Uncertainty  2002  0.02 -0.10 -0.27 -0.37  na  -0.34  0.28  0.09 -0.18 -0.19 -0.01 
  2003  0.18  0.15 -0.37 -0.29  na  -0.16  0.05 -0.39  0.04 -0.20 -0.24 
  2004  0.29 -0.28 -0.31 -0.36  na  0.39 -0.06 -0.16  0.03  0.00  0.28 
Confidence  2002 -0.02 -0.24 -0.24 -0.34 -0.12 -0.31  0.13  0.17 -0.23 -0.04  0.08 
  2003 0.21 0.20  -0.21  -0.26 0.57 0.09  -0.02  -0.17 0.00 0.00  -0.07 
  2004  0.33 -0.14 -0.23 -0.26 -0.29  0.66 -0.07  0.17 -0.03  0.27  0.45 
Fiscal  2002 -0.06 -0.29 -0.20 -0.43 -0.03 -0.27  0.19  0.03 -0.16 -0.31 -0.05 
  2003  0.00  0.15 -0.31 -0.39  0.53 -0.08  0.02 -0.42  0.05 -0.19 -0.30 
  2004  0.22 -0.30 -0.27 -0.35 -0.30  0.46 -0.07 -0.19  0.00 -0.01  0.31  
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Table 34:   Dynamic residuals (percent, quarterly averages) – all countries 
 
    BG DK FN FR GE GR IR  IT  NL OE PT  SD  SP  UK US 
Basic  2002 -0.89 -4.26 -0.34 -0.06 -2.39 -1.80  6.90  0.17  2.94 -0.93  5.12  1.04  3.21  2.77  3.14 
fixed  effects  2003 -0.68 -4.68  0.49 -1.15 -3.25 -0.32  5.30 -0.71 -0.14 -1.89  2.25  0.36  2.24  2.39  3.09 
Panel  2004 -0.02 -1.90 -0.18 -1.40 -4.85 -0.98  3.76 -1.86 -2.28 -1.51  0.95 -0.36  2.92  2.91  2.96 
Real  rates  2002 -1.41 -5.81 -1.81 -0.88 -2.37 -1.27  5.14  0.29  2.36 -1.09  4.61 -0.70  1.28  2.86  3.16 
fixed  effects  2003 -1.11 -6.13 -1.25 -1.80 -3.19 -0.34  3.83 -0.91 -0.39 -2.02  1.85 -1.29  0.18  2.42  3.02 
Panel  2004 -0.45 -3.74 -1.94 -2.07 -4.88 -1.84  3.29 -2.42 -2.43 -1.65  0.42 -2.04  0.71  2.80  2.47 
Real  house  prices 2002 -0.97 -5.68 -1.22 -2.19 -1.91 -0.75  3.88  3.02  1.25 -0.39  0.85 -2.71 -0.15  1.29  3.69 
fixed  effects  2003 -0.63 -5.84 -0.37 -3.56 -2.63  0.89  3.13  1.83 -0.63 -0.91 -1.69 -3.24 -1.52  0.93  3.82 
Panel  2004  0.27 -3.79 -1.15 -4.21 -4.18  0.47  3.34  0.43 -1.87 -0.20 -2.60 -4.17 -1.01  1.60  3.38 
PMG  2002 -1.01 -4.30 -0.51 -0.54 -1.30 -2.53  5.13  0.23  3.07 -0.57  4.85  2.12  3.69  2.76  2.94 
Basic  2003 -0.94 -4.80 -0.07 -1.41 -1.85 -1.29  4.48 -0.62 -0.34 -1.68  2.06  1.58  2.70  2.38  3.07 
  2004 -0.25 -2.09 -1.21 -1.52 -2.83 -2.56  3.74 -1.94 -2.73 -1.08  1.01  0.63  3.31  2.87  2.81 
PMG  2002 -1.50 -4.67 -1.65 -0.65 -1.32 -1.34  3.07 -0.66  1.79 -0.55  3.30  0.81  1.34  2.35  2.18 
Real  rates  2003 -1.10 -4.98 -1.07 -1.47 -1.91 -0.51  2.60 -1.34 -1.26 -1.53  0.75  0.34  0.28  1.82  1.92 
  2004 -0.47 -1.88 -2.07 -1.64 -2.81 -1.95  2.49 -2.54 -3.10 -0.87  0.35 -0.52  0.92  2.23  1.64 
PMG    2002  -0.49  -5.42  -0.91  -0.79  -0.76 1.37 3.22 2.83 1.22 1.26  -0.45  -1.39 0.55  -0.62 2.44 
Real  house  prices 2003 -0.17 -5.54 -0.25 -1.72 -1.21  2.40  3.13  2.23 -1.12  0.36 -2.58 -1.84 -1.02 -1.29  2.30 
  2004 0.61  -2.99  -1.24  -1.94  -2.13 1.35 3.79 1.17  -2.59 1.14  -2.35  -3.10  -0.57  -0.74 1.76 
Demographics  2002 -0.29 -5.77  0.44 -1.24 -1.61 -0.96  2.51  2.96  1.84 -0.97  0.64 -2.41 -0.90  1.60  4.83 
  2003 0.26  -5.77 1.45  -2.44  -2.00 0.63 1.41 1.96 0.21  -1.24  -1.87  -2.86  -2.35 1.31 5.05 
  2004 1.35  -3.54 0.87  -2.96  -3.20 0.18 1.33 0.79  -0.76  -0.28  -2.70  -3.73  -1.91 2.07 4.67 
Uncertainty  2002 -0.72 -5.37 -0.05 -1.75 -1.38  na  2.01  2.92  1.58 -0.18  0.85 -2.12  0.34  1.53  4.05 
  2003 -0.23 -5.50  1.13 -3.11 -1.80  na  1.27  1.76 -0.23 -0.69 -1.71 -2.45 -1.00  1.22  4.19 
  2004  0.55 -3.42  0.27 -3.84 -3.36  na  1.20  0.27 -1.61 -0.14 -2.70 -3.52 -0.64  1.83  3.69 
Confidence  2002 -2.29 -6.77 -1.37 -2.00 -2.06 -0.54  0.19  0.48  0.78 -1.51  0.99 -1.63 -0.43 -0.15  2.95 
  2003  -1.41  -6.56 0.01  -2.58  -2.28 1.54 0.43  -0.19 0.45  -1.92  -0.12  -1.89  -0.88  -0.24 3.95 
  2004 -0.25 -4.15 -0.32 -2.69 -2.96  1.46  1.25 -0.81  0.39 -0.96  0.15 -2.33  0.31  0.48  3.99 
Fiscal  effects  2002 -1.80 -5.35 -1.29 -1.88 -1.72 -0.68  3.01  2.14  0.96 -0.42  0.27 -2.86 -0.27  1.03  3.24 
  2003 -1.36 -5.37 -0.18 -2.99 -2.38  1.09  2.25  1.34 -0.75 -0.83 -2.05 -3.27 -1.58  0.88  3.61 
  2004 -0.43 -3.32 -0.89 -3.50 -3.70  0.80  2.37  0.20 -1.79 -0.16 -2.59 -4.09 -0.91  1.72  3.43  
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Table 35:   Dynamic residuals (percent, quarterly averages) – EMU 
 
    BG FN FR GE GR IR  IT  NL OE PT SP 
Basic  2002  -0.44 0.08 0.49  -1.92  -1.43 7.92 0.50 3.51  -0.57 5.51 4.00 
  2003  -0.28 0.87  -0.57  -2.78 0.11 6.31  -0.46 0.41  -1.52 2.63 3.06 
  2004  0.38  0.27 -0.78 -4.37 -0.37  4.84 -1.63 -1.74 -1.10  1.34  3.77 
RR  2002 -1.41 -2.01 -0.75 -2.02 -0.68  5.14  0.54  2.53 -0.91  4.46  1.22 
  2003 -1.14 -1.60 -1.59 -2.82  0.07  3.95 -0.88 -0.10 -1.85  1.74  0.04 
  2004 -0.46 -2.28 -1.82 -4.53 -1.60  3.59 -2.56 -2.12 -1.43  0.29  0.53 
RHP  2002  -1.13  -1.93  -2.62  -1.76 0.15 3.41 3.70 1.58 0.28 0.95  -0.66 
  2003 -0.67 -1.30 -3.66 -2.49  1.40  3.08  2.52 -0.13 -0.33 -1.50 -1.80 
  2004  0.31 -2.08 -4.10 -4.10  0.46  3.63  1.01 -1.35  0.32 -2.55 -1.18 
PMG  2002  -0.52  -0.10 0.04  -0.77  -2.10 6.18 0.51 3.81  -0.16 5.19 4.52 
Basic  2003 -0.47  0.36 -0.77 -1.29 -0.81  5.66 -0.38  0.36 -1.28  2.40  3.57 
  2004  0.22 -0.70 -0.83 -2.28 -2.04  4.97 -1.72 -2.14 -0.65  1.25  4.22 
PMG  2002 -1.17 -1.76 -0.15 -0.99 -0.98  4.63 -0.29  3.12 -0.26  4.73  2.18 
RR  2003 -1.03 -1.40 -1.04 -1.58 -0.25  4.24 -1.52 -0.28 -1.40  1.68  0.96 
  2004 -0.49 -2.31 -1.30 -2.75 -1.86  4.23 -3.11 -2.87 -0.72  0.38  1.40 
PMG    2002  -0.50  -1.47  -1.11  -0.74 1.31 3.38 3.09 1.37 1.37  -0.27 0.09 
RHP  2003 -0.14 -0.83 -1.99 -1.19  2.32  3.53  2.38 -0.87  0.50 -2.50 -1.39 
  2004  0.68 -1.76 -2.20 -2.21  1.24  4.42  1.24 -2.38  1.30 -2.41 -0.90 
Demographics  2002 0.08 0.21  -1.19  -0.99 0.15 2.08 3.33 2.24  -0.42 0.73  -1.46 
  2003 0.85 1.13  -1.93  -1.27 1.38 1.36 2.44 0.89  -0.78  -1.62  -2.64 
  2004 2.07 0.69  -2.14  -2.40 0.47 1.53 1.27 0.02 0.12  -2.52  -2.06 
Uncertainty  2002 -0.69 -0.78 -2.23 -0.88  na  1.43  4.08  2.15  0.98  1.08 -0.27 
  2003 0.06 0.29  -3.17  -1.24  na  1.33 3.01 0.67 0.42  -1.32  -1.23 
  2004  0.96 -0.54 -3.65 -2.85  na  1.72  1.46 -0.58  0.88 -2.41 -0.69 
Confidence  2002 -1.67 -1.63 -2.57 -1.05  0.07  0.32  1.21  1.51 -0.72  0.99 -0.42 
  2003 -0.62 -0.49 -2.85 -1.51  1.33  0.89  0.66  1.02 -1.11 -0.40 -0.70 
  2004  0.66 -0.70 -2.77 -2.49  0.53  2.30 -0.16  1.02 -0.31 -0.22  0.60 
Fiscal  2002  -2.25  -2.05  -2.11  -1.41 0.02 2.44 2.41 1.27 0.24 0.26  -0.73 
  2003 -1.65 -0.98 -2.80 -2.06  1.53  2.16  1.73 -0.20 -0.24 -1.89 -1.83 
  2004 -0.61 -1.62 -3.07 -3.39  0.81  2.57  0.57 -1.17  0.34 -2.52 -0.98  
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Table 36:   Residuals by year 
 









Basic 2002  -0.06  -0.10  0.98  1.61 
fixed effects  2003  -0.05  -0.06  0.22  0.71 
Panel 2004  0.07  0.01  -0.12  0.06 
Real rates  2002  -0.09  -0.15  0.29  0.56 
fixed  effects  2003 -0.11  -0.14 -0.48  -0.38 
Panel 2004  0.01  -0.09  -0.92  -1.13 
Real  house  prices  2002 -0.13  -0.14 -0.13 0.18 
fixed  effects  2003 -0.10  -0.11 -0.69  -0.44 
Panel 2004  0.03  -0.05  -0.91  -0.87 
PMG 2002  -0.03  -0.07  0.94  1.51 
Basic 2003  -0.06  -0.05  0.22  0.67 
 2004  0.05  -0.02  -0.12  0.03 
Real  house  prices  2003 -0.09  -0.08 -0.42  -0.02 
 2004  0.05  0.01  -0.52  -0.27 
Demographics 2002  -0.10  -0.10  0.04  0.43 
  2003 -0.07  -0.06 -0.42  -0.02 
 2004  0.08  0.02  -0.52  -0.27 
Confidence  2002 -0.12  -0.11 -0.89  -0.36 
 2003  0.05  0.03  -0.78  -0.34 
 2004  0.13  0.08  -0.43  -0.14 
Fiscal  effects  2002 -0.12  -0.14 -0.37  -0.17 
  2003 -0.09  -0.09 -0.77  -0.57 




Annex:   Additional specification tests 
We report on three specification test which indicate that our choice of wealth variable and our 
choice of time domain are all acceptable. 
 
Table 37:   Variant for all based on splitting net wealth 
  Basic  + Real interest 
rate 
+ House prices 












































DLRPH     0.077 
(7.5) 
F (pooling)  3.5 (8.5)  3.4 (8.8)  3.2 (9.1) 
F (fixed effects)  5.1 (7.7)  4.7 (7.6)  5.7 (7.5) 
F (LRNW Restriction)  2.0 (7.3)  1.9 (7.3)  4.2 (7.2) 
R-bar sq  0.146 0.138  0.17 
LM het  3.1 (0.08)  2.1 (0.15)  1.02 (0.31) 
DW  2.1 (0.91, 0.95)  2.09 (0.96,0.98)  2.2 (1.0, 1.0) 
Long run income effect    0.91 0.84  0.75 
Long run Gross wealth effect  0.09 0.11  0.13 
Note: Brackets after F tests show critical value for Leamer diffuse priors, brackets after LM heteroskedasticity test 
and DW show P-values.  
 
We tested whether the restriction implicit in the net wealth term (i.e. that gross assets and gross 
liabilities have equal and opposite signs) is accepted. This is done by replacing the lagged log of 
real net wealth (RNW) with the lagged log of gross wealth (RGW) and the term log ( real gross 
liabilities/real gross wealth) (RGL) and then testing the restriction that the coefficient on these 
two terms are equal. The test is reported only for the ‘All’ grouping but is repeated for each 
equation specification. We use the identity that real Net Financial Wealth (RNW) is equal to real 
Gross Financial Wealth (all financial assets, denoted RGW) less real Gross Financial Liabilities 
(RGL), and our test is based on the decomposition: 
 
B1*log(RNW) =.   B1*log(RGW-RGL) 
      =   B1*log(RGW*(1-RGL/RGW)) 
=   B1*log(RGW)+ B1*log(1-RGL/RGW)                                 (A1) 
As shown in the rows at the bottom of table 37 (LRNW Restriction) on splitting net wealth, we 
found that for each of the specifications, this result was accepted by the Leamer (1978) diffuse 
prior F test. The coefficients on income and on gross wealth were similar to those reported in the 
rest of the table. 
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Tables 37 and 38 extend and contract the time domain in order to test for the stability of the 
parameters of the equations we are estimating. The panel estimates are ‘unbalanced’ in that when 
data are missing for countries or variables then that country no longer has weight in the 
estimation for that period. A number of countries have missing data before 1980, and more have 
missing data before 1974, although some, such as the US, have data for all the variables of 
interest back to 1961q1. In general the first data constraint is for house prices and the second is 
for wealth. 
 
Table 38:   Unbalanced panel consumption functions for full sample 
  Basic  Real interest rate  House price 
  All EMU  All  EMU  Full  sample  EMU 
















































































F (pooling)  5.0 (8.3)  6.3 (7.9)  4.6 (8.7)  5.7 (8.2)  4.0 (8.6)  4.9 (8.0) 
F (fixed effects)  7.4 (7.7)  6.3 (7.3)  6.4 (7.7)  5.6 (7.3)  7.0 (7.5)  7.0 (7.0) 
R-bar sq  0.15 0.16 0.15  0.16  0.16  0.16 
























Implicit long run:-  
income effect    0.81 0.77  0.81  0.74 0.78 0.74 
wealth effect  0.1  0.1 0.11  0.12 0.12 0.15 
Note: Brackets after F tests show critical value for Leamer diffuse priors, brackets after LM heteroskedasticity test 
and DW show P-values. Dates for full sample are indicated in Table 25. 
 
On either data period we would suggest that it is useful to include real interest rates and real 
house prices in any explanation of Euro Area consumption developments, although the greater 
prevalence of liquidity constraints before 1974 leads to a decline in the size of the coefficient on 
real interest rates in the longer regression, but it also falls in significance in the shorter sample, 
suggesting that other problems may also be present. As regards other variables, the interest rate 
change is often significant with the full unbalanced panel and less so in 1980-2003. The level of 
the real rate remains significant in the Euro Area, however. The difference of house price effect is 
larger in the 1980-2003 estimates, consistent with financial liberalisation. All the diagnostics  
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remain satisfactory except for the 1980-2003 estimates that feature heteroskedasticity. This 
would suggest that using a longer data period is important when arriving at an explanation of 
consumption in the Euro Area, and this should be taken into account when assessing the inclusion 
of confidence indicators below. 
 
Table 39:   Panel consumption functions for 1980-2003 
  Basic  Real interest rate  House price 
  All EMU  All  EMU  Full  sample  EMU 
















































































F (pooling)  5.1 (8.2)  5.8 (7.7)  4.2 (8.6)  4.8 (8.1)  4.2 (8.6)  5.0 (7.9) 
F (fixed effects)  5.9 (7.4)  5.3 (7.1)  5.8 (7.4)  5.3 (7.1)  5.5 (7.2)  5.5 (6.8) 
R-bar sq  0.13 0.15 0.13  0.15  0.19  0.18 
LM het  0.79 (0.373)  18.5 (0.00)  1.0 (0.3)  19.7 (0.0)  5.7 (0.02)  15.5 (0.0) 












Implicit long run:-  
income effect    0.93 1.0  0.9  0.97  0.88  0.86 
wealth effect  0.15 0.12  0.12  0.13 0.11 0.11 
Note: Brackets after F tests show critical value for Leamer diffuse priors, brackets after LM heteroskedasticity test 
and DW show P-values.  
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5 Housing  Wealth   
It is widely suggested that trends in housing help to account for the pattern of relative resilience 
of consumption across countries in recent years. It is widely suggested that consumption in the 
UK, Spain and to some extent France has been supported by their housing market developments 
whilst Germany has been held back by developments in house prices. If there are no credit 
constraints, as in a liberalised financial system, there seems no reason for tangible assets (which 
are mainly housing) not to enter the consumption function in the same way as illiquid financial 
wealth. On the other hand, we note that there are arguments suggesting that housing wealth 
should have a lower weight in consumption than financial wealth, independently from its 
liquidity. Housing offers utility in itself and is a consumer durable as well as an asset. There will 
be a wealth effect of increased housing wealth, whether it arises from higher house prices or from 
accumulation of residential fixed investment for all consumers, which depends on the liquidity of 
housing. But it may be largely offset by an income and substitution effect for those who are not 
owner occupiers. Those wishing to buy houses will have to save more to do so, while those 
renting in a free market will anticipate higher future rents. Hence it is possible, under relatively 
strong assumptions, that there will be no impact of house prices on consumption. The 
assumptions would be the same as those for full Ricardian equivalence to hold for government 
debt, whereby public debt is not net wealth when there are no liquidity constrained consumers, 
equivalence of discount rate amongst consumers and the government and rational expectations. 
 
There have been a variety of studies looking at the role of housing wealth in the economy, and 
they are surveyed by Barrell and Davis (2004a). Some work has also included an estimate of 
housing, or mortgage, equity withdrawal, as in Catte et al (2004a and 2004b), who found that 
there were significant effects of their estimate of mortgage equity withdrawal on consumption in 
the UK and the Netherlands, as well as Australia, Canada and the US. For Germany, France Italy 
and Spain they found the average level of equity withdrawal over 1990-2002 to be close to zero, 
and correspondingly found no impact on consumption. This was felt to be consistent with less 
developed mortgage markets in these countries, where renegotiation or second mortgages are 
uncommon. 
 
Quite apart from the fact that existing work finds no effect in any of the major EMU countries, 
we do not consider further work on equity withdrawal wise except in cases where there are 
appropriate data, which is where housing wealth data exist. In other cases the approximation used 
(typically as in Catte et al 2004) which involves owner occupied housing investment less the 
change in the mortgage stock) is too crude to be able to produce usable results. The confusion 
between sources and uses of funds that this approach is based on also makes the results difficult 
to give economic meaning, and if good housing wealth data were available, we would advise that 
it be used. 
 
1.  Owner occupation and the ownership of homes in the household or personal sector are not 
the same thing. In Germany for instance owner occupation is under 50 per cent, but home 
ownership in the sector is over 60 per cent.  
 
2.  Homes owned in the sector are not necessarily representative of home overall and they 
may vary in the evolution of prices from the overall index used in many studies. 
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3.  It is possible to borrow on the strength of home ownership in many ways other than on a 
mortgage, even in unliberalised markets, and housing wealth can be collateralised against 
a loan even when it is not directly used as collateral. Hence one should use a wider 
measure of borrowing in this approach.  
 
4.  The existence of housing wealth even in unliberalised financial markets should enable 
individuals to plan their consumption with different levels of financial wealth than they 
would otherwise hold, and an increase in housing wealth may boost consumption through 
a reduction in saving. This will not be caught by equity withdrawal, but it will be captured 
directly by housing wealth effects in consumption equations. 
 
5.  The housing investment flow data in the national accounts includes the transactions cost 
of purchasing housing, and even in the liberalised UK this is 0.6 per cent of GDP, and 
about 10 per cent of housing investment. It is also very variable and cyclical. Unless this 
is excluded results will be questionable. 
 
We would conclude that constructing good data on housing equity withdrawal would require the 
same information set as producing and using a good estimate of housing wealth data. This would 
be a very expensive process well beyond the scope of this study.  
 
The alternative to using either house prices or equity withdrawal is including both financial and 
non-financial wealth in the consumption function. This can be seen in the extended version of 
equation (2.1.) shown here. In this model, planned consumption (
*
t C ) is a function of total 
wealth. Total wealth is the sum of human wealth ( t H ), net financial wealth (F 1 − t W ) and tangible 
wealth (TWt-1) which includes both housing assets and other durables. Planned consumption can 




− − + + = t t t t TW FW H m C          ( 5 . 1 )  
 
The differences between the impact of housing and financial wealth can be tested in both the 
short and long run as is the case in Barrell and Davis (2004a). It is better to utilise data on the 
value of the asset stock rather than its price, in part because this allows us to test for a long run as 
well as an immediate impact. It also allows for an effect of accumulation and transfers of wealth 
that could be expected to impact on consumption, as well as capital-appreciation due to changes 
in asset prices – or from changes in consumer prices given we use real wealth measures. 
Nevertheless, although an approach using total and tangible wealth seems most desirable, data 
limitations mean it can only be checked in an experimental way for a subset of countries on a 
country by country and not a panel basis, and with the most recent data for checking residuals 
generally not available, in part because the data is annual, and published with a noticeable lag. 
Both problems can be partly overcome, as we discuss below. 
 
Series for housing wealth are not available for all countries and this precludes any estimation in 
either a comparison of equations across all countries or in a full panel context. However, here we 
examine the role of tangible wealth in the single equation framework using a subset of countries 
for which we were able to obtain official series for housing wealth. This permits both long run 
and dynamic interpretations of these tangible wealth effects on consumption. We augment the 
standard specification to incorporate a role for real housing wealth in the long run cointegrating 
vector. This is done by constructing a series for real total wealth (RTW), which is the sum of real  
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net financial wealth (W) and housing wealth (HW) deflated by consumer prices. In the dynamic 
terms we disaggregate this relation to examine short run contributions from each real wealth 
term.  
 
Our approach to the incorporation of housing wealth in consumption studies differs from that of 
Catte et al, as they use a two stage process to construct their error correction models, and they 
have a wider choice of variables in their long run. In relatively short data sets the two stage 
process can lead to parameter biases, as Banerjee et al (1993) discuss. Hence a single stage error 
correction procedure is to be preferred. In addition it is worth using economic theory as well as 
statistical procedures for setting up the long run. They include real interest rates and the 
unemployment rate in their long run relationship, which we consider unwise as both are 
potentially stationary series. They also include the inflation rate in their long run, and our 
objection to this is not that it is stationary over long periods, which it is. We consider it a problem 
that the resulting equation in not properly homogenous in the price level, and we would exclude 
inflation on grounds of economic suitability alone. We suspect that the significant inflation 
effects they find in Canada, France and Japan mask an omitted variable. The absence of 
systematic effects of changes in real housing wealth in their study may also be a consequence of 
including inflation in their long run, as it acts as a proxy for revaluations of wealth.  
 
We choose to use a standard one stage error correction model involving income and wealth, with 
potential real interest rate effects as well as income dynamics and change terms in real wealth 
indicators. The specification we use is: 
 
1 0
1 2 1 1 1 1
* ln * ln ln *
ln * ln * ln * ln
− − − −
− − −
+ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ +
+ + = ∆
t k t i m t i j t i
t t t t
RR Y RHW W
RTW Y C C
δ α γ γ γ
β β α
   (5.2) 
 
where RHW is real housing wealth and, again, long-run homogeneity is maintained by use of the 
following identity.  
 
1 ) ln * ) 1 ( ln * (ln * 1 1 1 1 1 1 = − + − − − − t t t RTW Y C β β α .     (5.3) 
 
Recent work using this specification includes Barrell and Davis (2004a and 2004b), where 
significant effects from housing wealth are found in all G5 countries as well as in other 
economies in the European Union. 
 
Usable data for real housing wealth are obtainable for Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, the 
Netherlands, the UK and the US, although financial wealth data has to be estimated in Ireland 
after 1997 as it is not published. Data are also available for Italy and for Spain, but in neither 
country does the scale of housing wealth as a share of total wealth seem reasonable, and we have 
not utilised the series in our final results. Initial estimation confirmed out views.  
 
The data start in 1980Q1 and for the UK and US we have a full sample running to 2004Q4. For 
the remaining countries the sample ends in 2001Q1, except Germany which runs to 2003Q4, and 
in addition we have had to splice data carefully in 1990q1, but we have to look for additional 
breaks at that point. For consistency, we construct the missing quarters of housing wealth data for 
each of these countries using a simple dynamic equation of the form  
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t PS t t H t RIH PH HW HW φ δ + ∆ − = − log * ) 1 ( 1 ,         ( 5 . 4 )  
 
where PH is the price of housing (from above), RIH is real housing investment adjusted for 
property transactions costs,  H δ  is the depreciation rate of housing, and  PS φ  is the proportion of 
property owned by the personal sector.  
 
We run standard ADF tests for the newly created variables, RTW and RHW. These are detailed in 
Table 40, where it is clear that both RHW and RTW are non-stationary in levels; however, in most 
countries the differences variables are stationary, implying variables are integrated of order 1. In 
some cases, such as France, the first difference of RHW appears non-stationary, but the first 
difference of the combined variable, RTW, is found to be stationary. One noticeable exception is 
Ireland, where the first difference of both RHW and RTW are non-stationary; although this result 
is on the borderline in the latter case and it most likely attributable to a structural shift in the 
housing wealth data beginning in the 1990s. Taken in conjunction with the results for RPDI in the 
introduction above, the findings here suggest that consumption, income and real total wealth 
should form a cointegrating relation. As in the analysis above, we examine the ECM terms in the 
full equations below for evidence of cointegration.   
 
 
Table 40:   Full data period ADF tests for RTW and RHW 
  DK FR GE IR NL UK  US 















*  -0.670 1.944 -2.976  -0.224 -0.985 -1.195 0.131 
DLRHW
*  -4.356 -1.183 -4.414 -1.809 -2.943 -2.765 -3.140 
LRTW
*  -0.487 1.331 -2.164 0.682 0.026 -1.122 -0.129 
DLRTW
*  -4.071 -4.004 -5.947 -2.457 -3.339 -3.477 -5.060 
* Fourth order ADF test reported (critical value at 95% is -2.89) 
Key: LRHW stands for the log of real housing wealth and LRTW the log of real total wealth. A 
“D” prefix indicates the difference of the relevant variable.  
 
 
In examining the role of housing wealth in determination of consumption, we have employed an 
equation specification that is comparable to the “new basic” equation detailed in Table 6; and 
here real interest rate effects and short term real net wealth effects complement the short run 
housing wealth and long run total net wealth additions. The results are provided in Table 41, 
where two significant developments merit discussion. First, there is clear evidence of housing 
wealth effects in all countries in the short run. Second, this finding is attended by a marked 
increase in the size of the ECM term (or speed of adjustment to the long run equilibrium) as 
compared to the basic case regressions reported in Table 6 in all but one case.  
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Table 41:    Addition of Real Housing Wealth to Single Equation Consumption Estimates 
Using Non-linear Least Squares (including real financial wealth and real 
interest rates)  
 

























































ln RTW(-1)  0.252 0.354 0.222 0.054 0.068 0.206  0.294 
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(1.07) 
    
Intercept  
Dummy 
8802 9201; 9001 8102; 
9903; 





























2 adjusted  0.32 0.420 0.69 0.613  0.334  0.633 0.408 
SE  0.010 0.004 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.005  0.005 
LM(4)  5.4 3.1 8.8 4.5 2.6 4.5  9.9 
* A step dummy was used for D ln IRRHW for the period 1990Q1 to 1999Q1 illustrating a break in 
the data and the decline of real housing wealth effects over the 1990s.  This is reflected by the 
negative sign, although note that the coefficient is not significant.  
Key: C stands for real consumption; RPDI for real personal disposable income, RNW for real net 
financial wealth, RHW for real housing wealth, RTW for real total wealth, ECM for the error 
correction terms, RR for the real interest rate, RPH for real house prices. A “D” prefix indicates the 
difference of the relevant variable.  
 
 
Strong and significant dynamic housing wealth terms are found in almost all countries where 
elasticities range from 0.09 in the US to 0.22 in Germany. The UK, France, and the Netherlands 
all have elasticities greater than 0.1, while Denmark lies below 0.1. There is also a significant 
role for changes in real net financial wealth in Denmark, France, Ireland, the UK and the US, but 
it is absent in Germany and the Netherlands. In cases where both series are found to be 
significant, it is instructive to note that these short run housing wealth elasticities are between 2½ 
to 4 times greater than the short run net financial wealth elasticities. This implies that short run  
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housing wealth effects are much greater contributors to the dynamics of aggregate consumption 
than comparable net financial wealth effects. Similar results were found in Barrell and Davis 
(2004a and 2004b) cited above. We would argue that these differences reflect the different degree 
of knowledge about asset price changes. House prices are immediately visible to those who own 
them, whilst the majority of financial assets that change in market value because of price changes 
(bonds, equities) are held indirectly by insurance and pension funds. In addition, as Lettau and 
Ludwigsen (2004) argue, there is a great deal of noise in financial wealth data, and consumers 
have to separate signal from noise when making their consumption decisions. 
 
For Ireland Table 41 depicts two short run housing wealth variables with opposing signs. We 
employ a step dummy to shift the dynamic term for housing wealth in Ireland from 1990Q1 to 
1999Q1 where there is a noticeable shift in the macroeconomic data. This is due mainly to the 
rapid economic growth seen in Ireland during this period where real incomes rose substantially 
and became the main drivers of consumption.  As such, contributions from real housing wealth to 
consumption declined over this period and our specification here is meant to capture this shift 
while preserving prior contributions from housing wealth effects (although we note that the shift 
variable is not significant). 
 
Turning now to the long run wealth effects, we see a decline in long run income effects in most 
countries as evidenced by smaller elasticities on RPDI with respect to those in Table 6, and, 
given the imposition of homogeneity, a consequent increase in long run total wealth effects. 
There is a marked decline in long run income elasticities in Denmark, France, Germany the UK 
and the US, but an increase in Ireland. One would expect to see higher long run total wealth 
effects in countries with a greater degree of financial liberalisation. As discussed above, the 
significance of the error correction coefficient can provide information on the detection of a 
cointegrating relation (e.g. Banerjee et al. (1993)). In comparison with Table 6, Table 41 shows 
improvement in both the relative size and statistical significance of the ECM terms for all 
countries except France, where both figures are stronger in Table 6, and the US, where the size of 
the parameter has improved, but not the statistical significance. Using the t-statistic as a rough 
indicator of cointegration, it is clear that Germany, Netherlands, the UK and the US all have 
identifiable cointegrating relations.  
 
Overall, the above findings suggest that housing wealth is a significant contributor to aggregate 
consumption. On average across the sample we find that the short run housing wealth effect is 
nearly 3¼ times that of the net financial wealth effect. In the long run, we find an increased role 
for real total wealth. The net effect from the housing wealth additions is a more dynamic long run 
equation and hence stronger evidence of a cointegrating relation. However, lack of good quality 
data for most countries precludes us using this approach across the whole sample, and we utilise 
house price data. However, it is clear that they are a poor substitute for wealth data. 
 
6 Conclusions 
This report undertakes extensive econometric investigation of the determinants of consumption in 
Europe and in the US using macro data. We find that it is possible to explain consumption 
behaviour, and that demographic developments and fiscal policy innovations contribute to the 
explanation. We also find a pervasive role for house price developments. These results help us to 
understand consumption developments in the last few years. We analyse the factors that have 
been behind weak consumption in the Euro Area, looking at forecast residuals and the  
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decomposition of equations. We argue that changes in real personal disposable income have been 
the major factor behind weak growth in many countries, and that developments in financial and 
tangible (housing) wealth have had some impact. There has also been residual weakness in 
consumption in Germany and Italy that may depend on recent changes in institutional 
environments such as social security and labour market reforms, although in Italy they are as 
likely to be associated with weak supply side prospects. Consumption has also been weaker than 
we might anticipate in Sweden, Finland, and Greece.  
 
Our work extends the analysis of the determinants of aggregate consumption beyond income and 
financial wealth and applies it to the countries of the European Union and the US. We develop a 
common econometric framework for all countries where changes in aggregate consumption are 
based not only on real net financial wealth and real personal disposable income, but also reflect 
changes in real house prices and real interest rates (instrumented appropriately). We undertake 
panel data analysis in the same framework, and we report results. However, there is evidence 
from the panel estimation that the diversity of the European economies, especially in their 
dynamic responses, is significant. We would conclude from our panel work that assessing the 
factors causing slow consumption growth in Europe is better done using single equations with 
careful analysis of country-specific problems. 
 
Recognising the diversity and complexity of aggregate consumption patterns across the wide 
range of countries in our sample, we further augment our econometric specification by explicitly 
modelling the effects of demographic changes and government spending. Importantly, the 
analysis of the forecast errors suggests that the expanded model of consumption behaviour 
improves our understanding of the determinants of aggregate consumption in some countries, 
while consumer spending remains puzzling in others and this suggests scope for further work. 
This exercise is repeated in the panel analysis.  
 
In both the single country studies and the panel estimation we also investigate the role of 
confidence, and find that it is seldom significant. However, where it is significant we find that it 
is Granger caused by wealth, but does not Granger cause wealth; consequently, it is redundant in 
evaluating both forecasts and equations of consumption. We also investigate the role of equity 
market volatility and of equilibrium unemployment as indicators of uncertainty, but we find no 
role for them except for the NAIRU in Spain and the US. We argue, however, that the 
significance of this term in the Spanish results are more than adequately picked up by the 
structural change dummies that have been included.  
 
Basic model specifications involving only income and wealth effects suggest that consumption is 
largely driven by changes in income in Germany, Austria, Belgium, and Portugal, all of which 
had relatively unliberalised financial systems for much of the sample. In these countries the long 
run real income effects of over 90% suggest a degree of liquidity constrained behaviour as 
consumers are not able to borrow to smooth their consumption over time. However, the data 
cannot be used to indicate whether such reliance on current income for consumption is driven by 
choice or necessity. By contrast, the long run income effect in the US, UK and Sweden is below 
80%, as these countries have liberalised their financial markets in the late 1980s. They also have 
experienced major asset price fluctuations and/or banking crises, which may have prompted 
consumers to respond more actively to changes in asset values that are reflected in financial 
wealth holdings. The short run dynamics of income and financial wealth complement the long 
run elasticities – countries with strong dynamic income terms, such as Germany and Austria, tend  
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to have weaker, if any, dynamic wealth terms. Not surprisingly, several Scandinavian countries 
along with UK and US display the strongest dynamic wealth terms in the sample.  
 
The inclusion of real interest rates and house prices tend to improve the general fit of the 
equations suggesting that these variables are important determinants of consumption patterns in 
Europe and the US. The change in real house prices was found to be statistically significant in 
Germany, UK, US, the Netherlands, Spain, Portugal, and Scandinavian countries. With the 
notable exception of Germany, all the countries with significant house price effects have 
experienced housing market booms in recent years. In the context of limited financial 
liberalisation and significant evidence of liquidity constrained behaviour, German house prices 
have not followed the upward trajectory seen in many other countries and our findings suggest 
that lacklustre housing market developments may have contributed to weak consumption growth 
in Germany.  
 
Changes in house prices did not have a statistically significant impact on aggregate consumption 
in France, Italy and Ireland – all countries where anecdotal evidence suggests a positive impact of 
rapidly rising house prices on consumption. The explanation of relative cycles in housing markets 
along with relatively recent strides in financial liberalisation may explain the statistical and 
economic insignificance of house prices on consumption in France and Italy. The case of Ireland 
may merit a somewhat different explanation: the rapid rise of nominal house prices may be more 
rooted in the impressive GDP and income growth over a sustained period of time. In this context, 
real house prices may be merely adjusting to the growing demand and prevailing income levels. 
 
The inclusion of population composition into the model suggests that demographic changes may 
help explain changes in aggregate consumption patterns in Germany, France, Italy, Spain, 
Sweden and the US. That we did not find demographic composition to be important in more 
countries in our sample may be due to relatively small aggregate changes in the overall 
population composition in many European countries over the entire sample. Where deep and 
liquid financial markets existed for much of the time covered by our sample, they helped to 
smooth consumption and thus render demographic factors less relevant as explicit determinants 
of changes in consumption. Where the impacts are statistically significant, they tend to be of 
similar economic magnitude and positively correlated with consumption, as for example in 
France, Spain and US. By contrast, demographic changes in Germany have a negative impact on 
aggregate consumption, again pointing to a limited scale of consumption smoothing in that 
country. Furthermore, the proportion of people over 65 in Germany has been rising somewhat 
faster in recent years as compared to the 1990s and this too may have contributed directly to 
weak consumption growth since 2000. 
 
Overall, our findings indicate that fiscal developments have a limited impact on aggregate 
consumption. Changes in fiscal positions were found to be statistically significant in Spain, 
Sweden, Netherlands, Finland, Ireland and Italy and the results conformed to the accepted 
explanation of the Ricardian effects. Interestingly, significant levels effects had a negative sign in 
the US, confirming that US fiscal deficits have boosted consumption growth over the sample 
period. This may point to qualitatively different government spending in Europe as compared to 




Appendix on FRDB Database 
 
Details of the FRDB Pension and Employment Variables Selection 
Reforms of Employment Protection Legislation in Europe from 1986 to 2002 
 
Country Year Month  Description  Scope  Sign 
FN  1991  1  Individual employer's contributions are made 
independent of the lay-off record of the firm 
concerned 
structural increasing 
FR  2000  1,2  THE CONSTITUTIONAL COUNCIL 
approves the second 35-hour week law, 
except as regards the payment of overtime. 
The agreements already signed by the social 
parts will continue to apply. 
 
Entry into force of the second AUBRY law 
setting out the provisions for the reduction of 
the working week from 39 to 35 hours in all 
companies employing more than 20 people. 
structural decreasing 
GE  1996    The employment threshold, at which EPLs 
apply is increased from 5 to 10 employees 
(on a full basis) per firm.  
 
A law comes into force liberalising 
employment conditions. Legal conditions 
covering dismissals are relaxed. 
structural increasing 
NL  1995    THE GOVERNMENT DECIDES TO EASE 
DISMISSAL PROCEDURES. According to 
the new rules, an employer can dismiss his 
employee at the same time or even before 
asking permission from the director of the 
Public Employment Office. 
structural increasing 
PT 1991  FIRING  RESTRICTIONS EASED. Through 
a wider range of admissible lay-off. 
structural increasing 
SP  1994  5  INDIVIDUAL DISMISSALS EASED: zero 
days of notice is required when length of 
service is below 15 days for blue collar 
workers or below 1 month for white collar 
workers. Thereafter (only for objective 
dismissal): one month when length of service 
is below one year, 2 months when length of 
service is between one and two years and 3 
months for two or more years’ service.  
 
COLLECTIVE REDUNDANCIES: the 
firms can initiate a collective dismissal if the 
dismissal affects to 10 or 30 percent of 
workers depending on the size of the firms. 
The legally acceptable causes for collective 
dismissals have been expanded to include 
production and organisational causes. Law 
19/5/1994 nr.11. 
structural increasing 
SD  1997    The length of notice periods is now 








Enterprises' rehiring obligations vis-à-vis 
laid-off workers now expire after nine 
months instead of twelve. 
 
Twelve-months fixed term contracts are 
available with no restrictions: all enterprises 
are allowed to employ up to five persons on 
such contracts; these are allowed to be 
prolonged for up to 18 months. 
 
Introduction of a three-year limit after which 
temporary contracts have to be turned into 
permanent contracts. 
 
Unions at local level are allowed to deviate 



















Appendix 1 (cont). Details of the FRDB Pension and Employment Variables Selection 
Reforms of Non-Employment Benefits in Europe from 1986 to 2002 
 















'A comprehensive Labour Market Reform is approved by 
the Parliament: 
The maximum duration of unemployment insurance 
benefits is limited to seven years. 
 
'The Unemployment Benefits period is split in two (four 
plus three years) with full-time activation through job 
offers, training and education compulsory in the second 
period. 
 
Policy implementation is decentralised to regional labour 
market authorities. 
 
'Another Labour Market Reform is approved: 
Eligibility criteria for access to Unemployment Benefits are 
tightened (compulsory activation of 13 weeks of 
unemployment for youths below 25 years of age or 52 
weeks for all above 25 years). 
 
'The minimum age for access to Unemployment Benefits is 
raised from 17 to 19. 
 
'The maximum duration of Unemployment Benefits is 






























NL  1987  The two key parts of the previous Unemployment Benefits 
scheme (WW, unemployment insurance and WWW, 
unemployment assistance) are combined and eligibility 
requirements are tightened. 
 
The maximum duration of benefits is more closely linked to 
the age and length of the contribution period. 
 
The Revision of the Social Security System Act is enacted 
to reduce the incentive to obtain a disability pension rather 

























Criteria governing access to disability pensions are 
tightened. 
 
Claimants who are less than 80% disabled will receive a 
pro-rated disability pension supplemented by an 
unemployment related component declining over time. 
 
The total benefit will decline over time as the 
unemployment-related portion of the benefit falls, with a 
maximum benefit period of five years. 
 
Eligibility requirements for unemployment benefits are 
tightened: the worker obliged to accept an appropriate job 







SP  1992  A decree to redress fiscal slippage approved by the 
Government:  the minimum contribution period for 
eligibility is raised from 6 to 12 months. 
 
Lump-sum Unemployment Insurance schemes offering 
lump-sum payments are phased out. 
 
The system of minimum unemployment assistance 
allowances is reformed: it now provides those who have 
worked for at least three months but are not eligible to 
unemployment insurance with 75 per cent of the minimum 
wage. 
 
The amount is reduced by over 10 per cent. 
 
The unemployed people are no longer allowed to take up 
the unemployment insurance payment in a single instalment 





























SD  1997  The Employment Bill repealed before it entered into force 
and the revised proposal forwarded in March: 
 
The qualifying period is increased from 5 to 6 months (it 
had been proposed 9 months). 
 
The proposal for an upper limit of the duration is dropped. 
 
The underlying structure of the Unemployment Benefit is 
changed: the benefit now consists of an earning-related part 
and a flat rate component. 
 
The maximum Unemployment Insurance (earning-related 
component) benefit is raised. 
 
The possibility of requalifying for benefits through 





















UK  1996  Unemployment Benefit is replaced by the Job-Seekers’ 
Allowance. 
 
The duration of the Job Seekers Allowance is halved (from 













The replacement rate of the Job Seeker Allowance is 
lowered. 
 
The Income Support scheme is replaced by the means-
tested component of the JSA as a safety-net with a marginal 
withdrawal rate of 100 per cent. 
 
A new family credit, the Working Families' Tax Credit, 
guaranteeing all people in employment with dependent 
families (including lone parents) a minimum level of 
income (£200 a week) and giving them an allowance to 
cover the costs of child care; the hours a week which 
someone can work if their spouse is unemployed and in 
receipt of means-tested benefit have been increased from 18 
to 24 hours. 
 
Introduction of a minimum income guaranteed for people 





























Appendix 1 (cont). Details of the FRDB Pension and Employment Variables Selection 
Reforms of Pension Systems in Europe from 1986 to 2002 
 
Country Year Month  Description  Scope  Sign 
BG  1997    Pensionable age for women will be gradually 
increased and aligned with those of men (65 
years). 
 
The minimum working period for early 
retirement, which now stands at 24 years, will be 
gradually increased to 35 by the year 2005. 
 
The age limit for early retirement has been 
raised from 55 to 58 but early retirement before 




















FN  1997  1  An additional sickness insurance contribution of 
3% of pension income will be collected from 
pension recipients. 
 
Pension reform (1996-1997): pensions are more 
closely linked to work history; the minimum 
national pension is restricted only to with 
employment-derived pensions below a certain 
limit. 
 
The additional and basic national pensions are 
abolished. 
 
Creation of a "buffer fund" for Unemployment 
Insurance scheme and Pension scheme to run 
deficits during downturns and surpluses during 
upturns. 
 
The share of employees' social security 
contributions was raised as of 1 January 1999  
with a corresponding reduction in the employers' 




The minimum age of the unemployment 
pensions  was further raised, to  60 years. 
GE  1992    A reform proposal put forward and agreed upon 
by the Government: 
The de facto net-wage adjustment principle for 
pensions is formally adopted (the average 
pension is indexed to the average net wage). 
 
The retirement age is gradually increased from 
60/63 years for women and men respectively to 
a uniform retirement age of 65 years (starting in 
2001 and completed in 2012 for women and 
2006 for men). This implies the abolition of the 
present flexible retirement-age scheme; early 
retirement may still be obtained with a reduction 
in pension levels, while pension benefits for 
those working after the age of 65 are increased. 
 
For contributions between 1973 and 1992 
multiples (used in computing the individual 
relative contribution position) below 75 percent 
are multiplied by 1.5 up to the maximum of 75 
percent, effectively reducing the redistribution 
for workers with income position below 50 
percent. 
 
Contributions to the pension system during 
periods where contributors are receiving 
income-support payments paid by the 
unemployment insurance fund is to be increased. 
 
Contribution-free years of higher education are 
reduced. 
 
Pensions for low-income earners to be upgraded. 
 
Age 65 set as the pivotal age for benefit 
computations: for each year of earlier retirement 
up to five years and under certain conditions, 
benefits will be reduced by 3.6 percentage points 
in addition to the effect of few service years. 
Rewards for later retirement were also 
introduced: the pension is increased by 6 percent 
for each year of retirement postponed. 
 
The possibility of partial retirement is 
introduced: all rules and regulations apply in 
proportion. 
 
In the new Länder old-age pensions are raised 
by 11.65 per cent and legislation on pensions 


















































IT  1995    New law on pension programmes: 
Retirement age: flexible from 57 to 65 for both 







New formula to calculate old age pension, "pro-
rata" is introduced: those having at the time of 
reform less than 18 years of contribution, will 
enter contribution system; capitalisation of 
contributions based on nominal GDP growth; 
the coefficient converting cumulative 
contributions into annual pensions is based on 
residual life expectancy, plus adjustment to real 
GDP growth (1.5%). 
 
Eligibility to social pensions requires at least 5 
years of contributions, subject to the condition 
that pension is at least 20% higher than old-age 
assistance; Indexation of pensions to price 
inflation. 
 




Eligibility is raised to 40 years of contributions, 
or 35 years of contributions plus an age of 57. 
 
Private pension funds: earnings-ceiling for 
participation in public system, to favour the 




























NL  1996    The Pension Fund for Civil Servants is 
privatised. 
structural decreasing 
PT  1993    Reforms on pension formula: 
The basis to calculate old-age pension will be 15 
(rather than 10) years, and the accrual rate will 
be reduced from 2.2 per cent to 2 per cent. 
 
A gradual rise in the retirement age for women 
from 62 in 1993 to 65 years by 1999. 
 
An increase in the contribution period required 
for full pension. 
 
A reduction in the contribution rate paid by 
employers of 0.75 percentage points, offset by a 
rise in VAT rates of 1 point, receipts of which 
are marked for social security. 
structural decreasing 
SP  1997    In July the Parliament has approved legislation 
introducing several reform to pension system: 
 
Gradual extension of the basis to calculate 
pensions from the last 8 years of contributions to 
the last 15 years. 
 
Unification of the different contribution ceilings 
at the level of the highest one. 
 
Reduction of front-loaded accumulation of 
pension rights, which provides incentives to 
retire early by having an accumulation rate 
which diminishes in relation to the years of 
structural decreasing  
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contributions. 
SD  1998  6  A new retirement pension system will be 
introduced gradually, starting in 1999; passage 
from a pay-as-you-go system to a prefunding 
system with two kind of pensions: income-
related pension and prefunded pension. 
 
The retirement age will be flexible without 
upper age limit.   
 
The state guarantees a minimum pension to 
those who have earned insufficient pension 
right. 
 
Future pensions will be based on all income 



















Data description and sources 
 
Prefix Country   
OE Austria   
BG Belgium   
DK Denmark   
FN Finland   
FR France   
GE Germany   
GR Greece   
IR Ireland   
IT Italy   
NL Netherlands   
PT Portugal   
SP Spain   
SD Sweden   
UK United  Kingdom   
US United  States   
    
Suffix Description  Source 
2039  per cent of population aged 20-39  UN World Population Prospects (2004 Revision) 
4064  per cent of population aged 40-64  UN World Population Prospects (2004 Revision) 
65 or 
65p  per cent of population aged 65 and over  UN World Population Prospects (2004 Revision) 
C private  consumption, constant currency 
All national sources: Statistik Austria (OE); 
Banque Nationale de Belgique (BG); Danmarks 
Statistik (DK); Statistics Finland (FN); INSEE 
(FR); Statistisches Bendesamt (GE); National 
Statistics Service of Greece (GR); CSO Ireland 
(IR); Instituto Nazionale di Statistica (IT); 
Central Bureau voor de Statistiek (NL); National 
Statistics Office (PT); INE (SP); Statistics 
Sweden (SD); ONS (UK): BEA (US). Austrian 
data seasonally adjusted by NIESR. Irish data 
before 1999 is spliced using old 1995 fixed base 
series. Spanish data before 1995 is spliced using 
old 1995 fixed base series. 
CED   private consumption deflator  All national sources, as for private consumption. 
CONF   confidence indicator 
Eurostat and University of Michigan Survey for 
the US 
GBR   government budget ratio, as per cent of GDP 
Budget deficit/surplus levels are collected from 
OECD except for ONS (UK) and BEA (US). 
These are divided by nominal GDP figures 
obtained from the institutions listed in the source 
for private consumption. 
GVAR   measure of equity price volatility 
NIESR estimation (GARCH (1,1)); monthly 
share prices (looged first difference) 
HW  housing wealth  OECD Economic Outlook, table 58 
NAIRU  non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment  European Commission, smoothed by NIESR.  
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NW  net financial wealth, personal sector 
Oesterreichische Nationalbank (OE); Banque 
Nationale de Belgique (BG); Danmarks 
Nationalbank (DK); Statistics Finland (FN); 
Banque de France (FR); Bundesbank (GE); 
Banca d'IItalia (IT); Eurostat (NL, PT); Banco de 
Espana (SP); Statistics Sweden (SD); ONS (UK); 
Federal Reserve (US). GR and IR are NIESR 
estimates. 
PH   index of house prices 
European Central Bank (OE, BG, DK, GR, 
IT,NL, PT, SP, SD); Statistics Finland (FN); 
INSEE (FR); Bulwein AG (GE); Department of 
Environment and Local Government (IR); Office 
of the Deputy Prime Minister (UK); Office of 
Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (US). Irish 
series is average of new and second-hand homes 
(excluding apartments). 
R3M   3-month interest rate 
OECD Main Economic Indicators except 
Financial Times (UK) and Federal Reserve (US) 
RNW  real net wealth, i.e. net wealth deflated by CED  NIESR calculations 
RPDI  real personal disposable income 
All personal disposable income figures in current 
prices are taken from OECD, except for UK 
(ONS), US, (BEA) and (Bundesbank) Germany. 
All series are deflated by NIESR using the 
consumer expenditure deflator. 
RPH  index of real house prices, i.e. deflated by CED  NIESR calculations 
RRF   instrumented interest rate 
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This second part presents the findings of an analysis of household saving in Germany, Spain and 
the United Kingdom carried out using micro-economic data; the study is supported by and carried 
out on behalf of DG-ECFIN at the European Commission. These three countries represent a 
country with slow economic growth in the Euro Area and two countries with appreciably faster 
economic growth, one inside and the other outside the Euro Area. The purpose of this part of the 
study is to shed some light on the slow growth of consumption in Germany by investigating 
whether there are identifiable groups of households whose saving has increased in the last few 
years and also to discover whether there are any substantial difference between Germany and the 
other two countries which might account for more rapid demand growth in Spain and the United 
Kingdom. The micro-economic analysis complements the macro-economic analysis also carried 
out in the first part. 
 
The study of consumption and saving behaviour using micro-economic data faces a number of 
problems. First of all, there are few countries which maintain panel studies of household income 
and expenditure over any substantial period. The data for Germany and the United Kingdom are 
provided by cross-section surveys. The Spanish survey is a rotating panel; data are collected once 
a quarter from each household, with the household remaining in the panel for eight quarters. This 
means that, even in Spain if the keys to the panel are used satisfactorily, it is difficult to apply to 
the individual responses the standard theoretical model based on intertemporal optimisation to the 
study of consumption expenditure. Secondly there are questions about coverage. In the United 
Kingdom where funded pensions form an important part of provision for retirement, both 
employers and employees contribute to pension schemes. Net household incomes are measured 
net of pension contributions which are an important part of household saving. But employee 
contributions are not well recorded and there is no data source which provides information on 
employer contributions. Thus it is impossible to study saving in micro-economic data using the 
same definitions as those adopted in macro-economic data. Here we have tried to define income 
and consumption and saving in the same way in Germany, the United Kingdom and Spain using 
the budget surveys in the three countries. The German Einkommens- und Verbrauchsstichprobe, 
EVS, is available in 1998 and 2003. The Spanish Encuesta Continua de Presupuestos Familiares, 
ECPF, has, as its name implies, run continuously since 1998 with the data available up to the first 
half of 2003; we have used the data since 1999. The United Kingdom Family Expenditure 
Survey
7, FES, is conducted annually; we have studied 1997, 1999, 2001 and 2003. The surveys 
are described in greater detail in the Appendix. 
 
Although the Spanish survey provides, in principle, panel information on both consumption and 
saving we were unable to link
8 the individual observations in a manner which was satisfactory- 
i.e. with the ages of nearly all household heads stable across the panel and with reasonable 
correlations of household incomes in successive quarters. We were therefore unable to make full 
use of these data. 
                                                 
7This was combined with the National Food Survey to become the Expenditure and Food Survey in 2002 
8There were a number of problems. The delivery of the data was a slow process- although they have subsequently 
become available over the internet. A separate request was needed to obtain the key to link successive quarters and 
this was initially refused by INE. When the data arrived we contacted the person listed as providing support but he 
was on holiday. By the time of his return we concluded that there was not sufficient time to absorb and use the panel 
aspect. A Spanish member of staff was employed throughout our discussions with INE.  
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The disadvantages in the use of micro-economic data are offset by other advantages. The most 
important of these is that it is possible to see how saving depends on household characteristics in 
addition to income. The most important characteristic which we expect to influence saving 
behaviour is age, but other factors such as education may also be important. 
 
This report proceeds as follows. We being with an account of the movements in the 
consumption and saving shown in the macro-economic data comparing these with what is shown 
in the survey aggregates. We then survey the existing literature, discussing the life-cycle 
framework used as the basis for much modelling of saving behaviour and the modelling 
framework that other researchers have adopted to study the sort of micro-economic data to which 
we have access.  This is followed by sections which describe our findings country by country. 
Conclusions draw out the similarities and differences between the countries. 
 
2  The Macro-Economic Context and the Micro-Economic 
Aggregates 
 
In this section we present the macro-economic context of the data, looking at how aggregate 
household saving has changed over time. We then look at saving as measured in the micro-
economic surveys, focusing on three income categories ( < 60% median, 60-140% median and 
>140% median) and two employment categories (employed/not employed) drawing attention to 
the extent to which the pattern in the micro surveys matches what can be seen in the macro-
economic aggregate.  
 
2.1. Germany 
Low private consumption growth in Germany is sometimes regarded as one of the reasons for 
low corporate investment and a low labour demand. Figure 10 shows that the growth rates of real 
consumption (consumption in prices of the year 1995) of private households (including NIPSH) 
indeed were low in most years of the period from 1995 to 2004. The lowest growth rates and 
even negative rates are present in the last years from 2002 to 2004. The average yearly growth 
rate of real consumption over the period from 1995 to 2004 was 1.18 % p.a. 
 















Disposable income growth Consumption growth
 
 
One reason for low consumption growth may be low income growth. Another reason may be a 
rise in the savings rate. Figure 10 shows that the growth rates of real disposable income (deflated  
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using the consumer price index) of private households (including NPISH) were also low in the 
period considered. While the growth rates of real consumption and real disposable income differ 
considerably in most years, the average yearly growth rates of real disposable income (1.04 % 
p.a.) and real consumption (1.18 % p.a.) differ only slightly. Thus, for the whole period, it can be 
concluded that low growth of income was more important for low consumption growth. 
 
In principle, it is possible to infer the development of the savings rate from the development of 
disposable income and consumption because the savings rate may be defined as the ratio of 
disposable income minus consumption to disposable income. However, it is more convenient to 
look at the savings rate directly. Moreover, it is of interest to include the net increase in future 
pension rights from company pension plans in the definition of the savings rate. In this case, 
savings are defined as disposable income plus the net increase in future pension rights minus 
private consumption. The savings rate is the ratio of savings to disposable income plus the net 
increase in future pension rights. Figure 11 shows the development of the savings rate for both 
definitions. Note that the second definition is the one used by the German Federal Statistical 
Office. 
 

















Savings rate without pension rights 




Figure 11 shows that that the savings rate fell during the late 1990s and increased again starting 
with the year 2001. The increase was especially high in the year 2001. In each year following the 
year 1995, the savings rate was lower than in the year 1995. The development of the savings rate 
has thus contributed to the somewhat higher average growth rate of real consumption compared 
to the growth rate of real disposable income mentioned above. Looking at the two years for 
which we have micro-economic data, 1998 and 2003, it can be seen that the saving rate is only 
slightly higher in the second year.  
 
However, the increase of the savings rate in the last few years had a negative impact on real 
consumption. As can be seen from figure 11, the rise in the savings rate including net increases in 
future pension rights for company pensions from the year 2001 on was somewhat higher then the 
one excluding these rights. This is due to the fact that the net increase in future pension rights for 
company pensions grew over the period from the year 2000 to the year 2004.  
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These findings indicate that low growth of real disposable income of private households was 
more important for the observed low consumption growth than changes in the savings rate. It is 
of interest to know whether low income growth of private households was primarily due to low 
GDP growth or due to a shift of resources from private households to the other sectors 
(government, enterprises) in the German economy. 
 
 



















GDP Growth Disposable Income Growth
 
 
Figure 12 shows that the growth rate of real GDP was low as well in most years. In some years it 
exceeded the growth rate of real disposable income of private households, in some other years it 
was lower. The average growth rate of real GDP in the years 1995 to 2004 was 1.32 % p.a. and 
thus higher than the growth rate of real disposable income of private households (1.04 % p.a.). 
 
 






















However, the lower growth rate of real disposable income compared to the growth rate of real 
GDP does not imply that the share of disposable income of private households in GDP decreased. 
As figure 13 shows, it actually increased. The average increase of the general price level (GDP 
deflator) was 0.97% p.a. in the period 1995 to 2004 and thus considerably lower than the average 
increase of the consumption price level (1.38 % p.a.) which was used to deflate disposable 
income of private households. Thus households experienced prices of consumption goods rising 
faster than the price of overall output.  
 
We now turn to the disaggregate data on consumption and saving in Germany, looking at the data 
from the EVS which we use subsequently in our regression analysis. We show averages only for 
those households whose savings ratios lay in the range – 0.5 to 0.5 so as to exclude results which 
were likely to be attributable to measurement errors
9  and apply similar trimming to our 
subsequent regression analysis. The data for saving in Germany classified by age group are 
reasonably stable; we show in figure 14 the savings ratio classified by age for 1998 and 2003. 
Figure 14 shows the means of the savings ratios of individual households classified by age group. 
This gives a lower figure than would aggregate saving divided by aggregate income in each age 
band because the savings ratios of high-income households tend to be greater than those of low 
income households. The pattern shown in the graph is largely in line with what one might expect 
from the life-cycle savings model, in that people save more while they are of working age than 
after their retirement. However, saving of young people is surprisingly high and it is also 
surprising that saving does not show a clear peak in the years when many people no longer have 
families to support and might be saving up for retirement.  
 
It is also surprising that old people continue to save, instead of running down their assets
10. One 
reason for this may be that old people have difficulties keeping accurate records of their 
expenditure, and therefore tend to understate their spending. Comparing 1998 and 2003, we can 
see that saving was generally higher, although people in their twenties saved less. If an economic 
motive is to be given to the rising savings rate of people in their thirties, it is likely that it is 
precautionary in nature. Caroll and Samwick (1997) suggest that life-cycle saving does not 
become the dominant saving motive until people are around forty-five. To speculate further, then, 
it is more likely that fear of unemployment rather than retirement saving is the factor behind 
rising saving of people in their thirties. However, it is difficult to provide an economic motive for 
the rising saving of people in their sixties and seventies. 
 
                                                 
9 The exclusion of “genuine” outliers can, however also improve the resulting estimates. There is a lengthy statistical 
literature on this question. See for example Staudte and Sheather (1990). 
10 Even though their income is provided by pensions and thus it can be argued that income is itself partly dissaving, 
the apparent recording of consumption below income is unexpected given the life-cycle framework.  
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We now turn to look at saving by income category. We explore three income classes, households 
whose income after adjusting for family size is less than 60% of the median, those whose income 
is between 60% and 140% of the median and those whose incomes lie above 140% of the 
median. In figure 15 we show the savings rates of the households with incomes less than 60% of 
the median. These households have low savings rates at all ages. As observed in the aggregate 
data, the peak savings rates come earlier than might have been expected, and at the same time we 
also see more saving than dissaving by old people. People in their twenties are net borrowers. In 
contrast to the average picture, these households tended to save more in 1998 than in 2003.  
 
































In figure 16 we look at the saving behaviour of the group on middling incomes. The main 
features of the trends observed in the aggregate are present here, Saving is high among people in 
their thirties and falls off when people retire. Recorded saving then rises as people age in 
retirement. Saving by people in their twenties is surprisingly high. And the savings ratio in 2003 
is higher than that for 1998 at most ages, consistent with the aggregate picture.    
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Figure 16: Household Savings Ratios: Germany, Households with Incomes between 60% 




























Figure 17: Household Savings Rates in Germany, Households with Income more than 



























Figure 17 shows the savings ratio of households with high incomes. Here the pattern of high 
saving by young people is very pronounced, with the exception of the youngest group in 1998. 
Once again at most ages saving is higher in 2003 than in 1998 and the effect is pronounced 
among households headed by young people. The tendency for savings rates to rise in retirement 
is not marked in this income group.  
 
We now look at saving by employment category. Obviously most household heads of working 
age are employed, although Germany has relatively high proportions of non-employment among 
young people and also among people aged 60-64. Beyond the age of 65 most household heads are 
not employed, and the data for households where the head is employed are based on small 
samples. In figure 18 we can see that saving by households headed by employed people in their  
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thirties rose markedly between 1998 and 2003, with smaller increases among households headed 
by employed people in their forties and early fifties; saving by households headed by employed 
people in their early twenties fell. No great importance should be attached to the data for people 
aged sixty-five and older. 
 


























Finally in figure 19 we look at the savings behaviour of households headed by people who do not 
work for any reason. This shows a steady increase in saving with age with no important 
differences between 1998 and 2003. One explanation of the rise in the savings rate with age is 
that as people age their expectation of returning to work, and thus of receiving a higher income in 
the future than they do at present, declines. Investigation of this is, however, beyond the scope of 
this study. 
 






























A general observation we can draw from these data is that the life-cycle profile is much more 
strongly visible in the saving pattern of all households than it is for most of the subgroups. While  
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this project has not studied income dynamics of individual households, the reason for this is that 
most households do not spend their whole life cycle in any one of the categories we have 
identified. In particular unemployment rates among young people are much higher than those of 
prime age workers. A comparison of figures 18 and 19 suggests that the pattern of figure 14 
would be generated if the proportion of households not working is lower for people in their 
thirties than in their twenties. Similarly and for much the same reason young households are more 
likely to have low incomes than are middle-aged households. This on the one hand provides a 
reason for young people individually not wanting to save and on the other hand in aggregate 
explains why in the population as a whole one would see a saving rate higher for people in their 




Spain is perhaps the most successful of the large economies in the Euro Area. In figure 20 we 
show the growth rates of output and consumption over the last nine years. The chart shows that 
consumption and GDP have grown very much in line, with the possible exception of 2004, where 
consumption has grown considerably faster. However the data for 2004 are described as 
provisional and it would therefore be wrong to assert that Spain had relied strongly on 
consumption-led growth in 2004. 
 















Growth of GDP Growth of Consumption of Households and NPISH  
 
Study of savings ratios suggests a picture which is, on first inspection, inconsistent with that 
shown by figure 20. The share of household consumption in GDP has declined steadily, while the 
household savings rate declined until 2001 since when it has stabilized as figure 21 shows. The 
decline in the share of consumption in GDP can be reconciled with volume growth rates which 
are much the same for both variables only as a result of the price of consumption goods growing 
less fast than that of GDP as a whole.  
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Household and NPISH Savings Ratio Household and NPISH Consumption as Proportion of GDP  
 
The declining share of consumption in GDP has been associated with a declining share of 
household and NPISH disposable income in GDP as shown in figure 22. Thus, as the earlier 
figures imply, consumption growth has been maintained in Spain despite a falling share of 
household incomes in GDP. There have been two mechanisms for this. First, between 1996 and 
2000 household savings ratios have fallen. Secondly, slow growth in consumption prices relative 
to the GDP deflator has meant that real incomes have been supported even though the share of 
income in GDP has fallen in contrast to the situation in Germany. This has undoubtedly been an 
important factor in sustaining the growth of consumption and therefore of GDP itself in Spain. 
 






















Figure 23 confirms this picture. In the period up to 2000 GDP growth outran real income growth 
and consumption was supported by a falling household savings rate. But from 2002 onwards real 




















Growth Rate of Real Disposable Income Growth Rate of Real GDP  
 
 



































Income < 60% Median





We now turn to a summary of the individual data which we subsequently study econometrically, 
showing, in figure 24 the averages over the five years we study, 1999-2003
11 of the mean savings 
rates by individual households as a function of age and income category. This has the effect of 
smoothing fluctuations in data which we subsequently show to be much more volatile than those 
for Germany. The lowest category, income, after adjusting for household size using McClement’s 
scale below 60% of median corresponds to a standard definition of poverty. We have selected as 
two other categories, an income between 60% and 140% of the median and an income above 
140% of the median so as to give a reasonable and symmetric spread. As with Germany we trim 
the data showing means for those households with savings ratios in the range -0.5 to 0.5. The 
Encuesta has disproportionately more households headed by old people than by young people in 
                                                 
11 Data are available only for the first two quarters of 2003  
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the sample (see Appendix)  and we found that in some years there are no households in age 20-24 
or age 25-29 categories in some of the income categories. For this reason the lines in figure 24 do 
not show entries for all age groups in all income categories. 
 
The relative savings rates of the households in the different income bands show that people on 
high incomes save more than those on low incomes. Young people are relatively high savers 
contradicting what would be expected in a life-cycle framework in which incomes rise with 
experience (Mincer, 1974). Saving falls off modestly between the late fifties and the late sixties; 
this can be seen as evidence for life-cycle behaviour.  The failure to observe dissaving among 
retired people is, however, a common property of such data and may be a consequence of the 
failure of old people to keep correct records of their expenditure when responding to budget 
surveys.  
 
In figure 25 we explore saving rates in individual years. During the period the macro-economic 
savings ratio, shown in figure 21 declined gradually.  The movement was, however, not very 
large. The data from the survey itself are rather erratic and there is no clear tendency either in 
terms of saving by young people relative to old people or in terms of movement of the saving 
curve over time. We attribute the erratic movements to the small sample size (see Appendix).  
The 1999 curve points to low saving by young people while later data point to higher saving; in 
particular the 2000 curve suggests that saving declines fairly steadily with age. The erratic nature 
of these data may be compounded because the survey is designed primarily as an expenditure 
survey. The information it provides on income is much less detailed than that provided in 
Germany or the United Kingdom. With less effort devoted to the collection of income data it is 
perfectly possible that they are less accurate.   
 



























In figure 26 we look at the savings rates of households with incomes below sixty per cent of the 
median. The erratic nature of the data is more pronounced here, given the fact that the means are 
calculated from smaller numbers of  observations than are used in figure 25. In particular the high 
savings rates observed for young people are estimated from very small samples.  It is not possible 
to discern in these data clear factors driving the decline in the overall savings rate over time.    
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In figure 27 we show the saving behaviour of the households in the middle income band, with 
incomes of between 60% and 140% of the median annual income after adjusting for household 
size. Once again the data for young people are particularly affected by small sample sizes.  
 
 




























In figure 28 we look at the saving behaviour of  households with incomes above 140% of the 
median after adjusting for household size. Again the high saving of young households is 
calculated from a very small number of observations. It is difficult to discern any life-cycle 
savings pattern in these data. 
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We now turn to the question of savings by employment status. In figure 29 we show saving by 
people who are not employed. As with the other countries, this represents a minority of the 
population of people aged under sixty, but the vast majority of those aged sixty-five or more.  
 
 






























The volatile nature of these data for people of working age makes them difficulty to interpret. Not 
surprising, as the sample sizes increase for people aged sixty and above, the series become more 
stable.  
 
In figure 30 we show the savings behaviour of households whose heads are in employment. 
There is no obvious evidence of the downward drift in the savings ratio observed in the aggregate 
data between 1999 and 2003. The erratic pattern in the data for people aged sixty-five and over is 
a consequence of a very small sample.  
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Given the volatility of the data there is some point in looking at the averages of the savings rates 
across all years. This is shown in figure 31. The much lower volatility allows these data to be 
shown on a different scale and saving by employment households is seen to be higher than that 
by non-employed households- with the exception of households whose heads are aged 35-39, as 
would be expected. But, as we have observed earlier, the savings data for Spanish households are 
volatile even when aggregated across all years. 
 

































2.3.  The United Kingdom 
 
The United Kingdom, in contrast to some of its neighbours, has experienced something of a 
consumer boom in the last ten years. As figure 32 shows, the household savings rate fell sharply 
in 1998 and has remained lower than the level of the mid-1990s since then. Nevertheless, the 
period since 1998 was marked by a low, rather than declining savings ratio and a general 
conclusion is therefore that, while low saving may have led to a high level of demand since 1998, 
there is little reason to think that, for the aggregate economy, a falling savings ratio was 
responsible for rising demand. 
 

























































































Household Consumption as a Proportion of GDP Household Saving Ratio  
 
 
Figure 33: Growth Rates of GDP, Household Consumption and Household Real Disposable 































GDP Growth Household and NPISH Consumption Growth Disposable Income Growth  
 
On the other hand, as figure 33 also shows, from 1998 to 2001 consumption as a share of GDP  
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(with both measured at current prices) rose even though the savings ratio was constant. This can 
be explained by household income taking a rising share of GDP. 
 
Looking at the movements in volume terms, however, we can see that in each year from 1996 to 
2004 household consumption has grown faster than GDP. To the two factors which might explain 
growth in current price consumption exceeding that of current price GDP (a falling household 
savings ratio and a rising share of household income in GDP) we can add a third factor, a 
favourable movement in the terms of trade for consumers, or equivalently, a situation where the 
consumption deflator has been rising less rapidly than the GDP deflator, so that  independently of 
movements in income shares, household incomes have risen faster than GDP. This has, 
undoubtedly been an additional factor behind consumption buoyancy in the United Kingdom, as 
it has been in Spain. 
 










1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Employers' Contributions Employees' Contributions Net Saving in Pension Funds  
 
Much saving in the United Kingdom is institutionalised, with provision for old age relying 
substantially on funded pensions rather than pay as you go arrangements. In figure 34 we show 
contributions paid by employers and employees into pension schemes. These constitute a large 
part of the saving by people of working age. However these funds are obviously paying out 
pensions as well as receiving pension contributions and the graph also shows the net inflow into 
pension funds (the change in the net equity of households in pension funds); this represents the 
net flow of institutional saving. 
 
Over the last five years there have been a number of disappointments associated with private 
pension provision. In part this has happened simply because investors in pension schemes 
received smaller pensions than they had hoped for (and perhaps been led to expect). There were 
also a number of occasions where the opacity of the saving vehicles meant that investors did not 
realise the risks they were taking, and others where entitlements to defined benefit pensions were 
lost at least in part because companies became insolvent at a time when there were deficits in 
their pension funds. This situation, associated with a reluctance of individuals to invest at a time 
of stock market weakness, is often thought to explain the reduced employee investment in 
pension funds shown figure 34. Employee contributions may also have been deterred by the  
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extension of means testing of retirement benefits (the Minimum Income Guarantee which was 
replaced by the Pension Credit). This imposes high effective marginal tax rates at relatively low 
levels of income and is widely described as a reason for "not bothering to save" as too is more 
general uncertainty about the returns likely to result from pension saving. We also note that there 
have been substantial revisions to the data as a result of the discovery that earlier estimates of 
pension contributions involved double-counting
12. However employer contributions have been 
rising because stock market weakness led to short-falls in defined benefit pension schemes and 
increases in contributions in 2002 and 2003 represent an attempt to reduce these deficits. 
 
We now turn to the aggregated pattern of saving as identified from the Family Expenditure 
Survey data, looking at the average savings rate by household as a function of the age of the head 
of the household. We do this for all households, for households in three income categories, those 
with incomes below 60%of the median after adjusting for household size, those with incomes of 
60%-140% of the median and those with incomes above 140% of the median; we also distinguish 
households with heads in employment from those whose heads are not in employment.  As with 
Spain we look first at the average over all the years we study (1997, 1999, 2001 and 2003) 
because averaging over time smooths out the effects of data noise. We then look at the figures for 
the individual years. In interpreting these data it must be remembered that the saving behaviour 
of high income households has more influence on aggregate saving than does that of low income 
households. As with Germany and Spain, the graphs we present are constructed from data for 
households whose savings ratios lie in the range -0.5 to 0.5, so as to filter out extreme values 
which are likely to be due to recording errors most notably associated with very low reported 
incomes.  
 

















































Figure 35 shows elements of the pattern one might expect. At all ages saving is an increasing 
function of income. For the two upper bands, and in particular for the middle income band it 
tends to rise with age during working life. All three income bands show high reported saving 
                                                 
12Transfers between pension funds were erroneously counted as new contributions in the Blue Books published up to 
2004.  
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ratios for elderly people. It should be remembered that the incomes these people receive are 
pensions and, to the extent that they are funded pensions, the incomes are themselves paid largely 
by dissaving; thus on a national accounting definition the saving of these groups would  almost 
certainly be negative. Nevertheless the tendency of old people to save out of their pensions is a 
puzzle here as already observed elsewhere.  
 































In figure 36 we show the saving pattern by age averaged across all survey respondents. The 
general pattern observed in the average is also present in the individual years. Nevertheless, the 
striking feature of figure 36 is that the saving rate of households in 2003 was, at almost all ages, 
higher than that in the other years. This contrasts with the observation in figure 33 that the 
aggregated saving rate was appreciably higher in 1997 than in subsequent years. The divergence 
between the two has to be attributed to a combination of measurement error in both the macro 
and micro data, definitional differences and aggregation effects
13. 
 
Figure 37 looks at the saving of those with incomes after adjusting for household size below sixty 
per cent of the median in the year in question. We have already seen in figure 35 that these 
households have low savings ratios and this is shown to be generally true in figure 37. However 
the savings ratios in 2003 are something of a puzzle. There is no obvious reason (such as a 
substantial change in availability of credit) which should have made it harder to borrow for 
people on low incomes in 2003 than it had been in earlier years. Because the households 
represented in this graph have very low incomes, movements in their saving are not likely to have 
much influence on the overall pattern of saving.  
 
                                                 
13 Averaging savings ratios should not be expected to give the macro-economic savings ratio since households are 
given equal weight in the average instead of being weighted by their incomes.   
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Figure 38 shows the savings ratio for the middling households with incomes between sixty and 
one hundred and forty per cent of the median after adjusting for household size. Again a high 
savings rate is shown in 2003 but one can also see that in 1997 saving was high among 
households with heads aged 35-49.  
 




























In figure 39 we look at the savings behaviour of those households with incomes of more than 
140% of the median after adjusting for household size. For households with heads aged twenty-
five to sixty there is very little variation between the years. There may be some significance to 
the fact that the savings rate of young households has fallen since 1997, although the volatile 
nature of it in the subsequent years does raise doubts about the statistical importance of this. The 
figures become erratic among households with heads aged sixty-five and over. The sample sizes 
in these categories are small since relatively few households of this age have incomes 
substantially above the median for the whole population.   
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In figure 40 we turn to the question of saving as a function of employment status. The chart 
shows the savings rates of households whose heads were not employed or self employed. For 
2003 we can see the anomalous savings rate for households with heads aged forty-five and under; 
this was also visible in figure 37. Once again erratic movements reflect, at least to some extent 
the small sample size among the younger age groups. By contrast most household heads aged 
sixty-five and over are not employed and their households are therefore represented in this graph. 
 





























Figure 41 shows the savings rates of households whose heads are in employment.  Here the data 
for households with heads aged sixty-five and over are volatile as a result of the small number of 
households with employed heads of this age. Among younger households the anomalies in the 
2003 data are plainly present. Beyond that we can observe higher saving in 1997 than in 1999 
and 2001 for households in the mid age range thirty-five to forty-nine. 
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These data provide only a tenuous link with the striking observation of the macro-economic data 
in figure 33- i.e. that the savings rate was appreciably lower in 1999, 2001 and 2003 than it had 
been in 1997.  
 
There is a question whether this is an artifact of the trimming process we have adopted- looking 
only at the savings of households with savings ratios between -0.5 and 0.5. We compared the full 
datasets for people with incomes between 60% and 140% of the median and for those with 
incomes above 140% of the median, looking at how the savings rate had changed if all 
households in these categories were considered instead of the trimmed sample. We found that the 
untrimmed mean had risen for both income bands. We did not explore households with incomes 
below 60%of the median since without any trimming, these include households with reported 
incomes very close to zero and not much meaning can be given to the untrimmed mean. 
Nevertheless, this exercise allowed us to conclude that the rise in the savings ratio shown in 
comparing the 2003 survey to the 1997 survey is not an artifact of the trimming process. 
 
The main finding from this analysis is that saving by young people and particularly those in their 
early twenties is low while that of retired people is surprisingly high. As with Germany saving by 
people who are not employed tends to rise with age but, because the UK has lower 
unemployment than Germany this is not enough to create a clear life-cycle profile in the overall 
pattern of saving as a function of age (figure 35). There is evidence of higher saving in 2003 and 
particularly by those in the middle income band. But since this is not matched in the macro-
economic data it is difficult to know how much weight to place on it.  
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3  Life-Cycle Analysis and Income Uncertainty 
 
The life-cycle framework- that people plan their consumption over their life time, saving or 
borrowing so that fluctuations in income are smoothed out and in particular so that consumption 
can be sustained after retirement, has provided the basic theoretical framework for understanding 
consumption behaviour since the work of Modigliani (1954). However, early micro-economic 
studies (Blundell, 1988) showed that only a part of consumption variability explained by the life 
cycle theory. Moreover, there are phenomena such as excess smoothness of consumption with 
respect to unanticipated changes of income, excess sensitivity of consumption regarding 
anticipated changes in income and the underspending of elderly that cannot be accounted for by 
the simple life cycle theory (see Zeldes, 1989, Caballero, 1990 and Skinner, 1988). Subsequent 
research on the life-cycle model focused on the impact of income uncertainty on savings. These 
models used to look at precautionary saving relax the assumption of certainty equivalence so that 
savings behaviour depends not only on the level of expected income but also on its variance
14. In 
such circumstances, theory predicts that increasing uncertainty about future income reduces 
current consumption and increases savings. However, a closed form solution for optimal 
consumption with random human capital does not exist except in rather restricted circumstances. 
 
Intertemporal optimisation models of saving have placed considerable emphasis on the role of the 
precautionary motive for wealth accumulation. Nevertheless, the range of results from empirical 
papers is disturbingly large. Kennickel and Lussar (2004) distinguish three groups of empirical 
papers on precautionary saving. Theoretical intertemporal models such as those developed by 
Skinner (1988), Caballero(1991), Carrol and Samwick (1998), Gourinchas and Parker (2002) and 
Irvine and Wang (2001) all indicated that precautionary savings are a sizeable part, ranging from 
20 to 60 percent, of all savings. However, empirical studies conducted for the US and Europe 
yield mixed results. Dardanoni (1991) using UK Family Expenditure Survey (FES) shows that 60 
percent of saving  is due to a precautionary motive. Dardonni (op.cit) employed a linear 
regression where consumption was a function of normal income and income uncertainty
15. Under 
his framework the normal income was swept into the constant term and income uncertainty was 
estimated by its variance. Results from a cross section analysis showed that the constant was not 
statistically significant. This implies that findings on the importance of precautionary saving were 
overstated. Carrol and Samwick (1997) and Carrol and Samwick (1998) using data from Panel 
Study and Income dynamic (PSID) and two measures of income uncertainty show that between 
                                                 
14The precautionary saving model is based on the assumption that the next period utility function has convex 
marginal utility (see Leland, 1968, Dreze and Modigliani, 1972). This implies that the third derivative of utility 
function is positive. Under these circumstances certain equivalent does not hold and the expected marginal utility of 
consumption at next period is higher than the marginal utility of consumption. We can write this relation as follows:  
   11 [( ) ] > ([ ] )
''
tt t t EuC uEC ++   (a) 
where  1 t C +   denotes the level of consumption at time  1 t + ,  ()
' u   denotes the marginal utility and  t E  
indicates expectation given the information set at time t . This implies that an Euler equation that connect 
consumption between two periods will hold with the following inequality:  
  
   1 () <[( ) ]
''
ttt uC EuC +  (b) 
(a) implies that uncertainty about future income reduce current consumption and increase savings. 
15Dardanoni (1991) grouped households according to the occupation of the reference person. He measured income 
uncertainty as the variance of labour income of each individual group.  
  119
32 and 50 percent of wealth accumulation is due to extra uncertainty that households face 
compare to the lowest uncertainty group.
16 Empirical papers such as of Engen and Gruber (2001), 
Miles (1997) and Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes (1995) also found results in favour of the 
important role of precautionary savings in wealth accumulation. 
 
Alternatively, Dyan (1993) using Expenditure Survey data and a measure of risk based on the 
variance of consumption found that the equivalent precautionary premium (EPP) suggested by 
Kimball (1990) as a measure of income uncertainty was not statistically different from zero. This 
indicates that there was no evidence of precautionary savings affecting wealth accumulation. 
Skinner (1988) showed that households with riskier occupations do not save more than other 
groups with lower occupation risks. Skinner (1988) used the occupation of the reference person 
of household as a proxy for income uncertainty. This suffers from the drawback that it does not 
take account of the income variance associated with changes to family circumstances. 
 
Empirical studies conducted by Guiso, Luigi and Terlizzesa (1992), Lusardi (1997), Lusardi 
(1998) and Lusardi (2000) utilised subjective probabilities of income risk to estimate the effects 
of precautionary savings. Evidence from an OLS regression shows a moderate but significant role 
of precautionary saving. Results from instrumental variable regression implemented by Lusardi 
(1997), Lusardi (1998) and Lusardi (2000) and Arrondel (2002) show that although the 
precautionary savings motive was found to be significant, it was more modest than the studies of 
the previous paragraph showed. 
 
Leland (1968) defined precautionary saving as the difference between consumption when income 
is certain and when income is uncertain but has the same mean as the former. As is clear from the 
discussion above, the issue that obviously arises is what is the appropriate measure of 
uncertainty. In the literature on precautionary saving many proxies for uncertainty have been 
used. The majority of these studies have been criticised by Kennickel and Lussardi (2004) for 
ignoring the existence of information asymmetry between the econometrician and individual 
agents regarding the risk associated with future income. Although this criticism is correct it can 
be addressed fully only if data on the subjective perception of households regarding their income 
uncertainty is available. But using information from panel data about the income uncertainty of 
individual households means that the criticism can be met, at least if one makes the conventional 
assumption associated with rational expectations- that economic agents understand their 
environment. 
 
The EVS and FES collect information on income and expenditure for a cross-section of 
households but they do not provide any panel data; as we noted the ECPF does collect panel 
information but we were unable to exploit it. Miles (1997) in a study related to our work uses a 
proxy of earning uncertainty based on the second moment of the residual of an income equation- 
an approach we can follow for all three countries. He estimates an income equation using cross 
sectional data from the FES. In his framework past macroeconomics shocks are ignored. So too is 
                                                 
16The first measure of income uncertainty based on a theoretical model developed by Kimball (1990) is the 
equivalent precautionary premium (EPP). The coefficient of EPP is given is given as follows:  
  =(/)
''' ''




U are the third and second 
derivative of utility function. The second measure of income uncertainty is based on the variance of income 
distribution. Income uncertainty is computed across various groups of occupation, industry and education categories. 
Carrol and Samwick (op.cit) compute the variance of income distribution by taking the ratio of current income over 
the average income.  
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any distinction between individual-specific effects accounting for persistent differences in 
income between households and income uncertainty arising from short-term volatility. In order to 
provide a better measure of uncertainty we draw on information from income panel data where 
possible. Even then, because we cannot identify the income uncertainty specific to the households 
in the expenditure surveys, there might be risks that the full effect of uncertainty is missed and 
appropriate econometric methods are needed to deal with this. 
 
For Germany and the United Kingdom, we measure income uncertainty as the variance of 
expected one period ahead income explained by current income and demographic characteristics. 
This involves a two step approach which we have addressed slightly differently in the two 
countries. We take the variance of the change in log household income adjusted for household 
size, using changes in individual household incomes shown in the Socio-Economic Panel 
(GSOEP) and British Household Panel Survey in Germany and the United Kingdom respectively. 
We then use the mean values of the household economic and demographic characteristics to 
explain the household-specific income variances. Estimated coefficients from the second 
regression are used to construct proxy variance estimates which can be applied to the cross-
section income/expenditure data. In Spain, as noted, we could not identify the links between 
quarters and were unable to estimate income variance in this way.  
 
The implications of our definition of uncertainty should be fully spelled out. A belief that public 
or private pensions apparently promised would be paid only at some known fraction of the rate 
promised (e.g. 80%) is not itself uncertainty but simply an expectation about the future level of 
income. Provided that households feel they have access to satisfactory savings media such a 
belief will, in the context of the life-cycle model, tend to raise savings rates as people try to 
maintain a smooth consumption profile in the face of reduced expectations of future income. But 
a belief that the amount paid out will be symmetrically distributed around 80% of the promised 
figure, but ranging between 60% and 100% will result in a further increase in saving as 
households try to insure themselves against the risk that incomes could turn out to be 
substantially lower than the central figure of 80% of what is promised. Obviously neither the 
expectation of the central figure nor the distribution around it can be observed in from the sort of 
data available to us. 
 
A question was raised about the influence of the fear of unemployment. To the extent that 
unemployment affects households' incomes and that the pattern identified in the panel surveys 
correctly represents the way in which households see future income risks arising from the threat 
of unemployment, then our approach does take on board influences arising from the risk of 
unemployment. What it does not do is pick up variation in that risk over time or identify the 
impact of a fear about unemployment over and above the effect of unemployment on income. 
Given the relatively short periods of the income panels it is difficult to see that the effects of 




4   The Modelling Framework 
 
Because of the difficulties in deriving closed form solutions to the consumer's optimisation 
problem under uncertainty empirical studies of precautionary savings generally follow from 




2 () =(, ,,) hp ln C f Y Y X σ      (4.1) 
 
2 σ  indicates the risk associated with income calculated as described above and Y  is observed 
income;  p Y is described by the authors whose approach we follow as permanent income, although 
in our empirical work the variable used might more plausibly be called normal income;  X  is 
set of indicators such as education, age, marital status etc. that explain income behaviour. Given a 
logarithmic expression for consumption as the starting point, it is more appropriate to estimate an 
equation for the level of the savings ratio than its logarithm and we adopt the following structure: 
 
  
2 (/ )= ( ,, , ) ph p h SY f YY X σ      (4.2) 
 
Lusardi (2000) and Kennickel and Lussardi (2004) argue that empirical results based on equation 
(4.2) suffer from potential bias. This is so because they use both a wrong functional form of  () f  
and wrong measurement of income risk. Lusardi (op. cit) and Kennickel and Lusardi (op. cit) 
mentioned a number of shortcomings for the studies that use the variance of non capital income 
as a measure of income uncertainty. First income is measured with errors. Therefore the 
estimated coefficients from (4.2) will be inconsistent. Secondly, the income equation will be 
subject to model uncertainty. Finally and most importantly, each household knows more about its 
income uncertainty than the econometrician. The last point, raised by Caballero (1991) and 
Browning and Lusardi (1996), creates the possibility that income uncertainty as estimated by the 
econometrician might be insured against; however the chance of this is probably not very great 
since, for reasons associated with both moral hazard and adverse selection, the market for 
insurance against income risk is very imperfect. 
 
A different approach followed by Dyan (1993) would be to use the variance of consumption 
rather than the variance of income; this in fact fits more happily into the framework provided by 
optimising behaviour (Deaton, 1992). However without panel consumption data, it is harder to 
produce a satisfactory measure of the variance of consumption than it is to estimate the variance 
of income. 
 
Another approach that gets around the two pitfalls mentioned above is based on a direct survey 
question. A pioneer study of this approach is that of Guiso, Luigi and Terlizzesa (1992) who used 
Bank of Italy Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) data. The novelty of this 
approach lies on the estimation of income uncertainty based on the subjective perception of 
households regarding the variability of earnings in the year following the interview. The 
advantage of this approach is that it deals with the problem of the information that is available to 
the household and not to the econometrician. Lusardi (2000) adopting the approach of Gusiso, 
Jappelli, and Terlizzesa (op.cit) constructed a measure of earnings uncertainty by using the  
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subjective probabilities of job loss available from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) in the 
US. Kennickel and Lussardi (2004) measure precautionary savings relying on a direct question 
about precautionary wealth included in the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). The exact 
question was: " About how much do you think you and your family need to have in savings for 
unanticipated emergencies and other unexpected things that may come up?"
17 Eisenhauer and 
Ventura (2003) using a similar question available since 2003 in the Survey of Italian Household 
Income and Wealth (SHIW) estimate the effects of precautionary savings.
18 
 
4.1. Model  Specification 
 
We measure income uncertainty in Germany and the United Kingdom by the variance of the 
change in household income from one year to the next. Although the Spanish survey is a panel 
survey, we were unable to link the successive observations in a manner which was coherent, and 
we have not therefore been able to calculate this income uncertainty term for Spain. 
If  , ht Y  denotes household income per effective household member, then 
   ,, , 1 = ht ht ht ul n Y l n Y − −      (4.3) 
 
Our measure of income uncertainty is then given as 
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We then construct measures of income uncertainty by regressing 
2
,h u σ  on log income and a vector 
of other observed variables using the average values over the period in which we compute the 




, =( , ) uh h h h f lnY v σ + Z      (4.4) 
 
Given this we can impute income uncertainty using EVS/FES data based on the estimated 
coefficients θ
 





01 , = uh h h ˆ ˆ lnY σθ θ ++ φZ
  
     (4.5) 
 
Equations (4.1) and (4.2) point to the need for estimates of permanent income. The approach used 
in work of this type, and which we follow, is to estimate normal or fitted values of income from a 
regression equation which explains income in terms of demographic and other relevant 
characteristics. Indeed without panel consumption/income surveys there is little else that can be 
                                                 
17This question was pilot-tested in order to assess whether it was understood properly by the responders (for more 
details see Kennickell and Lussardi 2000). 
18The exact wording of the question is as follows  
 “You are offered the opportunity of acquiring a security permitting you, with the same probabilities, either to 
gain £  10 million or to lose all the capital invested. What is the most that you are prepare to pay for this security”. 
19Although we could not find a satisfactory equation for Germany with the income variable present.  
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done. Nevertheless, such measures, based on a comparison of actual to normal income cannot 
capture the  effects of temporary  macroeconomic shocks associated with the economic cycle (see 
Carrol, Dynan and Krane, 2003) and obviously describe a concept rather different from 
permanent or life-cycle income. However given such a measure of normal income, it is possible 
to take the view that the square of {actual income/normal income -1} is also an indicator of 
income uncertainty. The larger this variable is, the larger have been the income shocks to which 
the household has been subjected; if the income shocks are heteroscedastic, then it is an indicator 




,h u σ . For Spain it is the only indicator we have available.  
 
In line with much other work (e.g. Miles, 1997) we measure normal income as follows: 
 




where  ˆ b  is a vector of coefficients calculated by estimating the regression equations  
 
 = h,t h,t h,t lnY e + Zb    (4.7) 
 
The vector  h,t Z  includes a variety of factors that might affect income. One is the age of the 
household head. Education is very likely to affect income and so may family circumstances such 
as marital status. Time dummies and interactive effects are also included.  We then look at saving 
computed as the difference between actual income (i.e.  ) h,t Y  and total expenditure measured as a 
proportion of actual income. 
 
To summarise our approach, we use equations (4.5) and (4.6) as inputs in equation (4.8) to 
measure the impact of income uncertainty on the savings ratio. Estimating equation (4.8) we also 
include demographic variables in the vector  ;
*
h,t Z  the parameter vector associated with this is 
denoted γ  to distinguish it from the scalar parameters. We include the square of the exponent of 





th th ˆ Exp(e ) ε = −  (which is equal to {actual income/normal 
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It should be noted that this follows the traditional specification with terms in log normal income 
and log of the ratio of actual to normal income. This has the implication that the full impact of 
normal income is shown by α1- α2 while the impact of actual income is shown by α2. 
 
In order to avoid problems of collinearity, the demographic variables used in the savings 
regression cannot be exactly the same as those in the final version of the permanent income 
regression. At least one variable in the permanent income regression has to be dropped. In some 
sense this creates a bias towards the explanation of differences in the savings ratio by differences 
in permanent income rather than directly in the omitted variable. Because in (4.8) permanent  
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income and both uncertainty terms uncertainty are generated regressors the problem of 
inconsistent standard errors as considered by Pagan (1984) arises. We address this problem using 
instrumental variable estimation or other appropriate techniques. We choose as instruments 
variables that have not been used in the final forms of (4.4) and (4.6). 
 
5   Determinants of Savings Behaviour 
 
Micro-economic data such as those we use here can be subject to large variations; it is not clear 
whether this is due to reporting errors or represents genuine variation. In either case there are, 
however, advantages in suppressing the influence of outliers. The most convenient way of doing 
this is by trimming the sample. In the work described here we have looked only at those 
households which report a savings ratio between -0.5 and 0.5 of net income; in other words they 
consume between 50% and 150% of their reported income. This raises the question whether such 
households are different in their behaviour from those households with more extreme savings 
behaviour.  We address the problem of selectivity bias following Heckman (1976), estimating a 
probit equation to determine the probability that a particular household is in our trimmed sample. 
The addition of inverse Mills ratio derived from this probit equation in (4.8) corrects for the 
selectivity bias that otherwise might arise. A similar problem arises in the estimation of the 
parameters of equation (4.4) because not all households included in the surveys we use have 
adequate income records; we deal with this in the same way. We adjust standard errors for 
heteroscedasticity following Amemiya (1983). 
 
There are important questions how we handle the effects of age in both the permanent income 
and the savings equations. Income equations frequently contain linear and quadratic terms in age, 
following Mincer (1974). We have followed this approach; we have, however, included separate 
linear and quadratic terms for people over 65, to allow for the fact that age is likely to influence 
retirement income in a manner different from the way in which it influences the income of 
households headed by people of working age.  
 
By contrast it is much harder to identify a general pattern for the expected link between age and 
saving behaviour. We might expect savings rates to be at their highest in the years before 
retirement but have no obvious precedent for the shape of the profile. We handle this by 
introducing age dummy variables which indicate five-year bands for the age of the head of the 
household. The definitions of the other variables are straightforward and give rise to dummy 
variables. Different countries obviously have different education systems and the education 
dummies which we use reflect this.  
 
The theoretical models which we have set out above do not provide a strong specification of the 
way in which the various demographic variables should enter the equation. We allow for the 
possibility that there may be interactive effects as well as additive effects by introducing the 
products of the variables as well as the variables themselves. This obviously means that that there 
is a large number of variables in the unrestricted equations.  
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We now present the results country by country. 
 
5.1 Germany 
In our analysis of Germany we first consider the determinants of income uncertainty, with the 
latter measured as the variance of the growth of household income after adjusting for the effects 
of changes to household size. We then consider the factors which influence the normal level of 
income. This allows us to estimate saving as a function of normal income and income uncertainty 
as well as of observed variables such as actual household income and demographic 
characteristics. We conclude with a representation of the simulated savings behaviour of 
households of different income levels.  
 
 
5.1.1 Income  uncertainty 
 
Income volatility as a proxy for income uncertainty may be represented in several ways. We have 
chosen the variance of the growth of log income (variances of changes in log income). The 
consumer expenditure surveys (EVS) for Germany do not allow to assess individual income 
changes over time and thus, do not allow to assess income uncertainty. The appropriate data set 
for assessing income changes for Germany is the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP). The 
regression for the variance of changes of log income is based on the waves 1996 to 2003 of the 
German Socio-Economic Panel. We included all households for which observations are available 
for all years.  
 
In order to identify how income changes vary with socio-demographic characteristics, we include 
several characteristics from which we expect that they have an impact on income uncertainty: 
 
We used the mean of log real income per household member over the period 1996 to 2003 to 
identify effects of income on income uncertainty. In order to reduce the impact of changes in the 
household composition over time, income was divided by the household size, where the 
household size was computed using McClements’ scale. 
 
The specification for income deserves a comment. A simple descriptive analysis of the data 
shows that the variance of the changes in log income per person is high at rather low levels of 
income, then decreases first rather sharply and then slowly to increase slightly again in the last 
two income deciles. In order to capture the high income volatility at low income levels, a dummy 
for low income (poverty) is considered. The dummy is equal to 1 if the mean of income per 
person in the household in the period 1996 to 2003 is lower than 60% of the median of the mean 
income per person for all households in the period 1996 to 2003. In order to consider the increase 
of income volatility at high income levels, the square of the mean of log income per person is 
included for those households who are not in poverty.  
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Table 42:   Determinants of Income Uncertainty – Germany 
 Unrestricted  Restricted 
  Coefficient z Coefficient z 
Log Ym  -0.215 -4.670 -0.215 -4.670 
(Log Ym)
2  0.013 4.150 0.013 4.170 
Poverty  0.588 4.270 0.590 4.290 
Degree  0.002 0.280     
Age  0.001 0.860 0.001 0.890 
Age
2  -1.500×10
-5  -1.700 -1.600×10
-5 -1.740 
Married  -0.025 -5.360 -0.025 -5.350 
Hown  -0.009 -2.100 -0.009 -2.090 
Constant  1.002 5.560 1.000 5.560 
      
R
2  0.028  0.027  
Standard  Error 0.1235  0.1235  
Significance 
test   of 
restrictions  F(1,3754) 0.08  P=77%   
Variable definitions:  The dependent variable is σ
2, the variance in the growth of real income per effective household 
member between 1996 and 2003. Log Ym- mean of log income per person in the household over the period 1996 to 
2003; (Log Ym) 
2- mean of log income per person in the household squared if household not in “poverty” (see 
below); Poverty: a dummy for low income, which is equal to 1 if the mean of income per person in the household in 
the period 1996 to 2003 is lower than 60% of the median of the mean income per person for all households in the 
period 1996 to 2003;Degree: educational status =1 if graduate (college); Age: age of household head. Age
2: age of 
household head squared. Married: marital status of household head (1 if married); Hown: homeownership (1 if 
homeowner). Except for income, the values for the explanatory variables relate to the year 1997. 
 
According to the regression results shown in table 42, income volatility decreases with income 
and increases with the square of income. Due to the increase in the square of income, the variance 
slightly increases again at very high income levels. The positive coefficient for the poverty 
dummy shows that income volatility is higher at very low levels of income compared to higher 
income levels.  
 
The fact that the household head holds a college degree has no significant effect on income 
volatility. We excluded the dummy for degree in a restricted model (see table 42). Income 
volatility first increases with age but decreases in higher ages. The decrease starts at about age 
50. This seems entirely plausible because a considerable part of the income of pensioners is 
provided by the public pension scheme and there were only small changes in public pensions in 
the period under consideration. Income volatility is somewhat lower if the household is married 
and the household owns a home.  
 
The low value for the coefficient of determination indicates that the estimation based on the 
variables included is able to explain only a rather small part of the observed variation of income 
in the survey period. Thus the results should be interpreted carefully.   
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5.1.2 Normal  Income 
 
The estimation of normal income is based on the two waves of the EVS 1998 and 2003. The 
dependent variable of the model for normal income is the log of disposable income (in Euro per 
month) as defined above, adjusted for household size. The estimated equation is shown in table 
43. 
 
Table 43:   Determinants of Normal Income: Germany 
Dependent Variable   Coefficient  Z 
Log Real Household 
Disposable Income per person      
Married  0.341 22.19 
Hown  0.003 0.17 
Morg  0.212 11.56 
Size  -0.713 -40.42 
Age×Married  -0.006 -18.52 
Age  0.032 20.77 
Age
2  -3 ×10
-4  -17.05 




Age×Degree  0.001 5.44 
Age×Size  0.009 19.25 
Age×Hown  0.002 7.19 
Age×Morg  0.001 1.69 
Degree  0.220 17.7 
Time98  -0.018 -4.66 
Constant  7.603 227.22 
R
2  0.226    
Standard Error  0.43    
        
Variable definitions: Married: marital status of household  h e a d  ( 1  i f  m a r r i e d ) ,   H o w n :  h o m e o w n e r s h i p  ( 1  i f  
homeowner), Morg: mortgage payment (1 if homeowner is paying mortgage), Size:log household size (measured 
using McClements scale). Age: age of household head, Age
2: age of household head squared, Age65p: age of 
household head, zero if age of household head is less than 65, Age65p
2: age of household head squared, zero if age 
of household head is less than 65, Degree: dummy variable, 1 if graduate, zero otherwise, Time 98: dummy for year 
1998. Seasonal dummies were also included. 
 
 
Seasonal effects may be present because for every observation the data were collected for a 
quarter of a year only and about one quarter of the total survey population was interviewed in 
each quarter of the year. To account for these effects seasonal dummies were used. A dummy for 
the year 1998 (Time98) is included to capture differences in the general economic situation in the 
years 1998 and 2003. The model is estimated by OLS.  
 
The regression for normal income is based on the pooled data of the Consumer Expenditure 
Survey for the years 1998 and 2003. The results are shown in table 43. The reference household 
is headed by a person who is not married, not a homeowner, does not hold a degree and was 
observed in the second quarter of the survey years. According to the results, the (log of) 
disposable income per person in the household is higher if the household head is married. But, as  
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the coefficient for the interaction between marital status and age indicates, the impact of being 
married is negative in old age. 
 
The coefficient for homeownership is slightly negative. However, it has to be remembered that 
the coefficients for mortgage payments and for the interaction term between age and 
homeownership are positive. As most young homeowners pay mortgages, the positive coefficient 
for mortgage payments indicates that the income of young homeowners is higher than the income 
of young tenants. For older homeowners, the interaction term is of high importance. The positive 
interaction term between age and homeownership indicates that the income of older homeowners 
is higher than the income of older tenants. 
 
Income per person is lower in larger households. The positive coefficient for the interaction term 
between age and size shows that the negative impact of household size on income per member 
decreases with age. For households below age 65, the results show an increase of income per 
person with age and a decrease in the square of age. The maximum is at about age 45. The 
coefficients for households with a household head at age 65 or older show that the decrease in 
income after the maximum continues in older ages, but at a slower rate. A college degree 
increases income per person considerably. The impact is higher for households with an older 
household head. The time dummy for the year 1998 indicates that there may have been a slight 
increase in income per person between the years 1998 and 2003. 
 
Homeownership, mortgage payments and age are highly correlated. The results for the 
unrestricted case show an insignificant coefficient for homeownership. However, as 
homeownership is a precondition for mortgage payments, we decided to exclude mortgage 





5.1.3  Determinants of Savings 
 
The dependent variable of the main model is the savings ratio. The savings ratio is defined as the 
relation of savings and actual income. For several reasons, the savings ratio may show high 
positive or negative values. The most important reason is that the survey period lasts only three 
months and durables purchased in the survey period are fully treated as consumption. In order to 
limit the impact of these facts, it is necessary to restrict the observations included in the 
estimation. We restrict the households in the estimation to those with a savings ratio between –
0.5 and + 0.5. To take account of the possible selection bias, we estimate the savings ratio 
following the Heckman approach. 
 
The results for the probit equation are shown in table 44.  
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Table 44:   Sample selection (probit) to explain whether households have savings rates 
within the ratio [-0.5,0.5] – Germany 
Dependent Variable is 1 if Household Savings 
Ratio lies in interval  [-0.5, 0.5], 0 otherwise   Coefficient  Z 
Log Y  0.072 2.740 
Log Y  × Time98  0.002 0.810 
Age 25-29  -0.175 -3.110 
Age 30-34  -0.158 -2.740 
Age 35-39  -0.091 -1.470 
Age 40-44  -0.037 -0.540 
Age 45-49  -0.043 -0.580 
Age 50-54  -0.071 -0.880 
Age 55-59  -0.209 -2.410 
Age 60-64  -0.278 -3.010 
Age 65-69  -0.297 -3.050 
Age 70-74  -0.303 -2.980 
Age >=75  -0.313 -3.010 
Married  -0.203 -3.540 
Married  × Time98  -0.004 -0.140 
Divorce  0.093 3.020 
Age × Married  0.004 4.270 
Age × Income  -1.000×10
-6 -19.090 
Degree  0.069 5.040 
σ




Constant  1.289 5.390 
       
Number of observations  75429    
Variable definitions:  Log Y:  the log of actual disposable income, Log Y x Time98: log of income times year 1998, 
Age 25-29 to Age>=75: dummy variables for age groups 25-29, 30-34, …, 70-74, 75 and older, Married: marital 
status of household head (1 if married),  Married ×Time98: married times year 1998,  Divorce: marital status of 
household head (1 if divorced),  Age × Married: interaction between age and marital status, Age x Y: interaction 
between age and disposable income, Degree: educational status =1 if household head holds a college degree, σ
2: 
variance of the change in log income (imputed measure for income uncertainty), Age×σ
2: interaction between age 
and the variance of the change in log income, Time 98: dummy for 1998. Quarterly dummies were also included. 
 
 
The dependent variable of the savings regression is the ratio of savings to actual disposable 
income. The regression is based on the pooled data of the German Expenditure Surveys of 1998 
and 2003. The estimates of standard error take account of the fact that two of the variables 
(σ
2 and  YP are estimated). We estimate the savings equation on the quarterly data including 
orthogonalized dummies so that results can easily be reported as yearly averages. We explore the 
question of stability over time by including a time dummy for 1998 and also including this 
multiplied by key economic and demographic variables. An F-test then allows us to establish 
whether any model parameters including those linked to the time dummy or its product with other 
variables can be set to zero within the bounds of conventional significance testing.  
 
The impact of income uncertainty on the savings rate is negative and insignificant. We restrict 
this, its interaction with age and the term in the square of the ratio of actual to normal income to 
zero.  We find some but not all of the time terms can be restricted to zero. However the change in 
the savings pattern between 1998 and 2003 is not straightforward. There is a substantial negative  
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dummy for 1998 although other terms are also present which may offset this. This means that it is 
hard to generalize and the best way of observing how things have changed between 1998 and 
2003 is to look at the simulated saving behaviour of sample households. We do this for 
households in three income categories. 
 
A similar point arises about an analysis of the effects of age on saving behaviour; age effects 
arise both though the dummy terms and as multiplicative terms interacting with various other 
variables. Age also affects the level of normal income; this has a small influence identified as the 
difference of the coefficients on log YP and log (Y/YP ) and the overall picture is best distilled by 
looking at fitted values for representative households of different ages. 
 
Table 45:   Determinants of the Savings Ratio: Germany 
Unrestricted Restricted   Dependent Variable is 
Household Saving Ratio   Coefficient z Coefficient z 
σ²  -0.210 -1.41     
Log YP   0.104 9.1  0.108  10.67 
Log Y/YP  0.148 30.37  0.149 35.92 
(Y/YP-1)
2  -0.001 -1.35     
Age 25-29  -0.007 -0.97  -0.003 -0.51 
Age 30-34  -0.010 -1.35  -0.006 -0.91 
Age 35-39  -0.022 -2.77  -0.018 -2.89 
Age 40-44  -0.035 -3.98  -0.032 -5.02 
Age 45-49  -0.036 -3.62  -0.033 -5.08 
Age 50-54  -0.044 -3.99  -0.040 -6.15 
Age 55-59  -0.033 -2.67  -0.027 -4.06 
Age 60-64  -0.047 -3.58  -0.038 -5.49 
Age 65-69  -0.032 -2.29  -0.019 -2.66 
Age 70-74  -0.022 -1.47  -0.007 -0.97 
Age >=75  0.003 0.19  0.019 2.52 
Degree  -3.96×10
-4  -0.04    
Degree ×98  -0.034 -2.56  -0.036 -4.86 
Married  0.020 1.61  0.021 3.13 
Married×98  -0.015 -1.31  -0.001 -4.43 
Age × Married  -0.001 -2.53     
Age × Married ×98  3.93×10
-4 1.82     
Age × Degree  -3.32×10
-4 -1.6  -3.69×10
-4 -4.53 
Age × Degree × Time98  4.40×10
-4 1.74  0.001 3.09 
Size   -0.058 -3.9  -0.068  -11 
Age × Size  -2.02×10
-4 -0.69     
Age × Size ×98  0.001 3.65  0.001  4.9 
Time98  -0.268 -3.3  -0.255  -3.37 
Age × σ²  0.004 1.33     
Hown  0.039 14.51  0.039 15.11 
Poverty  -0.024 -5.36  -0.024  -7.9 
Empl  0.022 1.68  0.011 2.85 
Emp×98  0.025 1.93  0.007 1.74 
Empl×Age  -2.63×10
-4 -1.02     
Empl×Age×98  -2.89×10
-4 -1.13     
Log YP ×98  0.032 2.96  0.031 3.11 
Log Y/YP ×98  -0.029 -6.82  -0.028 -6.81 
λ  -0.732 -7.82  -0.841  -12.57  
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Constant  -0.424 -5.16  -0.435 -5.72 
R
2   0.110     0.110    
Standard Error  0.201     0.201    
F-test on restrictions  F(9,66660)  1.32  P=21.8%    
Number of observations  66701     66701    
Variable definitions: σ
2;  variance of the change in log income (imputed measure for income uncertainty),  Y, Real 
income per person Yp normal income per person (imputed). Age 25-29 to Age>=75: dummy variables for age groups 
25-29, 30-34, …, 70-74, 75 and older, Degree: educational status =1 if household head holds a college degree, 
Time98,dummy variable for observations in 1998. Size: log household size (measured using the McClements 
scale).Hown: home ownership (1 if home owner), Poverty: a dummy for low income, which is equal to 1 if the mean 
of income per person in the household in the period 1996 to 2003 is lower than 60% of the median of the mean 
income per person for all households in the period 1996 to 2003;  λ: Mills Ratio constructed from the Probit 
equation for the exclusion of households with a savings outside the interval [-0.5,0.5]. The equations included 
household size, dummies for degrees and marital status, with the product of these and the dummy for 1998 in 
addition. Quarterly dummies were also included. Interactive terms given by the product of age with size and age with 
marital status, both multiplied by the dummy for 1998 in the unrestricted equation  
 
Normal income as well as the ratio of actual income to normal income has a positive impact on 
the savings rate. The coefficients are of similar size suggesting that it is actual income rather than 
permanent income which is responsible for the dominant income effect. The effect of permanent 
income is lower in 1998 than in 2003 and the effect of the ratio of actual to permanent income is 
stronger. The implication of the dummies is that in 1998 nominal income plays no role, and in 
fact has a small negative coefficient. Households with married heads saved more in 1998, but the 
effect was attenuated in 2003. In 1998 graduates under the age of 55 had a lower saving ratio than 
in 2003 at any given level of normal income but beyond this age it increased slightly. At any 
given level of income and normal income size depresses saving slightly, perhaps reflecting the 
fact that households with children expect those children eventually to leave home or bring in an 
income, implying in either case that income per effective household member is likely to be higher 
in the future than it is at present. 
 
The coefficient for “poverty” indicates that the savings rate was lower for households with an 
income below 60 % of the median even after the effects of income are taken into account. The 
saving of home owners is slightly higher than that of people who do not own their own homes. 
Households where the head was employed tended to save more, at any level of actual and normal 
income than did households whose heads were not working. This effect is consistent with the 
idea that heads of non-working households have the prospect of raising their incomes by taking 
up employment- implying an effect over and above that represented by the permanent income 
terms. The effect was stronger in 1998 than in 2003 but was not sensitive to age. Direct effects of 
uncertainty on saving were not statistically significant. 
 
We can obtain an impression of the implications of the equations for saving as a function of age 
by looking at fitted values for the savings ratio for particular types of household. We look at a 
standard household consisting of a married couple. They acquire two children at the age thirty. 
These children age and then leave home when the household head has an age of fifty. We look at 
families with incomes after adjusting for family size at the mean values of the incomes of i) those 
households with incomes after adjusting for size below 60% of the median, ii) those households 
with incomes between 60% and 140% of the median and those families with incomes of more 
than 140% of the median. The families in the top income group are assumed to be headed by 
graduates and to have mortgages from the age of twenty-five to forty-nine, owning houses from  
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the age of twenty-five onwards
20. The heads of households in the other two groups are not home 
owners or graduates. When calculating saving a fitted value for normal income is calculated 
using the equation shown in table 43.  
 

























We see, around an overall savings rate which is close to zero, a relatively high savings rate by 
young households, a dip in middle age and a saving rate which rises again in old age. For this sort 
of household saving was generally higher in 1998 than in 2003.  
 
Figure 43 shows the saving pattern of a middling household, with income of between 60% and 
140% of the median. The profile itself is not very different from that for the household with 
income below 60% of median but position the curves has shifted so that at most ages for this 
group of households saving is higher in 2003 than in 1998.  
 
                                                 
20 In calculating fitted values the coefficients show the marginal effects of the various influences after correcting for 
sample selection bias. However the average position of the curve depends on the value of λ. We sidestep this 
problem by giving λ a value of zero (the value it would have for a household certain to be included in the sample) 
and adjusting the position of each savings curve so that its mean averaged across the ages shown is the same as the 
means of the curves shown in figures 1.6 to 1.8. We assume that households with heads aged 75+ have household 
heads aged 80. We use a similar approach for Spain and the United Kingdom.  
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Finally, in figure 44 we look at the savings of a household with income at the mean of those 
receiving more than 140%of the median after adjusting for household size. Here too the same 
underlying profile is present with high saving by young people and old people but with a dip in 
middle age. However for this group of households the savings rate is generally higher in 2003 
than in 1998. This reflects the fact that the coefficient on actual log income is higher in 2003 than 
in 1998, depressing the saving of low-income households and raising that of high income 
households. 
 















The key findings of the analysis of saving in Germany are i) that saving by young people is 
probably higher than would be expected from a  life-cycle model and that old people also 
continue to save. The simulation suggests that the rise in the overall savings ratio between 1998 
and 2003 is attributed mainly to increased saving by high income people although the data also  
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show that among young middle-income people saving has risen.  
 
In order to understand the factors leading to the life-cycle profile visible in figure 14 it is 
necessary to understand how the incomes of particular households change over time, as well as 
looking at the sort of snap-shot we have here. If households tend to start with relatively low 
incomes and these then rise over time, it is perfectly possible to generate the picture shown in 
figure 14 from the fitted profiles generated here.  
 
5.2 Spain 
For Spain we do not have any means of estimating income uncertainty from panel data since, as 
reported, we were unable to link the successive observations of the ECPF. We therefore proceed 
to a discussion of the determinants of normal income and follow this with an account of 
influences on saving. Finally we present fitted savings profiles for households in three different 
income bands.  
 
5.2.1 Normal  Income 
 
Table 46 shows the sample selection equation which distinguishes those households providing 
income data from the rest of the ECPF. It is clear that a wide range of deterministic factors 
influences the provision of income data. The income equation itself is shown in table 47. Age is 
an influence on income but the pure linear effect is small, at only 0.014 for someone who is 
unmarried or 0.017 for someone who is married.  There are important interactive effects; the most 
important one is that with size; this adds a coefficient of 0.015 for a household with two adults 
(size=1). The implication of this term is, perhaps not very surprisingly, that a large household 
adds more to income when the household head (and therefore probably the other household 
members) are old rather than when they are young. Young household heads with large 
households are likely to have non-earning children. Old household heads with large households 
are more likely to have adult children present who add to household income. Education effects 
themselves are very powerful. However, the effects of income growth with age tend to decline as 
the educational standing of the household head increases; the control category- special adult 
education- results in a low initial income level and a high slope. Sample-selection effects are 
shown to be statistically significant.  
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Table  46:    Probit Estimation for computing the Inverse Mills ratio for the Normal 
Income Equation 
Dependent variable takes value 1 if 
household has income data and 0 
otherwise  Coefficient Z 
Married  0.230 5.01 
Single  0.375 19.14 
Divorce  0.320 7.61 
Separated  0.381 13.67 
Hown  -0.266 -6.79 
Morg  -0.233 -5 
Size  1.216 16.5 
No education  2.997 2.24 
Primary   2.869 2.15 
Secondary   2.968 2.22 
Further Secondary   2.889 2.16 
After High School  2.856 2.13 
Degree  2.852 2.13 
Age × Married  -2.600E-05 -0.04 
Age  0.006 0.3 
Age
2  3.484E-04 7.44 
(Age>=65)  0.017 8.01 
(Age>=65)
 2  -2.458E-04 -7.25 
Age×No Education  -0.047 -2.23 
Age × Primary education  -0.048 -2.3 
Age × secondary school  -0.050 -2.4 
Age × Further Secondary school  -0.052 -2.49 
Age × After High School  -0.051 -2.44 
Age × 1st cycle University  -0.050 -2.38 
Age × 2nd cycle University  -0.054 -2.57 
Age × Size  -0.033 -26.39 
Age × Hown  0.004 6.02 
Age × Mortgage  0.005 4.95 
Constant  -3.079 -2.3 
 
Variable definitions: Married, Single, Divorced, Separated dummy variables indicating marital status of household 
head. Hown home ownership (1 if home owner). Size Household size measured by McClements scale. No education, 
Primary, Secondary, Further secondary, After high school, Degree, 1st cycle university, 2
nd cycle university dummies 
indicating education attainment. Age age of household head. Time dummies for 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 were 
included.  
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Table 47:   Determinants of Normal Income – Spain 
Unrestricted Restricted  Dependent Variable is log Real 
Household Income per person  Coefficient Z Coefficient Z
Married  0.216 8.22 0.216 8.22
Single  0.109 5.63 0.110 5.69
Divorced  0.082 2.65 0.082 2.67
Hown  0.444 8.81 0.444 8.81
Morg  0.429 8.16 0.429 8.15
Rent  0.283 5.29 0.283 5.29
Reduce Rent  0.296 3.62 0.295 3.61
Semi Free  0.195 3.08 0.195 3.08
Size  -0.322 -3.48 -0.320 -3.48
No education  -0.212 -0.2  
Primary  0.216 0.2 0.428 9.31
Secondary  0.279 0.26 0.490 9.78
Further Secondary  0.358 0.34 0.569 10.05
After High School  0.360 0.34 0.571 7.01
Degree  0.717 0.67 0.928 15.83
Age x Married  0.003 7.28 0.003 7.31








Age × No Education  -3.780×10
-5 0 -0.003 -1.23
Age × Primary   -0.005 -0.32 -0.008 -3.07
Age × secondary  -0.004 -0.28 -0.008 -2.82
Age × Further Secondary   -0.002 -0.11 -0.005 -1.75
Age × Non Univ High Education  -0.003 -0.17 -0.006 -1.91
Age × 1st cycle University  -0.003 -0.17 -0.006 -2.12
Age × 2nd cycle University  -0.001 -0.04 -0.004 -1.35
Age × Size  0.015 6.97 0.015 6.99
Age × Hown  -0.004 -4.51 -0.004 -4.51
Age × Mortgage  -0.003 -2.56 -0.002 -2.56
Age×Rent  -0.002 -2.57 -0.002 -2.57
Age× reduced Rent  -0.002 -1.94 -0.002 -1.94
Age×Semi Free  -0.001 -0.64 -0.001 -0.64
λ  0.395 5.35 0.397 5.43
Constant  1.669 1.55 1.456 14.14
R
2  0.502   
Standard  Error  0.456   
F-test of restriction  F(1,29633)  0.842   
Variable definitions: Married, Single, Divorced, Separated dummy variables indicating marital status of household 
head. Hown home ownership. Morg mortgage, Rent, Reduced Rent, Rent Free other forms of housing tenure.  Size 
Household size measured by McClements scale. No education, Primary, Secondary, Further secondary, After high 
school, Degree, 1st cycle university, 2
nd cycle university dummies indicating education attainment. Age age of 
household head. λ, the inverse Mills' ratio. Year dummies were also present 
 
5.2.2  Determinants of Savings 
Fewer data are used in the estimation of the saving equation than in the estimation of the income 
equation, because we truncate the sample. Looking only at households where the savings ratio 
lies in the range [-0.5, 0.5]. This is in order to remove potentially distorting effects arising from 
outliers. We therefore need to estimate a sample selection equation specific to those observations  
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used in the savings equation. The equation is shown in table 48. 
 
 
Table 48:   Probit Estimation for computing the Inverse Mills ratio Test to be used in 
the Saving Ratio Equation 
Dependent Variable is 1 if Household Savings Ratio 
lies in interval  [-0.5, 0.5], 0 otherwise   Coefficient z
Log Y  -0.450 -11.29
Log Y×Time99  -0.247 -4.64
Log Y ×Time00  -0.239 -4.42
Log Y ×Time01  -0.164 -3.1
Log Y ×Time02  -0.181 -3.48
Married  -0.144 -1.21
Married×Time99  0.298 1.97
Married×Time00  0.185 1.17
Married×Time01  -0.067 -0.41
Married×Time02  0.034 0.22
Primary×Time99  0.119 2.77
Primary×Time00  0.074 1.65
Primary×Time01  0.089 1.89
Primary×Time02  0.003 0.05
Secondary×Time99  0.273 4.4
Secondary×Time00  0.286 4.45
Secondary×Time01  0.300 4.49
Secondary×Time02  0.207 3.18
Further Secondary×Time99  0.531 7.25
Further Secondary×Time00  0.421 5.22
Further Secondary×Time01  0.629 7.85
Further Secondary×Time02  0.403 5.36
After High School×Time99  0.286 2.47
After High School×Time00  0.473 3.67
After High School×Time01  0.314 2.46
After High School×Time02  0.226 1.88
Age × Married  0.012 6.27
Age × Married×Time99  -0.006 -2.41
Age × Married×Time00  -0.003 -1.4
Age × Married×Time01  -0.001 -0.26
Age × Married×Time02  -0.002 -0.92
Age×Size  0.013 9.88
Age×Size×Time99  -0.004 -2.61
Age×Size×Time00  -0.001 -0.29
Age×Size×Time01  -2.408×10
-4  -0.13
Age×Size×Time02  -0.003 -1.87
Age ×Income  -3.110×10
-5  -0.09
Degree  0.537 7.86
Degree×Time99  0.331 3.17
Degree×Time00  0.319 2.99
Degree×Time01  0.275 2.51
Degree×Time02  0.308 2.93
Hown  0.325 4.93
Mortgage  0.181 6.33
Age ×Hown  -0.004 -4.24
Time99  0.522 3.11 
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Time00  0.503 2.94
Time01  0.396 2.34
Time02  0.496 2.98
(Y/YP)
2  -0.122 -1.52
Age ×(Y/YP)
2  -0.003 -2.01
Constant  1.038 8.56
 
Variable definitions: Y, real household income per person, Yp normal household income per person. Married, Single, 
Divorced, Separated dummy variables indicating marital status of household head. Hown home ownership. Morg 
mortgage, Rent, Reduced Rent, Rent Free other forms of housing tenure.  Size Household size measured by 
McClements scale. No education, Primary, Secondary, Further secondary, After high school, Degree, 1st cycle 
university, 2
nd cycle university dummies indicating education attainment. Age age of household head. Time99, 
Time00, Time01, Time02 year dummies 
 
 
In table 49 we show our explanation of the household savings ratio itself. Once again we test for 
the effects of stability over time. The fact that we are considering five years rather than just the 
two we had for Germany creates a large number of dummy variables and we do not show the 
unrestricted equation in full. We eliminate sixty-six variables from the initial equation, showing 
in table 49 the restricted and unrestricted values of the variables which remain in the equation. 
There is evidence that some of the coefficients are time-varying, with the interaction of age and 
log household size being the most important of these. 
 
We find that saving is a function of actual income relative to normal income but cannot identify 
further income effects. It does, however, also depend on age and marital status. The large 
coefficients on divorce are almost certainly generated by a small number of outlying 
observations. Home ownership and mortgage status have an influence on saving behaviour and 
these may be an influence behind the high savings rates of young households hinted in figure 25. 
Certainly people under twenty-five are less likely to be buying houses with mortgages than are 
other people.   
 
The term, 
2 1 P (Y/Y ) − , has a significant but negative influence which we find difficult to interpret, 
at least in the standard modelling framework. As with Germany the effects of age and income 
need to be explored in a way which takes account of all of the interactive effects, and also that 
income is itself a function of age.  
 
Table 49:        The Saving Equation, Spain 
Unrestricted Restricted  Dependent Variable is 
Household Savings Ratio  Coefficient ZCoefficient Z
Log Yp  -0.679 -1.700  
Log Y/Yp  0.118 5.330 0.079 14.830
(Y/ Yp-1)
2  -0.024 -1.920 -0.051 -6.870
Log Yp × 99  0.569 1.780  
Log Yp ×00  0.553 1.700  
Log Yp ×02  0.595 1.840  
Log Yp ×01  0.760 2.370  
Log Y/Yp ×99  -0.004 -0.160  
Log Y/Yp ×00  -0.008 -0.300  
Log Y/Yp ×01  0.024 0.930  
Log Y/Yp ×02  -0.004 -0.150   
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Employed  0.080 1.900  
Employed×99  -0.054 -1.210  
Employed×00  -0.064 -1.360  
Employed×01  -0.067 -1.420  
Employed×02  -0.088 -1.900  
Age 20-24  0.054 0.480 -0.013 -0.180
Age 25-29  0.033 0.300 -0.054 -0.890
Age 30-34  0.024 0.210 -0.081 -1.390
Age 35-39  0.056 0.480 -0.062 -1.080
Age 40-44  0.049 0.410 -0.083 -1.430
Age 45-49  0.053 0.440 -0.088 -1.510
Age 50-54  0.082 0.680 -0.068 -1.170
Age 55-59  0.091 0.770 -0.058 -0.990
Age 60-64  0.100 0.850 -0.052 -0.900
Age 65-69  0.107 0.930 -0.043 -0.740
Age 70-74  0.112 0.980 -0.042 -0.720
Age >=75  0.153 1.280 -0.023 -0.390
Married  0.346 3.010 0.051 8.270
Single  0.129 2.350 0.042 4.540
Divorced  0.643 3.590 0.450 2.600
Primary School  -0.059 -1.170  
Secondary School  -0.053 -1.370  
Further Secondary School  0.133 1.860  
After High School  0.073 1.430  
Married× 99  -0.343 -3.030  
Married×00  -0.247 -2.210  
Marr×01  -0.240 -2.370  
Marr×02  -0.280 -2.590  
Single×99  -0.043 -0.750  
Single×00  -0.062 -1.050  
Single×01  -0.095 -1.710  
Single×02  -0.108 -1.830  
Divorce×99  -0.881 -3.630 -0.634 -2.780
Divorce×00  -0.545 -2.290 -0.402 -1.790
Divorce×01  -0.676 -2.160 -0.444 -1.430
Divorce×02  -0.745 -2.630 -0.473 -1.700
Primary School×99  0.177 2.390  
Primary School×00  0.167 2.300  
Primary School×01  0.043 0.570  
Primary School×02  -0.024 -0.310  
Secondary School×99  0.201 2.860  
Secondary School×00  0.005 0.070  
Secondary School×01  0.039 0.540  
Secondary School×02  0.072 0.980  
Further Secondary×99  -0.139 -1.270  
Further Secondary×00  -0.087 -0.750  
Further Secondary×01  -0.164 -1.420  
Further Secondary×02  -0.088 -0.800  
After High School×99  0.044 0.280  
After High School×00  -0.093 -0.550   
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After High School×01  -0.134 -1.060  
After High School×02  0.045 0.350  
Age × Mar  -0.001 -1.230  
Age × Mar× 99  0.003 2.620  
Age × Mar× 00  0.001 0.840  
Age × Mar× 01  0.000 0.240  
Age × Mar× 02  0.000 -0.190  
Age × Divorce  -0.012 -3.430 -0.009 -2.820
Age × Div× 99  0.016 3.570 0.012 2.750
Age × Div× 00  0.012 2.620 0.010 2.340
Age × Div× 01  0.010 1.860 0.008 1.360
Age × Div× 02  0.014 2.680 0.011 2.110
Age × Widow  0.000 0.270  
Age × Wid× 99  0.001 1.590  
Age × Wid× 00  0.000 0.350  
Age × Wid× 01  0.000 -0.110  
Age × Wid× 02  -0.001 -1.260  
Size  -0.298 -1.900  
Age×Size  0.014 1.880 0.002 5.280
Age×Siz× 99  -0.009 -1.750 -0.001 -1.990
Age×Siz× 00  -0.008 -1.600
-8.250E-
05  -0.180
Age×Siz× 01  -0.009 -1.800
-3.328E-
04 -0.750
Age×Siz× 02  -0.012 -2.540 -0.001 -2.990
Age×Primary× 99  -0.002 -2.140  
Age× Primary× 00  -0.001 -1.460  
Age× Primary× 01  0.000 0.080  
Age× Primary× 02  0.001 1.390  
Age × Sec Educ× 99  -0.003 -2.330  
Age × Sec Educ× 00  0.001 0.690  
Age × Sec Educ× 01  0.000 -0.080  
Age × Sec Educ× 02  0.000 -0.340  
Age × Further Sec Educ× 99  0.001 0.420  
Age × Further Sec Educ× 00  0.000 -0.050  
Age × Further Sec Educ× 01  0.000 0.270  
Age × Further Sec Educ× 02  -0.002 -0.930  
Age×High sch× 99  -0.002 -0.600  
Age×High sch× 00  0.001 0.370  
Age×High sch× 01  0.001 0.580  
Age×High sch× 02  -0.003 -1.120  
Age×Degree× 99  0.001 0.520
-2.712E-
04 -0.710
Age×Degree× 00  0.001 0.840
-5.480E-
05  -0.150
Age×Degree× 01  0.001 0.520 4.030E-04 1.130
Age×Degree× 02  -0.002 -1.600
-2.469E-
04  -0.730
Time99  -1.894 -1.800 -0.021 -2.180
Time00  -1.812 -1.710 -0.014 -1.370
Time01  -1.900 -1.800 -0.022 -2.120 
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Time02  -2.395 -2.290 -0.025 -2.410
Hown  -0.012 -0.630 -0.034 -4.770
Mortgage  0.001 0.060 -0.022 -2.520
Λ  -0.194 -2.310  
Poverty  -0.024 -1.260  
Constant  2.318 1.850 0.139 2.370
R^2  0.026 0.026   
Standard Error  0.281  0.274  
F(66,12727) 1.230     
 
Variable definitions: Y, real household income per person, Yp normal household income per person. Married, Single, 
Divorced, Separated dummy variables indicating marital status of household head. Hown home ownership. Morg 
mortgage, Rent, Reduced Rent, Rent Free other forms of housing tenure.  Size Household size measured by 
McClements scale. No education, Primary, Secondary, Further secondary, After high school, Degree, 1st cycle 
university, 2
nd cycle university dummies indicating education attainment. Age age of household head. λ, the inverse 
Mills' ratio Time99, Time00, Time01, Time02 year dummies  
The unrestricted equation included dummies for highest level of education achieved, marital status and the 
interaction of these with age. It also included terms in the product of the home ownership dummy and age and the 
poverty dummy and age. There were 12838 observation in the sample. The F- statistic relates the restricted and 
unrestricted models.  
 
In figures 45 to 47 we present the fitted savings profiles of a representative household which 
consists of a married couple. Our dummy variables for age have been defined for ranges and we 
take the mid-point of these, with an assumed age of 80 for the category 75+.  When the reference 
person has an age of 33, we assume that the family has two children aged three. These children 
age, with impact on family size until they reach 20 when the household head has an age of 50. 
The children leave home at the age of 20, so that by the age of 52 the family then reverts to being 
a couple. The family with an income below 60% of median is assumed not to own its own home 
or have a mortgage. Families with higher incomes are assumed to be home owners from the age 
of 25 with mortgages which last until the age of 50; this treatment of families in the middle 
income group which is different from Germany, is intended to reflect the high rate of home 
ownership in Spain. The families in the low income groups are assumed to have household heads 
educated to secondary level. In the middle income group the household head is assumed to be 
educated to upper secondary level while among the high income group the household head is 
assumed to be a graduate.  
 
We are unable to calculate a reference income level for households with heads aged under 
twenty-five and incomes below 60% of the median. One explanation of why they do not crop up 
in the sample is that young people on low incomes tend to live with their parents instead of 
forming their own households. But exploration of this is outside the scope of the project.  The 
saving pattern for people on low incomes is that savings rates are close to zero but start to rise 
when household heads are in their fifties with retired households showing the highest savings 
rates. Since there is no clear match between movements in the savings rate identified in the 
micro-economic data and that shown in the macro-economic data, there is little to be gained in 
focusing on the positions of the curves in different years.  
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We are able to identify income figures for households with heads aged under twenty-five and 
with incomes in the ranges 60-140% of the median and more than 140% of the median. Both 
graphs show that this group has a high saving rate compared to older people. An important 
explanation of this is that we have assumed that they are neither home-owners nor mortgagees. 
Inspection of table 49 shows that buying a home with a mortgage depresses identified saving by 
5.6 percentage points. The mortgage is assumed to repaid at the age of fifty, raising the saving 
rate by 2.2 percentage points.  However this smaller rise is part of a general increase in saving 
with age. Both figures suggest high saving in 1999 although we cannot see this in the macro-
economic data.  
 


































































5.3   The United Kingdom 
 
As with Germany we begin our discussion with the issue of income uncertainty. This is followed 
by an analysis of the determinants of normal income and of the influences on the savings ratio. 
We conclude with a presentation of the fitted savings ratios for three types of household at 
different income levels.  
 
5.3.1 Income  Uncertainty 
 
We measure income volatility by looking as the variance of  the annual change in the real income 
per effective household member calculated over the period for which we have panel data, 1996-
2002. Since we can also observe household characteristics from the British Household Panel 
Survey, this allows us to estimate an equation explaining variance in terms of these socio-
economic characteristics.  
Table 50 indicates results from the estimation of equation (4). We find that volatility depends on 
average income over the period for which the income forecasting model was estimated. It also 
depends on the average over the period of a dummy which takes a value 1 if a household is " in 
poverty" , i.e. has an income after adjusting for household size below 60% of the median size-
adjusted household income. This term implies a marked non-linearity in the relationship between 
income and income uncertainty. That there should be some sort of non-linearity of this type is not 
in itself very surprising. State benefits are usually a substantial source of income for people with 
low incomes and these are bound to be more stable than employment income. Unlike 






Table 50:       Determinants of Income Uncertainty, United Kingdom 
Unrestricted Restricted Dependent Variable is 
Variance of Growth of Real 
Income per Household 
Member  Coefficient Z Coefficient Z
Log Y  0.086 3.450 0.097 4.110
Poverty  0.310 7.920 0.319 8.230
Degree  0.029 1.430  
Constant  -0.383 -2.880 -0.438 -3.430
R
2  0.072 0.071   
Standard Error  0.220  0.220  
Test of Restriction  F(  1,   983)  2.050P=15.3%   
Mean Dependent Variable  0.118 
 
Variable definitions: The dependent variable is the variance of the growth rate of real disposable income per 
effective household member over the period 1996-2002. Y is net real disposable income per effective household 
member. Poverty is a dummy which takes 1 if the size-adjusted household income is less than 60% of the median and 
0 otherwise. Degree takes a value of 1 if the household head has a degree and 0 otherwise. The equation is estimated 
for 987 households with comprehensive records in the British Household Panel Survey. Explanatory variables are 
averages for the period 1996-2002.   
 
 
5.3.2   Normal Income 
 
Our normal income equations are estimated from the Family Expenditure Survey data which we 
also use to estimate saving. Our sample includes 19632 households with heads aged 64 or 
younger pooled from the 1997, 1999, 2001 and 2003 surveys. The determinants of income in 
table 51 are age marital status of the head of household, family size and age at which full time 
education was completed. We have also included interactive terms, computing the product of 
various indicators with age. This is so because the effects of these variables on normal income 
may be functions of age. We also include the square value of age to capture the hump-shaped 
behaviour of household earnings. Following Mincer (1974) we expect age to have a positive 
effect on household income and age squared a negative effect. We include time dummies to 
reflect the fact that real incomes tend to rise over time. However, since we aim to produce a 
picture of long-run normal incomes we do not look for interactions between time dummies and 
the other variables present in the equations. 
 
Table 51 presents results from OLS income regressions. All parameters are consistent and the 
standard are computed using White's variance covariance matrix robust to heteroscedasticity. In 
the restricted equation we find that income is increasing in the age of the household head but 
decreasing in the square of the age of the household head, consistent with Mincer (1974). Not 
surprising the effect of size is negative; large households have lower incomes per member. A 
degree raises income by 34% relative to the rest of the population, but there is also an interactive 
effect with age; the value of a degree is greater for old than for young people. Home owners have 
incomes substantially higher than those who do not own their own houses. 
 
The time dummies point to rapid real income growth between 1999 and 2001 but an overall 
growth rate of real income between 1997 and 2003 of 2.3% p.a. which is consistent with the 
macro-economic picture.  
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Table 51:        Determinants of Normal Income: United Kingdom 
   Dependent variable is  Log Real Household  
Income per person  Coefficient Z Coefficient  Z





Age>=65  -0.016 -9.060 -0.016  -9.180
(Age>=65)
 2  2.420×10
-4 8.710 2.398×10
-4 8.830
Married  0.835 24.520 0.840  25.800
Divorce  -0.087 -2.040 -0.069  -5.560
Education  0.001 0.300    
Hown  0.591 23.010 0.596  24.510
Mortgage  0.000 0.460    
Size  -1.393 -29.860 -1.395  -30.050
Age×Married  -0.011 -17.230 -0.011  -18.010
Age×Divorce  3.577×10




Age×Size  0.020 20.810 0.020  20.890




Degree  0.307 21.060 0.308  22.170
Time97  -0.135 -13.640 -0.135  -13.680
Time99  -0.107 -10.980 -0.107  -11.000
Time01  -0.038 -3.950 -0.039  -3.960
Constant  -0.478 -6.400 -0.460  -8.210
R
2  0.309 0.309   
Standard Error  0.561  0.561  
F(3,26499) 0.160     
No Obs  26520     
 
Variable definitions: The dependent variable is the log of real household disposable income per effective household 
member; Hown indicates home owners; Size indicates log family size; Morg denotes home owners with mortgages; 
Age indicates the age of the head of the household; Education, age at which household head finished full-time 
education. The equation was estimated on pooled data from the Family Expenditure Surveys in 1997,. 1999, 2001 
and 2003, with 26520 households in the sample.  The F-test compares the restricted and unrestricted models. The 
coefficients presented here show the effects of age on income. The equation included dummy variables for home 
ownership, marital status (married divorced or widowed with single as reference), a degree and the presence of a 
mortgage. Time dummies were also included.  Product terms were also included to identify interactions and the 
effects of age working through these is shown here. Only the mortgage dummy was statistically insignificant at a 5% 
level and the F-test is shown for the zero restriction on this; the mortgage dummy is suppressed in the restricted 
equation. 
 
5.3.3   Determinants of Savings 
 
Saving behaviour is studied using the same data sets involved in the calculation of normal 
income. However, in order to avoid the influence of outliers on the regression, we exclude those 
households whose saving ratio lies outside the interval [-0.5,0.5]. As a result the estimated 
equations include 20,785 households. There is obviously the risk that households used in the 
regression may not be representative of the population as a whole. We address the problem of 
selectivity bias following Heckman (1976). We estimate a probit equation where the independent 
variable is an indicator function that take the value of one when the household is included in the  
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initial sample and zero otherwise. Table 52 presents a restricted form of the probit equation used 
to construct the inverse Mills ratio. The coefficients of probit equation show the probability that 
any of the households of initial sample provides a full usable record with the data of saving ratio 
smaller in absolute terms than 0.5.  
 
 
Table 52:   Sample selection (probit) equations to explain whether households have 
savings rates within the ratio [-0.5 0.5]: United Kingdom 
Dependent Variable is 1 if Household Savings 
Ratio lies in interval [-0.5, 0.5], 0 otherwise  Coefficient Z
Log Y  0.722 17.770
Log Y x Time03  -0.042 -7.110
Age 20-24  0.273 2.000
Age 25-29  0.552 4.090
Age 30-34  0.674 4.890
Age 35-39  0.889 6.180
Age 40-44  1.008 6.620
Age 45-49  1.175 7.210
Age 50-54  1.281 7.320
Age 55-59  1.473 7.820
Age 60-64  1.655 8.200
Age 65-69  1.964 9.090
Age 70-74  2.156 9.370
Age >=75  2.286 9.030
Married  -0.381 -4.740
Married×Time03  0.054 0.560
Divorced  -0.250 -2.330
AgexMarried  0.006 4.930
Age× Married×Time03  0.003 1.510
Age×Divorced  0.006 2.810
Age×Y  -0.009 -13.700
Degree  -0.234 -8.290
σ²  -2.209 -9.480
Age × σ²  0.035 8.210
Constant -1.764 -9.150
 
Variable definitions: The dependent variable takes the value 1 if the household's saving ratio lies between -0.5 and 
0.5 and zero otherwise; Y denotes the actual household's income deflated by the consumption deflator; σ² denotes 
income uncertainty computed by Equation 6; Degree=1 if the household head left full time education after the age of 
20 Time03 denotes a time dummy for 2003. Age 20-24 to Age>= 75 are dummy variables indicating the age band 
appropriate to the household head.  Age indicates actual  age of the household head. Married, Divorced indicate 
martial status of the household head. σ
2 indicates the fitted variance of household income. The equation was 
estimated on 26512 households from the pooled Family Expenditure Surveys for 1997, 1999, 2001 and 2003.  
 
 
Table 53 shows the effect of income uncertainty in an equation which explains overall saving. 
We present results both from an unrestricted model and a model where insignificant variables are 
excluded on the basis of a χ
2 test. It is worth noting that in contrast to Miles (1997) whose 
empirical results based on regressions for each individual year we have pooled the data from four 
nonconsecutive waves in 1997, 1999, 2001 and 2003. Inclusion of time dummies both on their  
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own and multiplying key variables allows us to explore whether there have been time effects 
present and thus to identify whether there have been changes in behaviour such as those which 
might arise from reduced confidence about pension schemes over the period considered. An F-
Test can be used to test whether any or all of these. 
 
We have employed an instrumental variable regression to address the fact that normal income 
and income uncertainty are generated regressors. We use dummies for marital status and  (years 
of) education in 1999, 2001 and 2003 as instruments. Note these dummies have not been used in 
the estimation of normal income. 
 
Table 53 shows that income uncertainty enters with a positive coefficient. However, we note that 
the variance of income depends positively on the poverty dummy as well as on income, while the 
savings ratio depends positively on the fitted variance of income and negatively on the poverty 
dummy. This non-linearity makes the interpretation of the effects of income difficult. The 
problem of interpretation is further augmented by the fact that the savings rate depends positively 
on the (log) ratio of income to normal income
21 but negatively on the square of this minus 1. As 
we have noted above, other authors have interpreted this as an uncertainty effect; it is difficult to 
give it any other interpretation.  
 
Home-owners tend to save less than other people, taking their educational status and income 
uncertainty as given. However, rather surprisingly, we see that whether they have a mortgage or 
not has little overall impact.  
 
Table 53:       Determinants of the Savings Ratio – United Kingdom 
Unrestricted Restricted  Dependent Variable is 
Household Saving Ratio  Coefficient Z Coefficient Z 
Σ²  4.760 1.36 3.454 5.540 
Log Y  -0.069 -0.48  





Log YP ×97  0.027 0.46  
Log YP ×99  0.031 0.44  
Log YP ×01  0.036 0.53  
LogY/YP ×97  -0.019 -0.51  
LogY/YP ×99  -0.016 -0.49  
LogY/YP ×01  0.011 0.27  
Age 20-24  -0.017 -0.32  
Age 25-29  0.034 0.49 0.055 3.100 
Age 30-34  0.041 0.49 0.066 3.560 
Age 35-39  0.032 0.32 0.060 2.960 
Age 40-44  0.036 0.33 0.066 3.110 
Age 45-49  0.037 0.31 0.069 3.080 
Age 50-54  0.030 0.25 0.063 2.600 
Age 55-59  0.044 0.35 0.080 2.880 
Age 60-64  0.042 0.31 0.083 2.570 
Age 65-69  0.050 0.35 0.093 2.480 
Age 70-74  0.079 0.54 0.123 3.000 
Age >=75  0.111 0.74 0.158 3.350 
                                                 
21 Although this term is not statistically significant in the restricted equation we could not accept that it had a zero 
coefficient when testing the overall set of restrictions.  
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Employed  -0.063 -1.5 -0.063 -7.610 
Employed×97  0.013 0.22  
Employed×99  0.001 0.01  
Emplyed×01  -0.020 -0.33  
Degree  0.009 0.46  
Degree ×97  -0.012 -0.65  
Degree ×99  -0.007 -0.41  
Degree ×01  -0.010 -0.54  
Married  -0.156 -0.88 -0.163 -2.350 
Maried×97  0.047 0.55 0.083 2.770 
Married×99  0.067 0.86 0.051 1.810 
Married×011  0.014 0.16 0.024 0.890 
Age×Mar  0.003 1.18 0.002 2.100 
Age×Married×97  -0.001 -1.55 -0.001 -1.960 
Age×Married×99  -0.002 -1.99 -0.001 -1.880 
Age×Married×01  -0.001 -0.63 1.640×10
-5 0.030 
Age× Degree  -2.339×10
-4 -1.97 -2.176×10
-4 -3.500 
Age× Degree× 97  9.400×10
-5 1.92 6.070×10
-5 2.910 
Age× Degree ×99  1.584×10
-4 2.96 6.800×10
-5 3.620 
Age× Degree ×01  3.750×10
-5 0.73 3.400×10
-6 0.200 
Size  0.433 0.85 0.311 2.160 
Age×Size  -0.005 -1.32 -0.004 -2.900 
Age×Size×97  2.040E-05 0.02 -0.001 -2.270 
Age×Size×99  4.601E-04 0.31 -3.756E-04 -0.820 
Age×Size×01  -0.001 -0.56 -0.001 -2.470 
Time97  0.114 0.49  
Time99  -0.038 -0.28  
Time01  0.054 0.29  
Age x σ²  0.004 1.07 0.003 2.010 
Hown  -0.083 -1.29 -0.078 -3.610 
Mortgage  -3.970E-04 -0.95 -0.001 -3.770 
Poverty  -1.548 -1.43 -1.123 -6.130 
λ  0.320 2.9 0.316 6.840 
Constant  -0.286 -1.27 -0.237 -7.640 
R
2  0.157   
Standard Error  0.305     
F(18, 20713)  1.010     
 
Variable definition: The dependent variable is saving divided by income. σ² denotes income uncertainty computed by 
equation 6; Y denotes the actual household's income deflated by the consumption deflator; 
^
p Y  denotes normal 
income; σ² denotes income uncertainty computed by Equation 6; Degree=1 if the household head left full time 
education after the age of 20 Time03 denotes a time dummy for 2003. Age 20-24 to Age>= 75 are dummy variables 
indicating the age band appropriate to the household head.  Age indicates actual  age of the household head. 
Married, Divorced indicate martial status of the household head. σ
2 indicates the fitted variance of household 
income. The equation was estimated on 26512 households from the pooled Family Expenditure Surveys for 1997, 
1999, 2001 and 2003. Size is the size of the household calculated using McClement’s scale before housing costs.    
Poverty denotes dummy indicating size-adjusted income below 60% of median; λ denotes the Mills' ratio computed 
by a probit estimation in table 52;. Time dummies for 1997, 1999 and 2001 were also included.  There were 20785 
households in the sample with savings ratios in the range -0.5 to 0.5. The unrestricted equation included an 
additional 21 variables representing the level of education, the level of normal income and interactive terms between 
key variables.    
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The equation shown in table 53 allows us to work out savings profiles for particular families as a 
function of age. As with the other countries, we look at a household consisting of a couple. They 
acquire two children at age 30 and the children leave home when the parents reach the age of 
fifty. The first household we consider lives with the average income of a household in its age 
group whose income, after adjusting for family size, is below 60% of overall median income.  
The head of this household is assumed not to be a home owner and also not to be a graduate. By 
definition the household  lives in poverty. 
 
The second household has the same family size but is a home owner from the age of 25 and has 
an income equal to the mean of households in each age group with incomes between 60% and 
140% of the overall  median after adjusting for family size. The third household has a head who 
is a graduate and also owns its own house beyond the age of 27. Its income is the mean of that of 
households  in its age group with incomes greater than 140% of the population median. 
 
In figure 48 we show the savings profile of our first  household, with income below 60% of the 
median. We can see that such a household typically dissaves while its head is of working age, but  
becomes a saver once its head has retired. The equation generates high savings rates for old 
people, although we have already noted some reservations about the data which underpin this part 
of the model. The slope of the line is steep; however further investigation of the data (by the 
introduction of specific age dummies for households in poverty confirmed the existence of a 
powerful age trend for the saving behaviour of households with incomes below 60% of the 
median. An obvious reason why young households may dissave more than old households when 
their incomes are in this band is that they have more hope of higher income in the future. Indeed 
a general finding is that most households with incomes below sixty per cent of median do not 
experience such low incomes for very long. Mitchell, Mouratidis and Weale, (2005) found that, 
between 1991 and 2002 35% of households headed by people of working age had an income 
below the 60% threshold in at least one year but fewer than 5% had incomes below the threshold 
for nine or more years.  
 
Figure 48: Fitted Savings Ratio – United Kingdom. Representative Family with Income < 






























In figure 49 we show the savings profile for a middling household. This again shows low saving 
by young people (despite the fact that the youngest households are assumed not to be home 
owners which tends to raise their savings rates) followed by a reasonably stable saving pattern in 
middle age and then once again saving rising among households headed by people over seventy. 
An implication of the low saving by young people is that, even though their incomes are those of 
the mean of the middling group, they nevertheless look forward to higher incomes in the future. 
Obviously there is less room for rises by people in this group than there is for those with incomes 
below 60% of the median. 
 
It is difficult to attach any importance to the positions of the curves in different years. As we have 
noted earlier, the 2003 survey shows high saving at most age groups although the aggregate data 
show 1997 as the year with high saving. 
 
Figure 49: Fitted Savings Ratio – United Kingdom. Representative Family with Income 






























Finally we look at the savings behaviour of a household whose income is more than 140% of the 
median and which accrues the average income of households in its age group and in this income 
category, with income measured after adjustment for family size. We could not estimate the 
equation for the youngest age group for two of the years because there were no households in this 
income category and therefore it was not possible to work out a mean income. The pattern shown 
in figure 50 is very similar to that of figure 49 although the position of the curves is generally 
higher reflecting the way in which saving rate rises with income. Given the UK equation this 
effect arises, as we have noted earlier, almost entirely through the effects of income on income 
uncertainty.  
 
The low saving of young people once again deserves comment. People in this income band are, if 
there is any degree of regression to the mean, more likely to see their incomes fall than rise. It is 
hard to imagine that dissaving simply on grounds of youth is a rational decision. On the other 
hand the number of young households in this income band is very small (and none at all for two 
of the years) and the equation may not be at its best when describing this part of the population.   
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Figure 50: Fitted Savings Ratio – United Kingdom. Representative Family with Income 





























The general findings from the United Kingdom are that saving rises with income, although the 
effects are driving through the link between income and income variance. The fact that the 
equation for income variance includes a dummy for poverty in some sense creates the need for 
one in the saving equation as well. A reasonable conclusion, given figure 48 is that further work 
remains to be done on the saving habits of people on low incomes in the United Kingdom but it is 
unlikely that this has a great impact on overall saving, simply because only a small proportion of 
income accrues to people in poverty. We also find, in contrast to the figures for Spain and 
Germany that saving by young people is low. Analysis of the micro data does not provide a clue 
as to the decline in the aggregate savings ratio between 1997 and 2003 because this decline does 





The general pattern provided by the saving equations is complex and in order to carry out a 
proper analysis of how various factors have influenced saving behaviour over time it would be 
best to incorporate them into a micro-simulation model. This would allow one to look at the fitted 
values of savings for households evolving, in their income and demographic characteristics in a 
realistic way over time. We can nevertheless draw some conclusions from a combination of the 
regression equations and the plots of the micro-economic aggregates in section 2.  
 
First and perhaps most importantly the data shed some light on what has been happening in 
Germany, when the aggregate savings ratio rose slightly between 1998 and 2003. There we can 
see from figures 16 and 17 that saving by households on middling and high incomes rose 
between these two years, with the effect being particularly marked among young households on 
high incomes. In our simulations this effect is also present  among households with high incomes. 
Such households can have a disproportionate influence on overall saving. The impression created 
from the fitted equations is that young people in Germany have a high savings ratio and this is  
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probably what lies behind the overall savings ratio which has to be described as high given that 
the pension scheme is not funded.  
 
Another aspect of the same rise in savings rates is that savings rates of employed households in 
their thirties have risen. This is unlikely to be a consequence of life-cycle saving which tends to 
take place closer to retirement. However it may be precautionary saving associated with a fear of 
unemployment. It is not possible to assess whether that is in fact the case because we cannot 
observe fears from the available data. However further study would make it possible to assess 
unemployment risk as influenced by economic and demographic variables and to establish 
whether a latent variable describing this had any influence on saving behaviour. Even if this is 
not the case it is of course possible that fear of unemployment may still drive saving.  
 
An effect which emerges very clearly from the German data- which are of the highest quality of 
the three countries we studied both because the sample sizes are large and because the income 
questions are very methodical- is that an important influence on the pattern of aggregate saving 
by age is the composition of the population. Saving as a function of income may not change very 
much with age, but if people tend to move through income categories aggregate saving will be 
affected. This can be seen in by comparing figure 14 with figures 16 and 17. Once again it points 
to the importance of looking at the implications of this in the context of a micro-simulation 
model. 
 
Less important, but interesting nevertheless is the fact that employed households save more than 
non-employed households even after adjusting for income. This may again indicate saving driven 
by fear of unemployment. 
 
The pattern for Spain and the United Kingdom is less clear. In neither case can we match the 
movements in the micro-data to movements in the macro-economic aggregates. For both 
countries and particularly for Spain the patterns shown in section 2 are much more volatile than 
are those for Germany. This results from much smaller samples and, in the case of Spain a survey 
which is much more focused on collecting consumption than income data. However the overall 
Spanish data in figure 25 given an impression of high saving by young households but declining 
with age unlike Germany where it is increasing with age. Simulating the results of the regression 
equations, particularly for low and middle income households in figures 45 and 46 re-inforces 
this impression and this may be a factor behind Spain’s high overall savings rate.  
 
The United Kingdom offers a contrast to this continental picture of high saving by young people. 
The data in figure 36 indicate a saving rate which rises up to the age of thirty at least with further 
rises up to the age of fifty or later. The simulations present this picture rather more strongly, with 
low saving by young people and even those on high incomes.  Unless young people on high 
incomes expect further relative increases with the passage of time it is unlikely that the low 
savings rates can be attributed to life cycle effects; they are more probably an indication of a 
credit culture which has depressed saving in the United Kingdom for a long period.  
 
We explored the effects of income uncertainty in all three countries using the measures which 
were available. We found a strong positive influence of income uncertainty on saving in the 
United Kingdom. In Germany we did not identify a significant effect. In Spain, where the only 
indicator of income uncertainty was constructed from the ratio of actual to normal income, the 
variable entered the equation with the wrong sign. It is impossible to say whether exploration of 
alternative measures of uncertainty would shed further light on this.  
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Finally we should note that the pattern we have identified here is coherent with the findings from 
the macro-economic analysis that in Germany and to a lesser extent in Spain consumption is 
depressed when the proportion of young people in the population is high. The United Kingdom 
does not experience this and the difference between the United Kingdom and Germany in the 
behaviour of  young households is likely to be one of the factors explaining why saving is higher 
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8 Appendix:  Data 
In this appendix we discuss our data sources.  
 
In this appendix we show the number of households whose savings rate falls within the range -0.5 
to 0.5 in each age group. It is clear that the German surveys are run on a scale much larger than 
those used in Spain and the United Kingdom. 
 
8.1 Germany 
The main data bases for the analysis are two waves of the German income and expenditure 
survey (Einkommens- und Verbrauchsstichprobe, EVS) for the years 1998 and 2003. The EVS is 
collected every five years and includes extensive information on household characteristics 
(general socio-demographic characteristics, income, expenditures, household wealth) as well as 
separate information on the individuals in the household. Households report on income and 
expenditures for a quarter of a year. The sample in each quarter is of nearly equal size. About 
50,000 households have participated in the 1998 survey. Currently, the data for the year 2003 are 
available only for the first two quarters with about 26,000 participating households. The survey is 
conducted by the German Federal Statistical Office. Scientific use files are available for 
researchers. 
 
The survey focuses on a detailed recording of income from different sources (wage income, 
investment income, ... ) as well as the recording of expenditures. Income from the withdrawal of 
savings and expenditures for the accumulation of savings are recorded in detail. Expenditures on 
consumption goods are reported for a large number of consumer good categories including 
imputed rents for owner occupied housing. 1998 data in money values are converted to 2003 
prices. 
 
In addition to the EVS, we use the data of the German Socio Economic Panel (SOEP) for the 
years 1996 to 2003 to analyze the variance of income of households over time. The German 
Socio-Economic Panel is a representative longitudinal study of private households in Germany 
and is operated by DIW, Berlin. The panel started in West-Germany in the year 1984 with 5,921 
households containing 12,290 respondents and in the year 1990 for East Germany with 2,179 
households and 4,453 respondents. Since the start, the sample was refreshed drawing additional 
households and also extended for a better coverage of specific household groups such as 
immigrants and households with very high income. The data set covers a huge number of socio-
demographic characteristics of the household as well the household members. Among these 
characteristics is also net household income. The analysis of the German data is applied to the 
whole survey population. 
 
To assess the factors which may explain the degree of income uncertainty of households 
identified in the SOEP, we use the information on actual monthly net household income which is 
collected directly in the questionnaire. It is defined as gross household income including public 
transfers minus taxes and social security contributions. 
 
Our analysis of savings behaviour was conducted using the EVS. Variable definitions
22 were 
                                                 
22Disposable Income and Saving are defined as:  
  Gross labour income (employees) (not including contributions of employers to social security, including  
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chosen to be as close as possible to the definitions used for Spain and the United Kingdom. It 
should be noted that imputed income for owner-occupied housing is not included in the gross 
income of the household and thus not in the disposable income. Monetary variables are deflated 
to 1998 prices using the consumer expenditure deflator. The number of households with saving 
lying in the range -0.5 to 0.5 is shown in table 54 classified by age of the household head. 
 
Both German surveys are available only to authorized researchers. 
 
















                                                                                                                                                              
grants from employers to certain private savings plans, but not including employer contributions to occupational 
pension schemes)  
 + Gross self-employment earnings  
 + Investment income (imputed income for owner-occupied housing not included)  
 + Public transfers  
  + Private Transfers (from private insurance companies, unions, private non-profit organizations, other 
households, occupational pensions)  
 + Subletting  
 = Gross Income  
 - Taxes and social security contributions  
 = Net Income  
 + income from selling goods (used or produced in the household, including jewelry), refunds for goods, 
reimbursements for example from insurance companies, specific benefits from private insurance companies (not 
included in " private transfers" ), other kinds of income (for example lottery proceeds)  
 = Disposable Income 
- private consumption: consumption including durables 
- " other expenses" : contributions to private insurance companies (with some minor exceptions insurance 
with no capital building), transfers to other private households and organizations, voluntary contributions to the 
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8.2 Spain 
The Spanish Encuesta Continua de Presupuestos Familiares, ECPF, has, as its name implies, run 
continuously since 1998 with the data available up to 2003. It provides information on 
households' income and expenditure and is, in principal, a panel survey with households taking 
part for eight quarters. However we were unable to link the panel in the time available during this 
project, and we were obliged to treat it as a cross-sectional survey. In each quarter the survey 
contains up to 8000 households; over the period 1998-2003 we have in total  about 165,000 
records.  
 
It is plain that the main purpose of the ECPF is to measure expenditure; the survey gives the 
impression that the income data are used mainly to categorize households rather than to provide a 
firm basis of the relationship between income and expenditure. Households are nevertheless 
asked whether they receive income from a variety of sources and also to provide a figure for their 
monthly income. The components of income underlying this total are not spelled out in the 
questionnaire. Perhaps because the focus of the survey is on expenditure rather than income the 
majority of households do not report their incomes. Out of the 165,000 records only about 25,000 
contain usable income data. 
 
The overall total for expenditure includes imputed rent. However the aggregated file also shows 
the percentage of total expenditure which has been imputed and we calculate and then deduct the 
imputation in order to use a figure for cash expenditure which we compare with cash income. The 
survey provides only summary information on income. Real income is calculated by dividing 
nominal income by the consumer price index for the year in question. The age of the household 
head is specified but not for other household members. We are simply told to which age bands 
they belong. We assume that the people concerned have the ages given by the mid-points of the 
bands in order to calculate the effective household size based on the McClements scale. The 
Spanish survey is publicly available from INE. 
 




Table 55:   Number of Households by Age – Spain 
Age  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
<24  15 16 17 17 17
25-29  89 66 63 54 66
30-34  183 155 125 136 170
35-39  290 250 241 255 239
40-44  268 244 243 237 313
45-49  250 214 205 214 241
50-54  212 196 172 214 244
55-59  196 175 214 258 270
60-64  354 261 244 234 249
65-69  463 413 399 417 417
70-74  474 418 397 445 440
75+  694 742 740 725 797
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8.3 United  Kingdom 
The United Kingdom Family Expenditure Survey
23, FES, is conducted annually; we have studied 
1997, 1999, 2001 and 2003. It provides data on household income and expenditure. We estimate 
savings functions from the income and expenditure data provided by a pooled sample of  26512 
households in four years of the Family Expenditure Survey mentioned above. We define income 
as net cash income excluding imputations, with imputations similarly excluded from expenditure. 
Real income is calculated by dividing nominal income by the consumer price index for the year 
in question. Household net income represents the gross weekly household earnings minus taxes 
and superannuation contributions while total expenditure includes housing maintenance, central 
heating, net rent, council taxes, water etc.  The number of households in the pooled sample with 
income in the range -0.5 to 0.5 is shown, classified by age in table 56. 
 
The data we use to calculate income variance cover the period 1996-2002 and relate to 987 
households with complete records for this period in the British Household Panel Survey. We look 
at the uncertainty of income adjusted for household size; household income is divided by an 
indicator of size constructed from the McClements scale.  All monetary data are converted to 
2000 prices using the consumer expenditure deflator.  
 
The UK surveys are available only to approved researchers.  
 
Table 56:   Number of Households by Age – UK Surveys 
Age  1997 1999 2001 2003
<=24  201 75 80 46
25-29  455 412 373 303
30-34  602 552 552 507
35-39  535 603 580 568
40-44  492 503 496 585
45-49  496 475 496 496
50-54  405 448 503 465
55-59  323 409 376 441
60-64  309 350 343 375
65-69  353 356 370 423
70-74  387 364 360 387






                                                 
23This was combined with the National Food Survey to become the Expenditure and Food Survey in 2002 